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ABSTRACT
Montesquieu and Early Liberal Thought:
The Dilemma of the Citizen in the Modern State
September 1981
Stephen J. Rosow, B.A., Columbia University
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Jerome King
This study probes the origins of the modern theory
of citizenship through a reint erpretat ion of the works
of Montesquieu. I interpret Montesquieu as a 'conser-
vative-liberal' who shares the fundamental assumptions
of the liberal theory as it had developed in the late
sixteenth through the early eighteenth centuries while
distinguishing himself from the Lockean tradition. I
examine Montesquieu's theory of citizenship in his two
major works, The Persian Letters and The Spirit of the
Laws through an analysis of Montesquieu's own view of
the context of his thought. I develop his reading of
the eighteenth century context through an analysis of
Montesquieu's theory of human nature and his theory of
history* as well as through an analysis of the way in
which liberal theory prior to Montesquieu, formulated
the theory of citizenship. The fundamental concern of
vi
Montesquieu's theory, I argue, is how can individuals,
whose self-interested private action is considered the
primary legitimate sphere of action, act to produce the
public good. Montesquieu solves this dilemma by devel-
oping the primacy of a public but non-political sphere
of action, described by 'moeurs' and 'manieres, ' which
is made consistent with the needs of the state through
the conception of the "general spirit" which universal-
izes the particular elements of the social life and tra-
dition of a particular nation. The dissertation con-
cludes by drawing out the implications of my interpre-
tation of Montesquieu for a contemporary critical theory
of citizenship.
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INTRODUCTION
The question I want to investigate in this disser-
tation has both historical and contemporary relevance.
I am interested in understanding the conception of cit-
izenship, the relation between ruler and ruled, which
governs the self -interpret at ion of citizens in the mod-
ern state. The contemporary debate among social and
political theorists about the nature of the contemporary
state lacks an adequate understanding of the historical
development of the liberal theory within which individ-
uals define their public roles. By returning to the
historical roots of that theory and probing its philo-
sophical presuppositions I hope to begin to supply a
historical dimension lacking in current theories.
My choice of Montesquieu as a subject of inquiry
is rooted in my understanding of 'liberalism'. I follow
what I take to be two senses in which we currently use
the term. In the larger sense we use it to describe the
general or 'total'"*" theory which historically fed the
bourgeoisie's rise to power during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries and legitimated capitalist social
relations.^ This theory involves crucial assumptions
about the nature of man as an autonomous individual who
1
2acts more out of self-interest and passion than out of
reason and the public good. I will argue in Chapter
Three that with regard to a theory of citizenship, lib-
eral theory in this general sense rests upon a theory
of political knowledge which polarizes the knowledge
necessary to the citizen and that necessary to the
ruler. Further, the general theory assumes that a
stable political order can only result from the media-
tion between private interests and the public interest
by an autonomous 'civil society' which is public but
not political.
In a more narrow sense we use the term 'liberal-
ism' to refer to a particular tradition within bourgeois
ideology developing out of Lockean social contract
theory with its particular defense of private property,
the market and the minimal state. However, in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries another tradition
emerges within the general theory of liberalism, accept-
ing its fundamental presuppositions, which reaches dif-
ferent conclusions about the nature and role of the
state from those of the Lockean tradition. It is this
tradition, which might be called 'conservative-liberal-
ism,'"^ which Montesquieu initiates and which I want
to investigate. In the conclusion I will show how in-
vestigating this strain of the liberal tradition sheds
new light on the contemporary dilemma of the liberal
citizen.
The central problem which the liberal theory of
the citizen seeks to solve is: given a conception of
individuals as autonomous actors whose pursuit of self-
interest is necessary and legitimate as the primary
sphere of action, how can self-interested action be
made, or make itself, consistent with the public inter-
est? It seems to me that this question crosses the
historical horizons of both eighteenth century political
thought and contemporary thought. In the conclusion I
will suggest reasons why I believe current liberal
society is unable to solve this dilemma and how the
study of Montesquieu broadens our own historical hori-
zons by opening up new possibilities. The institutions
created with primary reference to the Lockean tradition
seem to me able to sustain only a weak and contradictory
notion of citizenship.
In this context there are two general reasons for
focusing this study on Montesquieu. The first, which I
have already mentioned, is that the strain of liberalism
which he initiates provides a different view of the
dilemma of the citizen. The Lockean tradition argues
that the institution of private property along with the
market can successfully transform private interests into
4the public interest. The classical formulation of this
argument is in the political economy of the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries and has spawned a long
development. It is still a strong component of the
current debate. The tradition deriving from Montesquieu
attempts a different solution. Rather than insisting
that the market serve this mediating function, 'conser-
vative-liberals' assign that role to a particular na-
tional spirit and tradition. I will try to show in the
course of this study that this view leads Montesquieu
to highlight different facets of the problem of the
citizen which tend to be overlooked in the current
debate and which might inform possible solutions. The
tradition that develops out of Montesquieu allows us to
locate possibilities for restructuring current social
and political institutions in order to promote a fuller
notion of citizenship and civic virtue.
The second reason for concentrating on Montesquieu
is that his theory provides a more complete view of the
early modern state than any other. His work seems to
me the culmination of the various historical traditions
that lend support to an early theory of the modern
state. His theory combines Natural Law theory developed
by Pufendorf and Grotius together with the individualism
of both Lockean epistemology and French moral theory.
5Understanding the synthesis which his work attempts can
tell us much both about the early modern state and about
the structure of liberal thought.
The study of Montesquieu is in two parts. The
first develops the context of Montesquieu's theory of
the citizen through his own eyes. This section of the
dissertation makea two arguments: that the philosophi-
cal grounding of Montesquieu's theory must be sought in
"his theories of man and history, and second, that his
theory must be seen to emerge out of the historical con-
text as Montesquieu himself could have conceived it.
Hence the first chapter develops Montesquieu's theory
of man as a moral theory which he constructed as a basis
for a theory of history which could mediate between the
empiricist and rationalist methods available in the
early and middle eighteenth century. The key notion of
this attempted synthesis of competing methods is
Montesquieu's conceptualization of historical law and
causation. I argue that the idea of developmental his-
tory which guides this theory is central to his attempt
to use the spirit of the law and tradition to solve the
dilemma of the liberal theory of the citizen.
Chapter Two develops Montesquieu's use of his
theory of history in order to delineate the context
in
which an adequate theory of the modern state could
6emerge. For Montesquieu an adequate political theory
had to grow out of an understanding of the European
state system. Many of his major arguments were devel-
oped first in works on what we would now call interna-
tional politics— "Considerations sur les Richesses de
L'Espagne," "Reflexions sur la Monarchie Universelle en
Europe, " and "Considerations sur les Causes de la Gran-
deur des Romains." Montesquieu borrowed freely from
these works in De L' Esprit des Lois and it is essential
to understand the political context they sought to
describe. Crucial to his theory of citizenship
Montesquieu's study of international politics led him
to recognize the need for new forms of political action
based upon the free movement of goods across borders
and for a reinterpretat ion of the classical model of a
republic as a commercial republic.
The third chapter sets a bridge between Parts I and
II of the dissertation. In it I develop the philosoph-
ical presuppositions of the liberal theory of citizen-
ship which developed in the late sixteenth through mid-
seventeenth centuries. The chapter first traces Bodin's
critique of Aristotle's definition of citizenship, argu-
ing in its place that the life of the citizen can be
properly understood only in terms of the opposition of
public and private life. Next I develop Montaigne's
7theory of the self and lastly the theory of political
knowledge in Bacon and Hobbes which polarizes the knowl-
edge of the citizen and that of ruler.
Part II of the dissertation is divided simply into
two chapters, the first dealing with the theory of the
citizen in the Lettres Persanes and the second with that
of De L' Esprit des Lois . I have dealt with these sep-
arately mainly because they seem to me to be radically
different works which Montesquieu wrote with radically
different purposes in mind. By this I do not mean to
imply that the theories which emerge out of the differ-
ent works do not have similarities. Indeed, in Chapter
Five on De L'Esprit des Lois , I try to show that the
questions and issues raised by the earlier work became
central to the latter work. But despite similarities I
think it is misleading to treat both works as involved
in a unified and consistent theory.
My interpretation of the Lettres Persanes is based
upon the reading of the story as a novel, as a coherent
piece of fiction rather than as a series of disparate
and only tangent ially related vignettes about the French
society and politics of the Regency. This line of
interpretation has begun to be investigated by recent
works by J. Robert Loy and Marshall Berman and my par-
4
ticular interpretation owes much to theirs. The
8fiction of the Lett res Persanes represents a theory of
the citizen as an autonomous individual whose nature is
to strive for freedom and self-expression. The drama
of the harem and the dialectical relation between the
classes of characters (eunuchs and wives; wives and
Usbek; Usbek and eunuchs) depicts the tragedy of self-
destruction that results from the inability of the
political order to allow for free self-expression, the
most extreme form of which is despotism. The need for
political institutions adequate to accomodate self-
expression is carried over as a central theme of the
mature theory of De L'Esprit des Lois .
In the later work Montesquieu seeks to develop a
universal politics which successfully absorbs the self-
interests and needs of the particular elements of the
society. The key to this theory is the concept of
1' esprit general. I argue that this fundamental concept
attempts to unify both the 'subjective' elements of
action, depicted in the Lettres Persanes and embodied
in the mature theory primarily in the notion of the
principle of a form of government, with the objective
element of political institutions embodied in the
famil-
iar constitutionalism of the balance of powers.
The
fundamental synthesis, I argue, is achieved with
some
but not complete success by Montesquieu's
dual notion
9of law as growing out of everyday social relationships
and at the same time enforcing and instilling proper
norms, and by his traditional notion of the spirit of
the constitution as rooted in the fundamental laws of
the kingdom.
CHAPTER I
iMAN AND HISTORY
As is well known. Part I of Leviathan is devoted
to the study of man, that 'matter' and 'artificer' of
the great Leviathan, the 'artificial man ' . ^ This
knowledge is to be gained not by reading books but by
reading into man himself to consider "what he does when
he does think, opine, reason, hope, fear, etc. . . ."
By looking inside himself man will discover what is the
nature of all men: "
. . .he shall thereby read and
know what are the thoughts and passions of all other
men upon the like occasions."^ Hence we can take the
individual mind as a model for all minds; the passions
of men are the same, although their objects may be dif-
ferent. Montesquieu will likewise claim that the
passions of all men are the same everywhere.'^
In the Preface to De L' Esprit des Lois Montesquieu
says: "I began my inquiry by examining men . . ."—
a
curious claim since nowhere in the work, especially at
the beginning, does he explicitly develop a theory of
human nature as did his predecessors like Hobbes who
began with the same claim. Rather, he begins by dis-
tinguishing the nature of the various laws that govern
10
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man's world, giving the reader an analytic tour through
the anatomy of history. However, his claim had already
been fulfilled by his development of a philosophy of
human nature in earlier works, the Lettres Persanes and
the "Essai sur les Causes qui Peuvent Affecter les
Esprits et les Characteres . " If we compare this philos-
ophy of human nature to Hobbes ' abstract individualism
we can see why Montesquieu chose to depart from the
style of his predecessor.
Montesquieu does not follow Hobbes 's procedure
because for him the passions are inextricably linked to
their objects in ways they are not for Hobbes. Man's
spirit can only be known through its involvement in the
historical and cultural world. Whereas Hobbes and Locke
analyzed the human mind in terms of abstract faculties
of thought, Montesquieu looked to a matrix of relation-
ships with the historical world and found resultant
principles of action. From the complex relations of
thought and its objects Montesquieu postulates, in a
manner that is foreign to Hobbes and Locke, a diversity
of human nature according to particular circumstances
demanding not sequential but simultaneous understanding
of man and his environment. Out of this view of human
nature Montesquieu develops a philosophy of history
wherein men can be studied only through an examination
12
of the anatomy of the historical world. This chapter
will be devoted to the theories of man and history that
Montesquieu counterposed to the models established by
Hobbes and Locke.
Montesquieu seeks to explain historical events on
their own terms, to de-mystify their genesis, develop-
ment and demise. He claims to "derive my principles,
not from my prejudices, but from the nature of things."^
Montesquieu's heightened awareness of the historicity
of human action led him to construct a philosophy of
history which could situate contemporary politics* in
order to illuminate both its empirical development and
its theoretical meaning. His theory of citizenship is
a direct result of this philosophy of history.
I. Man as Moral Agent
1. Pessimism as the foundation of the theory of mind
and history . In the Preface to De L' Esprit des Lois
Montesquieu sets out the book's purpose in a pessimistic
but not quite fatalistic tone. He is under no illusion
as to his prospects for success, not even expecting his
work to be given adequate and fair consideration by
most of his readers. Prejudice makes men ignorant
of themselves, and social life is such as to be always
governed by prejudice, except for those men "of such
13
exceptional genius that they can understand everything
about the constitution of a state." Knowledge, no
matter how absolute, has limits. The most complete
enlightenment would still face the prejudices instilled
in life by a particular culture. "The prejudices of
magistrates," he asserts, "originate in those of their
nation." Wise rulers may understand the causes of
evils and the method necessary to correct them, but
they must continually be aware of the evils their new
policies will inevitably engender. Men confront a world
which they can scarcely control, even when they under-
stand its complexities and the depths of its soul.
Their own nature is conceivable only in terms of par-
ticular relations with the particular objects of their
world. Nature is not to be controlled, as optimistic
prophets of progress believed. Rather, Montesquieu's
pessimism about man's ability to control nature, and
his resulting view that man is destined to accomodate
himself to nature, established the tone for his theory
of mind which in turn grounds his theory of history.
In the "Essai sur les Causes qui Peuvent Affecter
les Esprits et les Caracteres," published sometime
prior to De L' Esprit des Lois (the date is uncertain)
Montesquieu seeks to provide a psychological and physi-
ological foundation for a causal theory of explanation
14
in history. in this essay he develops his theory of
mind more fully than elsewhere. His main sources are
Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689) and
the sensationalist psychology which developed from it,
and John Arbuthnot
' s L'Essai sur les Effets de I'Air
(1733). Following Locke, Montesquieu asserts that
initially all ideas derive from sense experience:
An idea, then, is only a sentiment that one
has on the occasion of a sensation that one
has had, a present situation on the occasion
of a past situation.
8
Together with Arbuthnot
' s physiology based upon the
flexibility of nerve fibres, Montesquieu develops a
mechanical view of mental functioning. The brain works
best when it does so out of habit, like the "fingers of
a clavichord player" which "no longer depend on the
9
will." Montesquieu establishes this physiological
theory as the grounding of his theory of climatic deter-
minism. The diversity of types of characters in differ-
ent climates is dependent on various physical causes
(temperature, wind, food) which make the fibres more or
less flexible and moist. Hot climates tend to produce
flexible, active fibres which make people more spirited,
cold climates having the opposite effects. Most types
of characters exist somewhere on a continuum between the
15
extremes. Taken together the various physical causes
prescribe particular characters under particular cir-
cumstances .
But Montesquieu wants to limit the applicability
of Arbuthnot ' s and Locke's paradigm. Human character
is not molded merely by physical causes but primarily
by moral causes. Through the "general education within
the society, ""^^ physical causes give way to moral
causes: "Moral causes form the general character of a
nation more, and decide more of the quality of its
spirit than physical causes . "''"' The idea of moral
causes leads Montesquieu to minimize the machine like
character of the mind, arguing that it is most appro-
priate to non-reflective reflex actions. Instead he
replaces it with a more fluid notion of the mind as a
reflective organ, capable of making autonomous moral
judgments. The mind does not merely rearrange ideas in
order to create more complex ideas. Moral judgments are
a different sort of idea requiring an understanding of
external objects in such a way that men would know how
to respond to them properly. Montesquieu refers to
Locke's sensationalist psychology for different reasons
than his contemporaries. He is not concerned so much
with how the human animal processes sensations, but more
16
With how, through reflection, he mediates between him-
self and the objects in the world, Montesquieu wants
to develop the side of Locke's psychology which eigh-
teenth century philosophes like Condillac and Helvetius
want to expunge, the capacity for reflect ion. ""-^
He is at one with Locke in prizing comparison as
the mind's most important faculty. For Locke, compari-
son remains possible only between simple ideas in the
mind, but for Montesquieu it composes the proper rela-
tion between sensations and their objects. The educa-
tion of the individual consists of two things: "procur-
ing ideas to ourselves;" and "proportioning them to the
just value of things One does not first develop
a set of ideas and then a set of moral rules. Rather,
the acquisition of ideas must have an evaluative con-
tent, ideas must be in 'accurate proportion' to their
objects. The aim of Montesquieu's psychology in the
"Essai" is to discover how men can produce a harmony
between themselves and their world. This harmony is
the key to Montesquieu's conception of the 'good' man:
It is not enough to have many ideas and many
ways of feeling; it is necessary still that
there be a harmony between these ideas and
things. It is foolish to be struck more than
necessary by an object; it is foolish not to
be struck enough.-'-^
17
-e- s
2. Moderationt Mont esquieu's reinterpretat inn nf
Aristotle's Ethics. Montesquieu uses Locke's sensa-
tionalism to develop a moral theory akin to Aristotle
search for the mean between extreme forms of action,
transforming this doctrine into the quest for the proper
relation between the acting subject and his objective
world. For Aristotle, discovery. of the mean produces
the just man who understands his own goodness, knowing
that his intentions are as righteous and just as his
actions; for Montesquieu, moderation produces in the
individual the sense of just proportion, a comfort in
the world which dissolves the antipathy between subject
and object. This idea of proportion is echoed in
Usbek's discussion of justice in Letter Eighty-three of
the Lett res Persanes . "Justice," he declares, "is a
true relationship of appropriateness which exists be-
tween two things, and this relationship is always the
same, no matter by whom considered, whether it is God,
or an angel, or finally a man.""*"^ Moderation and
just proportion are natural relations which describe
man's moral attitude towards the world. Montesquieu
has Usbek conclude his letter by echoing the doctrine
of Artistotle's Ethics:^^
When a man performs a self-examination,
what satisfaction for him to realize that he
18
has a just heart 1 This pleasure, sober as it
may be, must delight him. He finds that hisbeing is elevated as much above those without
one as he is elevated above tigers and bears.
Yes, Rhedi, if I were sure of always followinginviolably that equity which I have before my
eyes, I should think myself the foremost among
men.
Locke's sensationalist psychology acts as a cata-
lyst for Montesquieu's reinterpretat ion of Aristotelian
ethics. By opening the mind to empirical understanding,
Locke added a dimension not available to Aristotle.
However, in Montesquieu's eyes, Locke's theory did not
negate Artistotle. Rather, it demanded that the Ethics
be reinterpreted and incorporated in a moral theory
appropriate to modern conceptions of science and nature.
Aristotle had opened the Ethics by claiming that:
"Every art or applied science and every systematic in-
vestigation, and similarly every action and choice, seem
to aim at some good; the good, therefore, has been well
1 7defined as that at which all things aim." However
noble and proper this program was for the classical
Greek, for Montesquieu and his contemporaries this ideal
could no longer usefully guide action. In a society in
which men were more inclined to self-interest than to
the public good, the classical virtue of self-renun-
ciation would lead one to be swallowed up by the in-
trigues of modern politics and the ethics of capital
19
accumulation. In this context, human action must seek new
goals. The good man who can leap from practical to con-
templative wisdom would last but a short moment in Pari-
sian society. However, the 'man of spirit' (I'homme
d' esprit) would flourish in such a society. He could re-
construct society according to its proper spirit of moder-
ation, mediating his self interest through respect for
others. He must be the product of a good education, feel-
ing as well as knowing the proper moderation in his action
1
9
in the world. He must know the world clearly and im-
mediately; acting not according to abstract rules or prin-
ciples but according to the particular circumstances which
confront him. He is a continually self-conscious and act-
ing subject who creates himself within the world:
A man of spirit knows (connoit) and acts in a
momentary manner, with which he must be acquaint-
ed in which he must act; he creates himself, that
is to say, at each instant, on the actual need;
he knows and he feels the accurate relation which
exists between things and himself. 20
It is this idea of the active subject, creating himself
within the material world which Locke's psychology sup-
plies to Montesquieu's reinterpretat ion of Aristotelian
ethics. Montesquieu's concern for the differences be-
tween ancient and modern life is crucial to his moral
theory- He concludes his discussion of the man of
20
spirit in the "Essai" by stating that what really dis-
tinguishes the classical Greek moral vision from the
modern one is that the Greeks lack the crucial notion
of 1
' esprit :
Here is a song of the Greeks: "the
first of all goods is health; the second,
beauty; the third, wealth amassed without
fraud; the fourth, the youth that one passes
with friends . " At no point is the 'esprit'
mentioned, which is the principle attribute
of our modern times. 21
Locke's psychology unleashes the individual as individ-
ual. Montesquieu attempts to apply the Aristotelian
principle of moderation as the primary moral rule to
the action of concrete individuals confronted by other
individuals
.
However, it is not only the Greeks who lacked the
idea of 1 ' esprit . Montesquieu's pessimism about the
prospects of contemporary life penetrates the discussion
of the man of spirit in such a way that foreshadows some
of the most important principles of his philosophy of
history. The man of spirit requires the absolute con-
junction of theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom, of
knowledge and action. Yet this requires men that are
rarely found. Theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom
are separated by a nearly unbridgeable gulf. Some men
are capable of being philosophers, others of being men
21
of the world, but the man of spirit, the subject who freely
creates himself in harmony with his world, must be both,
and few men are capable of that. it is worth quoting Mon-
tesquieu's statement of the dilemma of the man of spirit
at some length:
A man of spirit is then more universal, but he is(m the narrow sense) very rare. He must unitetwo almost physically incompatible qualities:
for there is really as much difference between
that which is called a man of spirit in the world
and the man of spirit according to the philoso-
phers, as there is between a man of spirit and a
fool. The spirit, for men of the world, consists
in approaching the most distant ideas; the spir-
it, according to the philosophers, in distin-
guishing them. According to the first man of
spirit, all the ideas which have some relation,
(however distant they may be) are awakened; they
are so distinct, for the other, that nothing is
capable of confounding them. 22
The result of modern spirituality in Montesquieu's
view is that modern man must reject the purely contempla-
tive life as a valid expression of the ends of knowledge.
The purpose of knowledge must always be practical, even if
that knowledge is of the most theoretical sort. The formal
goal of knowledge is the extension of 1' esprit. The aim
of Montesquieu's greatest work, De L' Esprit des Lois , is
to teach men to think. He insists that he does not seek a
mere compendium of laws but an understanding of their spir-
it so as to inform the creation of stable and just polities
according to the particular circumstances of the various
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nations. The central task of reason is to understand both
the physical and historical 'facts' of the world. But
facts alone are useless, they lead to mere confusion and
many painful pages of manuscript thrown to the wind. Mon-
tesquieu could only discover truth "once I discovered my
principles "--only then did history make sense. But
those principles must derive from the knowledge we gain
from reflecting on the facts of history, and if our prin-
ciples are correct then our knowledge will be useful. Here
lies the true failure of ancient philosophy:
Knowledge gives much extension to the
spirit. The ancient philosophers lacked such
consciousness (manquoient de connoissances )
.
They had good spirits; they made little use
of them. They never penetrated to the heart
of the question; they wanted to explain what
was inexplicable, and spent their time giving
reasons for false facts on the basis of prin-
ciples which were as completely false. 24
The ancients failed to adequately explain the
world because they could not penetrate the depths of the
human mind. Because they tried to understand the wrong
things, the nature of the abstract Good, the internal
moral content of physical nature, they did not recognize
that true knowledge must derive from the depth of the
human mind, and is justified in so far as it extends the
human spirit. The mind is an autonomous whole, a self,
which interacts with the objects, including other
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selves, around it and makes its own judgments about the
appropriateness of actions.
However, the ancient world presented some glimpses
of the self, if only negatively, in the power of sui-
cide. A passage from the original 1734 edition of the
"Considerations sur les Causes de la Grandeur des
Romains" which was supressed in later editions^^ as-
serted that the power to commit suicide allowed the
ancients to do greater things than the moderns, whose
religion forbids it. Montesquieu's choice of language
is interesting, for he describes suicide as a "power
that one takes over oneself:" "It is certain that men
have become less free, less courageous, less disposed
to great enterprises," he asserts, "than they were then,
by this power which one takes over onself, one is able
at any moment to escape from all other power." In the
Lettres Persanes Montesquieu had already presented a
modern defense of suicide as a direct consequence of
the Newtonian view of man's diminished place in the
2 6
universe. Since the defense of suicide plays a
crucial role in Montesquieu's moral theory, as it did
for Montaigne and seventeeth century French moralists,
it is worth quoting from Letter LXXVI at some length:
European laws are merciless against those who
take their own lives. They are made to die.
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so to speak, a second time. They are infa-
mously dragged through streets; they are cov-
ered with ignominy; their possessions are
confiscated
.
It seems to me, Ibben, that such laws
are quite unjust. When I am overwhelmed withgrief, misfortune, scorn, why should they want
to prevent me from putting an end to my trou-bles, and why cruelly deprive me of a remedy
that lies in my own hands ?
Why should they want me to go on working
for a society of which I am no longer willing
to be a part? Why should they insist, despite
my feelings, that I hold to a convention that
has been made without my consent? Society is
founded on mutual benefit. But when it be-
comes a burden to me, who can keep me from
renouncing it? Life was granted to me as a
favor; therefore I can give it back when it
is no longer one. The cause stops; the ef-
fect should therefore stop too . . .
But, you will say, you are disturbing
the order of providence. God has united your
soul and your body and you are separating
them. You are opposing his plan and you are
resisting him.
What does all that mean? Am I disturb-
ing the order of providence when I change the
modifications of matter and square a ball
which the primal laws of movement—that is to
say, the laws of creation and conversion of
matter—have made round? Certainly not, for
I am using a right given to me, and in this
sense, I can disturb all of nature as much as
I please without being told that I am ob-
structing providence.
When my soul is separated from my body,
will there be less order and less arrangement
in the universe? Do you believe that this new
combination will be less perfect and less de-
pendent on general laws? Do you think the
world has lost something thereby? Or that the
works of God will be less great, or, rather,
less immense?
Do you believe that my body, having
turned into an ear of grain, or a worm, or a
piece of turf, will have turned into a work
of nature less worthy of her? Do you think
that my soul, cut off from everything earthly
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it once possessed, has become less sublime?[emphasis added]
This defense of suicide seems on wholly modern grounds:
the Newtonian view of men as small inconsequential parts
of God's universe and the view of social life as a con-
tractual relationship which men can opt out of when it
no longer serves its original purpose, or even when they
no longer want to live in it. Even the language—sui-
cide as "a remedy that lies in my own hand "--implies a
modern conception of agency and self that Montesquieu
argues is lacking in the classical theory of mind.
Yet this avid defense of suicide based more on
despair than honor, the traditional stoic defense, is
not altogether incommensurable with the more traditional
defense Montesquieu gives in "Remains." They both rep-
resent man's assertion of power over himself; in both
instances man freely takes the reins directing his life.
The moral import (and power) of the act of suicide is
no less in either case. Whereas the stoic could assuage
the painful thoughts of leaving the world by his iden-
tification with the natural harmony of the universe,
Montesquieu could not. Indeed, Montesquieu believed
that men of his time could not conceive of such an idea
of greatness. But short of the grandeur of the stoic
vision, Montesquieu did see the need to assert oneself
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in the world and sometimes against it.^"^ Therefore,
he could accept the Newtonian defense of suicide in the
Lettres Persanes as a sort of reinterpret at ion of stoi-
cism. The nobility of the act of asserting control over
one's life is really consistent with the cosmological
vantage point which Montesquieu assigns to the self.
Man stands in the world as a fragment of it, capable of
knowing his own condition and struggling against it.
The difference between animals and man, Montesquieu
asserts in the opening book of De L' Esprit des Lois , is
that man is cognizant of the fact that he will die.^^
Suicide, 'the power one takes over oneself,' is the ul-
timate expression of the self in a world he cannot
otherwise control.
Neither the classical Platonic ideal of reason
overcoming the passions and putting the soul in line nor
the rationalism of the seventeenth century natural law-
yers captures adequately the structure of the spirit.
It is crucial to recognize that Montesquieu makes modest
claims for reason precisely because rational action is
not the primary end of human action. Passion governs
men's behavior far more than reason. His critique,
similar though less philosophically sophisticated than
Hume's, is that man is, by nature, more a passionate
than a rational animal; that human nature is the reverse
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of the Platonic ideal—the passions put reason to their
own use; reason does not control the passions. In
Montesquieu's view, as in Hume's, if moral judgments
were to be based upon the rational intuition of a natur-
al moral law, then the world would certainly be a bas-
tion of immorality. The psychological foundations of
human action are more complex, requiring a moral theory
which expresses not merely one faculty of the mind, but
the spirit as a whole. Men are governed more by self-
love than by their faculty of reason. To build a moral
theory on the basis of natural law would be at best
futile and at worst dogmatic and authoritarian; com-
pelling and constraining people to act according to
moral principles and values it is not in their nature
to accept. Montesquieu's rejection of the dogmatic
rationalism of natural law, along with his rejection of
the moral implications of empiricism which we discussed
earlier, distinguished him from the main currents of
seventeenth and early eighteenth century secular moral
theory. His philosophy of human nature charts a new
course which is filled with potentialities for a phil-
osophy of history and a theory of citizenship.
3. Human nature and the origin of society . Human
nature for Montesquieu was not fixed as it was for both
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dogmatic rationalism and empiricism. Only the biologi-
cal structure and function of the mind are universal in
men. But to understand man's nature one must understand
his social life. Individuals cannot be understood out-
side of the various particular influences that affect
and determine their behavior. Physical factors such as
climate or the geography of the nation they inhabit and
social factors such as laws, moeurs and manieres, to-
gether mold the particular character of societies and
individuals. In Montesquieu's view, investigating in-
dividuals abstracted from the social and physical situ-
ation is useless and misleading
. The relation be-
tween man and the world is like that between a subject
and object in a sentence, men in their particular cir-
cumstances acting as the verb. Together they form a
context in which each can be better understood. The
concepts of proportion and moderation provide the rules
of syntax which constitute discourse between man and
his world, and this discourse determines his nature.
Men bind together in society out of natural inclin-
ations not out of rational assent. In Book I, Chapter
Two of De L' Esprit des Lois Montesquieu distinguishes
the first four laws of nature. Following Hobbes and
sensationalist psychology he presents a materialistic
interpretation of natural law claiming that the laws of
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nature are "so called because they derive exclusively
from the constitution of our being. m order to learn
what they are, it is necessary to consider man before
the establishment of society. Montesquieu seems
to follow Hobbes further, depicting man's first instinct
as one of self-preservation and his first psychology as
one of fear:
Clearly, the first, ideas conceived by man
would not be speculative: he would concern
himself with the preservation of his being
before investigating its origins. Such a
person would feel only his weakness; his
timidity would be very great.
But here the agreement with Hobbes dissolves, for
Montesquieu's framework is very different. Peace, not
war is the initial condition of nature. Hobbes had er-
roneously attributed ideas and motives to men in their
animal state that required for their genesis the more
complex institutions of civil society. The Hobbesian
state of war presupposes complex concepts on the part
of individuals, such as the understanding of their es-
sential equality, which could arise only with particular
political and social configurations. Rather than a per-
petual war in the state of nature, "every man would feel
himself an inferior; he could scarcely imagine himself
an equal." Montesquieu draws the opposite conclusion
30
from that of Hobbes: "No one would seek to attack any-
one else; peace would be the first law of nature."
Just as Montesquieu's notion of the natural state
is different from that of Hobbes so also the way to the
creation of society is different. The social contract
plays no role in Montesquieu's view. Society must arise
out of man's instincts in the state of nature, not his
reason. Against the rationalism of contract theory,
Montesquieu uses the language of animal attraction and
passion to describe the formation of civil society:
I have said that fear would lead men toflee one another. But encouraged by all theindications that such fear was universally
shared, they would soon come together. Be-
sides, they would be drawn by the pleasure
felt by one animal when approached by another
of the same species . A third law would fol-
low from their natural inclination for one
another
.
In addition to whatever men feel origi-
nally, they succeed in acquiring knowledge.
Thus they possess a second tie that does not
exist for other animals. They have, then,
another new motive for uniting; the desire to
live in society is the fourth law of nature,
[emphasis added]
Even the addition of knowledge to inclination does not
produce the rational construction of society, but the
'desire' to live in society. Society must develop 'or-
ganically' from human instincts. Much earlier, in
the Lettres Persanes
,
Montesquieu had already criticized
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the idea that primitive men joined together rationally
to form a civil society. Society has its roots in na-
tural human relations. The family, he argues, is the
first natural association followed closely by society.
Paternal bonds are natural and society develops out of
them as a matter of course. It is abnormal and a pro-
duct of socially constituted norms that individuals
would ever isolate themselves from one another. Direct-
ing his argument at Hobbes, Montesquieu claims: "If men
never formed any societies, if they abandoned each other
and fled each other's company, we should have to ask the
reason for this and search out why they stand off from
each other. "^^
Montesquieu derives relativistic conclusions from
his emphasis on the social context of human action. Men
are different in different societies. In Letter XXXIV
of the Lett res Persanes Montesquieu has Rica say to
Ibben
:
I shall continue to write to you, and I
shall teach you things far removed from Per-
sian character and spirit. It is certainly
the same earth carrying both countries, but
the men of this country where I am and those
of the country where you are are quite dif-
ferent .
It is a constant theme throughout Montesquieu's works,
which scholars have often noted, that to understand men
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one must understand their particular situation in time
and space; their national spirit, their individual so-
cial role and their particular education. Following his
'organic- conception of human association Montesquieu
praises the naturalness and importance of human felici-
ty, and decries the void created by a lack of human
association and friendship. In Letter XXXIV of the
Lettres Persanes Rica compares his culture's social
individualism unfavorably to the friendship amid French
society :
This Asiatic sobriety derives from the
dearth of intercourse between people. They
see each other only when forced to do so by
ceremony. Friendship, that sweet bond of
hearts which creates a gentleness of existence
here, is practically unknown to them. They
withdraw to their houses where they always
find a social company awaiting them, so that
each family group lives, so to speak, in
i solat ion
This idea is especially important in Montesquieu's
praise of cosmopolitanism and commercial capitalism,
both fundamental components of his theory of citizen-
ship .
4. From the social to the political self . The belief
that human nature is intertwined with the social world
finds its fullest expression in the Lettres Persanes .
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Constantly the Persian travellers and their subjects at
home demonstrate that the passionate life of men and
women is bound up with the political life; what is most
personal and private is at the same time political. in
the final letter, Roxane, Usbek
' s most cherished wife,
reveals that she has decived her master and announces
her suicide. The immodesty of Usbek
' s treatment of
'his' women as objects of both his lust and his paternal
political power is in the end negated by this act of his
3 5most beloved object. Roxane, the former object of
Usbek 's love and passion and subject of his political
domain, must reject both roles if she is to reject
either. First, she rejects her position as the subject
of his political power, leading the other women in the
seraglio to take lovers, covertly but emphatically de-
fying Usbek ' s rule. By doing so she asserts her poli-
tical freedom against Usbek ' s despotism. "I might have
lived in servitude," she declares, "but I have always
been free." She continues by proclaiming that not only
has she always been free, but that she has turned
Usbek ' s despotism back on him: "I have rewritten your
laws after the laws of nature, and my spirit has ever
3 6
sustained itself in independence." By taking a
lover, and committing suicide in the wake of his murder
by Usbek ' s eunuchs, Roxane has negated her role as the
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object of Usbek's passion. m her final act she asserts
her subjectivity. The final paragraph of the letter,
and the book, reads:
My language, no doubt, seems new to you.
Could it be that after having overwhelmed you
with sorrow, I should even yet force you to
admire my courage? But it is finished. The
poison consumes me. My strength is leaving
me. The pen falls from my hands. I feel even
my hatred weaken. I am dying.
The use of the first person and the constant repetition
of the possessive 'my' seems to emphasize that Roxane
is in complete control. Her acts of defiance must be
simultaneously personal assertions of her self and ex-
pressions of her struggle for freedom against repres-
sion. By rewriting the laws of repression 'after the
laws of nature,
'
her spirit has 'ever sustained itself
in independence.'
Roxane 's declaration, so to speak, completes
Montesquieu's theory of mind. Human beings are social
animals meant for constant intereaction with others and
always subject to certain forms of public life. In
Roxane 's case personal freedom is necessarily political
freedom. In the discussion of De L' Esprit des Lois
(Chapter Five) I will show that whatever the form of
government Montesquieu seeks to safeguard the space for
self-expression. In despotism, he will argue this is
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impossible, wheras in both republics and monarchies this
is possible if self-expression is limited as much as
possible to
-society' while it is kept at a distance
from the state. But now I want to complete the argument
of the present chapter, demonstrating how the theory of
man I have described so far grounds Montesquieu's theory
of history.
II. Particulars and Universals
1. The nature of history and the historian . Montes-
quieu's concern for the social constitution of human
nature led him to urge new standards in the study of
history which respected the autonomy of particular
events. Particular events and cultures in history must
be understood in their own right, free from the preju-
dices of the age of the historian. Montesquieu's own
historical work followed this insight. In the Preface
to De L' Esprit des Lois he writes:
When I have had to consult the works of
the ancients, I have sought to understand the
spirit in which they were written. Otherwise
I might have considered as similar cases that
in fact differed; I might have missed those
differences that separate cases ostensibly
similar. ^
In order to understand the past one must recapture its
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spirit. Indeed, Montesquieu seems to have seen his role
in the debate over the ancient French feudal tradition
as in part to restructure the debate itself, to change
the way questions about the past had been asked.
For example, in Montesquieu's view, both Boulainvilliers
and the Abbe du Bos were involved at least as much in
political polemics as they were in writing history.
In the midst of his own discussion of the origin of the
French monarchy Montesquieu implicitly attacks them,
warning of the dangers of interpreting the past through
the present. Their interpretation distorted the past
by reading it as if it were coexistent with the present.
The striving "to render modern all the ancient centur-
ies," which Montesquieu charged his adversaries with
doing, deprived the ancient world of its authenticity
and uniqueness. His judgment of those who failed to
respect the historicity of the past was unequivocal:
"To transport into remote centuries all the ideas of
the century in which one lives, is the source of the
40deepest confusions." As I showed above, this same
spirit which led him to attack both Boulainvilliers and
du Bos guided Montesquieu's critique of Hobbesian con-
tract theory.
This mode of critique led Montesquieu to envisage
a new role for the historian as one who could relate
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the past as it was, purged of the preconceptions of the
present. His praise of Ceasar's and Tacitus 's accounts
of the ancient legal codes of the Germans reflects this
new ideal for the historian:
These two authors can be found in such harmony
with the codes of the laws of the barbarous
people that we have, that in reading Ceasar
and Tacitus one finds these codes throughout,
and that in reading these codes one finds
Ceasar and Tacitus throughout . 41
Montesquieu's ideal historian transports himself into
the past age, blending himself with his subject matter.
Montesquieu himself attempts to do this in order to un-
derstand the contribution of Saint Louis to the French
legal tradition, for him a crucial moment in the crea-
tion of modern France. The code as it appears to the
modern historian is confused, combining different and
sometimes contradictory legal traditions. Indeed, the
glory of Saint Louis was his ability to unite tradi-
tional with Roman law. The historian who wants to
understand Louis' contribution properly must study it
in the spirit of the times in which it was written.
What is, then, this compilation that we call
by the name of d ' Establissement
s
of Saint
Louis? What is this obscure, confused and
ambiguous code where French jurisprudence is
continually mixed with Roman law; where one
speaks as a legislator and sees a juriscon-
sult; where can be found an entire body of
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:urisprudence on every case, on all points of
civil law? To understand this it is necessaryto transport oneself into those times.
Montesquieu understands the demands of historicity even
more than Meinecke's great reint erpretat ion claims.
Despite an apparently naturalistic theory of causation,
Montesquieu made demands on the historian more akin to
nineteenth century historical idealism and the Romantic
conception of history than to the materialistic ration-
alism of his more well known theoiry of climate. Recog-
nizing the seeming incompatibility in these two views,
Montesquieu seeks a philosophy of history which synthe-
sizes the contradictions between these two systems of
understanding. The purpose of the remainder of this
chapter is to trace that synthesis, especially as it
provides a basis for the theory of law which is crucial
to the theory of citizenship in De L'Esprit des Lois .43
2. Developmental history . As many commentators have
recognized Montesquieu's nascent historism led him to
embrace a wide ranging cultural relativism. However,
it also led him to develop a fundamentally new type of
history in De L'Esprit des Lois which posits a theory
of historical development. For Montesquieu the present
could only be known by knowing the past. He asserts
that this is the reason that he studied the old Germanic
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44law. But he has not completely given up more tradi-
tional attitudes towards history. As many passages in
De L'Esprit des Lois demonstrate history is still a
storehouse of lessons to inform the statesman's present
actions as it had been for renaissance historians such
as Machiavelli and Bodin. Yet, for Montesquieu history
plays a greater role too: it is the condition of cor-
rect knowledge of the present. It is a constant and
'
important theme in his work that there has been a break
in the historical continuity of the western world and
that we can only recognize its consequences if we un-
derstand the historical development which necessitated
it. In the next chapter we shall see how this break
has rendered the ancients' solutions to political prob-
lems, such as the virtuous republic and imperialism,
utterly inapplicable to contemporary circumstances. I
will show in Chapter Five that this leads Montesquieu
to conceptualize the political future in terms which
transcend the analysis of the traditional forms of gov-
ernment. In the face of the growing nation-state and a
world capitalist economy political analysis based on
traditional ideas about forms of government reflect
inadequate conceptual tools.
The most neglected, although crucial, historical
work in Montesquieu's major treatise deals not with
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traditional subject matter—nations, laws, rulers,
wars—but with the development of institutions and
social practices. In Book XXI of De L' Esprit des Lois
Montesquieu writes a history of the development of com-
merce from the ancient world to the present. This book
illustrates his notion of developmental history better
than any other. The first five chapters are introduc-
tory advancing the theory of climate's strong influence
on the ways of life of different peoples and on their
modes of commerce. The last two of these are devoted
to citing the general differences between ancient and
modern commerce. With Chapter Six the history of com-
merce begins with 'the immense treasures of Semiramis,
'
and ends by analyzing Spain's fall as due to its failure
to harness the power of modern commerce, allowing the
Dutch and English to command international trade.
On the way Montesquieu discusses the various revolutions
in the structure of commerce, from the ancient world to
the Athenian 'empire of the sea,' through the revo-
lutionary expansion of commercial networks under Alexan-
der and the supremacy of the Egyptians after his death.
He continues to discuss the commerce of the Roman Empire
and the disastrous effects of its breakdown. He finally
surfaces in the modern world through a discussion of the
technological advances, praising particularly the com-
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pass, that broke the cages of barbarism and freed com-
merce to spread across the globe taking on far greater
importance than ever before. As if to drive the point
home Montesquieu ends the book with a chapter which
makes a plea for free trade and competition as perhaps
the best way for Spain to retain some of the economic
and cultural values of the trade with the New World
drawing on his earlier essay on the riches of Spain.
—
S^^entific history: laws and causes . Montesquieu
seeks to give philosophical depth to his developmental
theory of history with his scientific theory of 'laws'
and 'causes.' His view of law begins similarly to tra-
ditional seventeenth century natural law theory with the
proposition that law is in essence human reason. The
essential condition of the universe is the invariable
regularity of law logically prior to both the material
existence of the world, which exists as possibility, and
God. The beginning of Book I of De L'Esprit des Lois
echoes Grotius's famous phrase from the "Prolegomena"
of The Law of War and Peace that the rationality of na-
tural law would be valid even if God did not exist :47
Thus the creation, which might appear to be
an arbitrary act, presupposes rules as invar-
iable as the fatality dear to atheists. It
would be absurd to say that the Creator could
govern the world without these rules, since
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con-
If the world were not r^i-^^^^irational, governed by unchanging
laws, then men could have no knowledge of it. Yet
immediately after his affirmation of natural law
Montesquieu departs from Grotius and the natural law
tradition shifing to the language of Newtonian science
to describe the internal relations of the system of
laws :
These rules are in an invariable relation toone another. Between two moving bodies act-ing upon each other, motion is received, in-creased, diminished, or lost in proportion totheir respective mass and velocity. Evervdiversity is uniformity; every change, con-stancy. ^ ' "
The use of the physical analogy is not limited in
Montesquieu's work to this passage. In fact, this sci-
entific view seems to play a far more important role
than the view taken from the moral natural law tradi-
tion. In the opening chapter of the all important Book
V, "The Laws Provided by the Legislator Ought to be
Relative to the Principle of Government," Montesquieu
states the physical nature of the system most clearly:
The relationship between the laws and this
principle stretches all the springs of govern-
ment, and the principle in turn receives new
strength from the laws. Thus in physics, an
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action is always followed by a reaction. 49
Montesquieu's notion of historical law seeks to combine
both a moral dimension drawn from the rationalist natur-
al law tradition and an explanatory dimension drawn from
Newton and empiricist science.
Montesquieu's definition of 'laws' as "necessary
relations deriving from the nature of things, seems
to imply for him two ideas of necessity. First, laws
are necessary because the world is in essence rational.
As we saw above, laws are the preconditions for the
world's existence. If it were not governed by invari-
able laws of reason then the world could not exist.
Laws in this sense imply a moral compulsion. If laws
embody a universal rationality then universal justice
must be the obedience to law, to which all beings,
intelligent or not, are subject. With relation to the
moral compulsion of law the difference between men and
less intelligent beings on the one hand, and physical
beings on the other, is that men are imperfect, led by
their nature to contradict laws, whether of God, nature
or men. Just as for Plato justice and law transcend the
material world of appearance, embodying the universal
'good, ' so they also do for Montesquieu.
Implied in Montesquieu's use of his definition of
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law, however, is an almost antithetical meaning o£ •nec-
essary.' in the first case laws are logically neces-
sary, they exist a priori. Yet laws, along with their
corollary 'causes,' describe the actual movement of
history, they are necessary to make sense out of empir-
ical history. Montesquieu rejects the idea that history
is governed by any laws which are extrinsic to it, such
as the 'fortuna' of Machiavelli or the divine Providence
of Bossuet
.
If Montesquieu had clearly distinguished these two
ideas of law, as contemporary social science tries to
do, the task of understanding his theory would perhaps
be easier. We could cite his confusion and treat his
two views of law as separate. However, Montesquieu does
not clearly distinguish them not because of a lack of
philosophical acumen but because he sees a need for both
as dimensions in a single system of law. Montesquieu
considers both the rationalist and the empiricist para-
digms of law as inadequate by themselves and attempts
to transcend them by incorporating both into a single
system of law. Before trying to judge Montesquieu's
success we must examine his theory of law linked to his
theory of historical causation more closely.
Continual flux and stasis are important categories
of Montesquieu's historical ontology, forming the basis
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of his crucial distinction between general and particu-
lar causes and between physical laws and laws of intel-
ligent beings. The more general causes are, the more
fixed their effects will be. The more particular (in-
dividual) the causes are, the more arbitrary the actions
seem and the less knowable and predictable their effects
are. Montesquieu opens the first part of the "Essai sur
les Causes" by clearly distinguishing these two levels
of causation:
These causes become less arbitrary to the
extent that they have a more general effect.
Thus, we know better what gives a certain
character to a nation than that which gives a
certain character to an individual (un par-
ticulier), that which modifies a sex than
that which affects a man, that which forms
the genius of societies which have embraced a
general way of life than that of a single
person . 51
On the most general level human history is fixed or
in more modern language determined. Climate will deter-
mine the character of a nation. However, this does not
mean that individuals within a particular nation subject
to a particular tradition and set of laws will act in
the way that the climate prescribes. Were their social
traditions not to intervene to counter the influence of
physical laws the determinism of physical causes would
be more pronounced. Hov/ever, through education and the
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development of tradition men can struggle against the
determinism of physical causes often countermanding
their less useful and more dangerous commands.
Physical causes, then, are only one part of the
system of laws and causes which govern Montesquieu's
universe. As soon as men begin to think and a nation
begins to develop a particular spirit and tradition
they are absorbed under moral causes. Although
Montesquieu's philosophy of history contains a level at
which behavior is determined, viewed as a whole the sys
tem of laws and causes demands human initiative, knowl-
edge and self-conscious action. Human history, like
human nature is the saga of man's total relationship to
his physical and moral environment. In some cases the
physical causes overtake the moral causes producing a
relatively static society. For example, Montesquieu
uses this to explain the predisposition of oriental
nations toward despotism:
The oriental peoples have a certain indolence
of mind reinforcing that sensibility which
makes them so sensitive to every impression.
Such indolence of mind and body makes them
incapable of any action, any effort, any
resistance. Their souls, once they have
received an impression cannot be rid of it.
For this reason oriental laws, moeurs, and
manieres, even if of no intrinsic importance,
such as their mode of dress, remain today
what they were a thousand years ago.^-^
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Climatic influence, however, is not always deter-
minative. In fact, societies often rise to greatness
by counteracting the effects of physical causes. "The
more physical causes incline men to inaction, the moral
causes ought to counter such effects. "^^ The task of
the legislator is to understand the determinism of phys-
ical causes (and the general Ifevels of moral causes) and
to mold the best possible polity out of them, even if
it means struggling against them. Montesquieu's disen-
chanted history has no room for causes that men cannot
recognize and, at least in principle, counterbalance.
The limits to understanding history are limits pre-
scribed by man's passionate nature, not limits inherent
in nature. The irrationality that we recognize in human
history is not that of the world itself but of human
nature. It is crucial to recognize, so as not to over-
rationalize Montesquieu's doctrine, that irrationality
is not so much a fault of human nature as a necessity
of it. Just as universal reason is a precondition of
the material world passion and subjectivity are precon-
ditions of human existence. Without these society would
never have developed out of the intercourse of primitive
men. For Montesquieu neither fortune nor Providence is
necessary to explain the irrational in history. Rather,
what is necessary is scientific knowledge.
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De L- Esprit des Lois proposes to establish such
knowleage. Like Montesquieu's other major works, it
undertakes to explain the structure of political and
social life through an analysis of the 'spirit' of the
laws: that system of laws and causes which motivates
and describes a particular political situation. There
must then be some principle which captures the internal
dynamic of that system, which gives the system motion
and internal cohesion. Montesquieu discovers this prin-
ciple in 'utility,' a principle which for him embodies
both of the conceptions of 'necessity' mentioned above.
In the first place Montesquieu follows Machiavelli in
linking utility to the stability of the state, deducing
the proper laws of a particular government from what is
necessary to preserve it. This is embodied in Montes-
quieu's famous definition of liberty as security.
The moderate government which acts so as to preserve its
liberty will adopt the best laws. To establish laws on
any other basis is to invite, indeed to guarantee, the
destruction of the state. Furthermore, to depart from
the principle of utility and the preservation of liberty
will require plunging the state into civil war and the
adoption of cruel and inhuman public policies. If the
Romans had constructed public policy solely to ensure
the preservation of liberty not only would they have
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maintained their greatness but they would also have pre-
vented the cruelties of civil war and the atrocities of
the later emperors. But utility does not merely pre-
scribe the proper course of action embodying the most
just and best possible laws under the particular cir-
cumstances, it also describes the movement of the laws
of history. All events in history can be explained by
their causes which are either physical or moral (tradi-
tion). Human history requires men to reflect upon their
circumstances and to act self-consciously to create the
best possible polity. Yet as they reflect they will
come to recognize the laws of history which are as fixed
as those of physical nature. The task of the legisla-
tor is to turn this scientific knowledge of the 'neces-
sary system of relations' into concrete historical re-
ality. Above all, Montesquieu wanted to demystify his-
tory—to purge it of all notions of 'fortuna' and 'Prov-
idence'
—
yet not lose its spontaneity and subjectivity.
We can see this system at work in Montesquieu's portray-
al of Roman history.
Rome fell because of its own internal contradic-
tions which for Montesquieu typify the contradictions
embedded in the classical Republic as a form of govern-
ment. In Book II, Chapter 2 of De L' Esprit des Lois
Montesquieu uses Rome's failure to follow the principles
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of a republic to demonstrate the centrality of utility
for the laws of history:
It is essential to fix the number of citizenswho may participate in assemblies. Otherwise
It would be uncertain whether all the people
'
had spoken, or only one part of it. At Spartathe number was fixed at ten-thousand. Rome
was destined to rise from insignificance tograndeur, to experience all the vicissitudes
of fortune. At one time almost all its citi-
zens were outside its walls; at another, allItaly and much of the rest of the world wereinside them. The number of citizens was neverfixed, and this was among the principle causes
of Its ruin. 56
Rome was able to rise to preeminence in the world be-
cause it best embodied the spirit and virtue which makes
for greatness in republics. This spirit led to the per-
fection of the arts of war and territorial expansion.
While the polity remained in harmony, its citizens moved
by the spirit of virtue and the public good, the state
could prosper both at home and abroad. During its rise
to greatness the Roman polity preserved liberty at home
and adopted good laws for the preservation and continued
expansion of the empire, such as the wise policy of al-
lowing conquered territories to retain their own laws
and way of life. However the dynamic of imperialism
while leading to Rome's greatness also mandated its
destruction.
The emphasis on militarism, so necessary to the
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greatness of the Roman spirit, accentuated class divi-
sion within the state, creating a rift between two types
of citizens. The virtues of conquest are not suited to
the peaceful life of the city:
We hear in the authors only of the dissensionsthat ruined Rome, without seeing that thesedissensions were necessary to it, that theyhad always been there and always had to be.
It was the greatness of the republic that
caused all the trouble and changed populartumults into civil wars. There had to bedissensions in Rome, for warriors who were soproud, so audacious, so terrible abroad could
not be very moderate at home. To ask for menin a free state who are bold in war and timidm peace is to wish the impossible. And, as
a general rule, whenever we see everyone tran-
quil in a state that calls itself a republic,
we can be sure that liberty does not exist
there
.
This class division led to a usurpation of political
power by the military and the privatization of govern-
ment in the persons of generals who led soldiers more
loyal to their chiefs than the state.
Class polarization and the privatization of gov-
ernment developed as well out of the mode of production
consequent on the greatness of Roman expansion, the
city's wealth becoming more and more based upon foreign
sources. However, as the soldier class grew in strength
the traditional mode of the distribution of wealth based
upon the equality of the citizenry gave way to the ag-
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grandizement of the soldiers through increased shares
of booty and tribute. Furthermore, as the wealth of the
city grew private interest dwarfed the public good. The
antithesis of civic virtue motivated the people, leading
on the one hand to the eclipse of the power of the Sen-
ate by the military and on the other to increased de-
mands by the plebs. The system of political and social
life became unbalanced as conflicts latent in the struc-
ture of the state exploded onto the surface.
But the tragedy of the Roman empire, and of human
history, is that both Rome's greatness and fall were
necessary, mandated by the laws of history. Certainly
there were more correct policy choices which would have
prolonged the life of the republic—Montesquieu does
claim that Rome "lost its liberty because it completed
the work it wrought too soon."^® However, human his-
tory moves by internal contradictions. Men must insti-
tutionalize their social life through laws and govern-
ment. But to do this is to fix the flux of history
which itself never remains fixed. Statesmen must create
laws out of the particular circumstances of their soci-
ety at a given time in history but that history is
fluid; circumstances change often because of the laws
themselves. As Montesquieu's depiction of Rome's his-
tory is meant to demonstrate, the most important move-
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m^nt in history is that motivated by the choices of men.
For Rome, as for all polities, there is a gulf between
creation and maintenance of the state; as in the case
of Rome, they contradict each other:
It is true that the laws of Rome becamepowerless to govern the republic. But it is
^^'^^^J^ °^ common observation that good lawswhich have made a small republic grow largebecome a burden to it when it is enlarged!For they are such that their natural effect
was to create a great people, not to govern
There is a considerable difference be-tween good laws and expedient laws—betweenthose that enable a people to make itself
master of others, and those that maintain itspower once it is acquired. 59
When we discuss Montesquieu's view of political knowl-
edge and the legislator in Chapter Five we shall see how
important this gulf between creation and stability is to
political life. It is important to recognize that this
gulf is part of the structure of human history giving
meaning to the vicissitudes of law in the flux of his-
tory .
4. The success of the synthesis; the general and the
particular
. It remains to assess Montesquieu's attempt
to synthesize the two dimensions of law, the empirical
and the moral/rational, in a single theory of history.
Laws both bind men morally and describe the physical
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determinants of their action. m their latter aspect
laws are invariable, men cannot deny their need for food
and the general effects of cliamte, but in their moral
aspect laws can be and are broken by men. in Book I of
De L- Esprit des Lois Montesquieu claims that intelligent
beings are bound by the physical aspects of laws as are
all other animals. Eut the intelligent world is not so
well governed as the physical:
For although the intelligent world also hasIts laws that by nature are invariable, itdoes not follow them without deviation as doesthe physical world its laws. The reason forthis is that individual intelligent beings arelimited by their nature and hence are subject
to error. On the other hand, because of their
nature, they act by themselves. Thus they do
not always observe their original laws, anddo not always obey even those they made for
themselves . °0
Yet there is an ambivalence in Montesquieu's seeming
distinction between laws as physical constraints and as
moral rules, for the thrust of his argument as we de-
scribed it above is that law plays both roles simultan-
eously. Either Montesquieu is sunk in a quagmire, con-
founding descriptive and normative laws, as some critics
• 4. • 61maintain, or he conceives law as containing both
normative and descriptive content necessarily. The
thrust of my argument in this chapter has been that the
latter is central to an understanding of Montesquieu's
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Philosophy of history. m describing what Montesquieu
seems to have meant we must be careful to dissociate
our own conceptions of law from Montesquieu's. m the
early eighteenth century discussions of law were still
governed by the aura of natural law theory which never
conceived of a disjuncture between normative and de-
scriptive dimensions of law. Even the late seventeenth
and early eighteenth century empiricists following Bacon
and Newton only imperfectly enunciated this distinction.
Viewed historically, the complexity of Montesquieu's
theory of law derives from his recognition of the seem-
ing incompatibility of the two dimensions of law and his
conviction that no theory of law could be complete with-
out both.^^
For Montesquieu laws establish the necessary
course of action if an end is to be properly achieved.
This fundamental relationship is the same for physical
as well as positive law. Law orients man's action to
its proper end. Man "might at any moment forget his
Creator
:
God has reminded man by the laws of religion.
Such a being (man) might at any moment forget
himself; philosophers have reminded him by the
laws of morality. Made to live in society, he
might forget his fellows; legislators have
recalled him to his duties by political and
civil laws. ^3
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Laws express in the material world the rational ends of
God's creation, a creation which, as we have seen, must
itself be rational. If the compulsion which brings the
physical as well as the moral world into existence is
'rational' then it must 'ought' to be as well as 'be.'
On the most general level, Montesquieu does not seem to
distinguish between the physical and the spiritual
world. (In this sense he may actually have been closer
to Spinoza than he thought:) Whether the theory is in-
ternally consistent or not Montesquieu held to it and
developed it consistently through De L' Esprit des Loi .. .
The confusion and true novelty of Montesquieu's
view was the way he distinguished between the general
and particular levels of phenomena. There was a quali-
tative difference in the phenomena at various levels.
The particular level of human existence embodies the
full and tenuous life of the free and active subject,
whereas the general level embodies the invariability of
a strict determinism. This is evidenced in Chapter 3
of Book I wherein he states the traditional view of
natural law as human reason, only to follow it by a
profound statement of the diversity of cultures:
Law in general is human reason, to the
extent that it governs all the peoples of the
earth. The political and civil laws of each
nation ought to be only particular cases of
57
the application of human reason
Laws ought to be so appropriate to the
people for whom they were made that it would
be highly unlikely that the laws of one nation
could suit another. ^4
The rest of the chapter explains how laws must be tai-
lored to particular circumstances, including a clear
statement of the 'system of relations' that together
constitutes the general spirit:
Laws should be relative to the physical char-
acteristics of the country, to the climate,
whether freezing, burning, or temperate; to
the quality of the terrain, to its location
and extent to the style of life of its inhab-
itants, whether farmers, hunters, or shep-
herds; the laws should be relative to the
degree of liberty permitted by the constitu-
tion; to the inhabitants' religion, inclina-
tions, riches, number, commerce, mores
(moeurs) and customs (manieres). Finally,
the laws are related to one another; their
origins are related, as is the intent of the
legislator, and the order of things on which
they were established. They must be consid-
ered from all these points of view.
This is what I shall undertake to do in
this work. I shall examine all these rela-
tionships. Taken together they comprise what
is called the Spirit of the Laws .^^
Two views seem to be competing for preeminence in
the explanation of history, causal explanation and a
more organic explanation of the internal development of
historical events. The first leads Montesquieu to as-
sume that the physical system of relations embodied in
a matrix of laws can be known not as historical knowl-
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edge but as a form of technical knowledge of statecraft
removed from the everyday life of politics. We must
remember the distinction between the laws of creation
and those of stability and maintenance which he consid-
ers crucial to the understanding of human history. The
former requires a knowledge and genius not available to
the majority of men. As we shall see he lodges this
species of absolute knowledge in the legislator, no
longer represented by the ancient lawgiver but by the
form of scientific knowledge of the political system
itself. Yet, as it was for Plato and later for Bacon
and Hobbes (see Chapter Three below) this knowledge
must be isolated from political life proper.
Still this technical knowledge of the system of
laws and causes that comprises the general spirit does
not fully capture the true being of historical events.
Montesquieu's fundamental departure from empiricist
psychology to develop an organic theory of human nature
will not allow him to forget that men create their his-
tory out of their own wills; there is a spontaneity and
freedom to human action which causal explanation, no
matter how complex, can never capture. This aspect of
human history requires that the historian not merely
show what causes are opeative in any particular situa-
tion, but also explain how various causes are subsumed
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or repressed by others in the particular action of any
historical moment. Montesquieu's analysis of the poli-
tical content of love in the Lett res Persanes provides
one example of this sort of explanation,^^ his expla-
nation for why the Greeks needed music to soften their
military character in order to produce a whole society
is another. More important than these particular
explanations, as I will demonstrate in Chapter Five, is
Montesquieu's attempt to embody this more organic idea
of historical events in the conception of the 'princi-
ple' of a form of government.
In the end Montesquieu does not adequately recon-
cile these two ideas of the being and explanation of
history, both of which have far reaching implications
for a theory of citizenship. The first implies a view
of citizenship which is subordinate to an active civil
society into which the state interjects itself only as
the initiator of technical manipulation of natural social
mechanisms. This view is developed most clearly in the
political economy of the physiocrats and in a more so-
phisticated way by Mam Smith and the Scottish school
of political economy. It is also developed in a slight-
ly different way by the ideologues of progress: Turgot,
Condorcet, Saint-Simon and Comte. In John Stuart Mill
these two branches of Montesquieu's view come together
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in the most sophisticated attempt to formulate a liberal
theory of citizenship.
However, the other side of Montesquieu's philosophy
of history leads to a different solution to the problem
of citizenship in the modern state. Montesquieu's idea
of the principle of the form of government represents
his most far reaching attempt to synthesize in a single
system of law the two competing interpretations describ-
ed above. The 'principle' represents the subjective
internalization of the law and its outward manifestation
in society, embodying a psychological argument akin to
Freud's theory of sublimation. The same argument that
Marshall Berman sees as the logical compliment to
Montesquieu's theory of love in the Lett res Persanes
,
which I will develop more fully in my discussion of the
Lett res Persanes in Chapter Four, guides his formulation
of the principle of the form of government. This dimen-
sion of the life of citizens leads him in De L'Esprit
des Lois to formulate a political theory which retains
a strong civic virtue which is lost in earlier liberal
theory. The idea that society cannot function unless
its laws are internalized by its subjects and projected
back into society by those subjects acting in the
'spirit' of the laws provides a foundation for this
second idea of citizenship, most clearly expressed in
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the dictum that for good laws to function in a republic
they must be loved by the citizens. Out of this side
of Montesquieu's philosophy of history a theory of
citizenship is developed which links the individual
directly to political life through an elaboration of a
radical notion of public life. After him, this theory
is developed most clearly first by Rousseau and then in
different ways by Hegel and Marx.
CHAPTER II
COMMERCE AND THE EUROPEAN STATE SYSTEM-
THE CONTEXT OF CITIZENSHIP IN THE MODERN WORLD
Montesquieu considered himself a citizen of the
world.
^
He owed allegiance to particular associa-
tions, the family and the state, but his final alle-
giance was to humanite. All men belonged to a single
community that knew no 'national' boundaries. This
cosmopolitan vision defined the scope of Montesquieu's
theory of citizenship as it did for many others in
eighteenth century Europe. To understand the particular
associations which men enter into in everyday life it
is necessary to view them in their universal context.
In Montesquieu's view that context was the European
state system with its rules for relatively peaceful
coexistence among states and its commercial system based
upon a 'capitalistic' cont ractarian ethic which drew
men together in the common pursuit of a true interna-
tional community. Montesquieu's description of the
European state system meant to probe possibilities for
the realization of a Utopian vision of world peace and
human felicity. This context impressed upon him the
need for contemporary political theory to supplant the
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classical definitions of problems and solutions.
The purpose of this chapter is to trace the system
that Montesquieu saw governing the European system in
the eighteenth century and which established the setting
of the principles of action of states and citizens.
Europe of the eighteenth century presented statesmen
with a new historic moment, different both from anti-
quity and from the universalism of the Middle Ages.
Most important, new economic forces coalesced into a
vast commercial system and new political configurations
rendered traditional empire building obsolete as well
as mandated a balance of power.
Montesquieu described a European system which prom-
ised the possibility of a peaceful and prosperous commun-
ity among nations. Commerce, he believed, would impress
upon European nations the benefits of international
felicity and law. Empire based upon the Roman model of
political expansion could only have harmful effects.
In the newly discovered lands of America and in the East
expansion had to be based upon economic not political
goals. Universal Monarchy must be banished from inter-
national politics. This was the aim of Montesquieu's
description of the European system; to show European
rulers the imperative of encouraging commerce together
with the pernicious consequences of Universal Monarchy.
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I. Commerce: The International Marketplace
~
The historical development of European Commerce .
In Montesquieu's view commerce did not develop steadily
since antiquity. Trade first flourished in the Greek
world under the rule of the Athenian Empire. Situated
by the sea it was natural for the Athenians to develop
their economy on a mercantile basis. Their wealth de-
rived from their trade and their power from their abil-
ity to protect that trade and to colonize areas for eco-
nomic advantage. The Athenians, says Montesquieu, were
successful as a 'world' power because they expanded not
merely for the sake of the glory of conquest but for the
sake of commercial advantage. Roman policy was exactly
opposite. Lacking the commercial spirit of the Atheni-
ans they gloried in pure conquest. They sought colonies
not in order to establish firm trading partnerships but
in order to exact tribute."^ Hence, the creation of
secure trading networks gave way in the Roman experience
to concrete political and military domination. With the
decline of Athens and the rise of Rome commerce receded
from the center stage of world events. It was no won-
der, then, that when the Germanic tribes overran the
4Western Empire commerce was nearly obliterated.
Oriented primarily toward agriculture and hunting these
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tribes had not developed the prerequisites for a flour-
ishing of commerce. Isolated from one another, knowing
little of the arts or of craftsmanship, they perceived
little need for peaceful intercourse with others in
order to exchange different goods. ^ it would take
several centuries for trade routes to reopen and for
trade to increase in volume. When the Roman Empire
split the East did continue to trade, but most of this
was turned eastward to Asia and remained isolated from
the rest of Europe.
The modern world of the eighteenth century was very
different. Commerce penetrated the fabric of life far
re than it did that of the ancient world. There was
re of it and it took on an expanded importance for all
of society. All nations were involved and a greater
variety of goods were traded. The more powerful nations
in Europe were those most involved in commerce not those
with the greatest armies.
Montesquieu argued that the revival of trade in
Europe owed much to certain key technological inven-
tions. "The compass," he claimed, "opened the uni-
verse." It facilitated broader knowledge of Asia
and Africa and led to the discovery of America. The
expansion of the space in which trade could easily take
place put a greater premium on larger-scale enterprises
mo
mo
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than the Italian city-states had revived and controlled
during the Renaissance. Hence, this extension of the
focus of trade to the New World and the expansion of its
volume gave the larger states of Central and Northern
Europe, which had easy outlets to the Atlantic ocean and
greater resources to increase trade, a strong competi-
tive advantage. The supplanting of the Italian city-
states was crucial for the development of the European
commercial system.
The discovery of the Cape of Good Hope meant that
the western and northern states of Europe could trade
with the Levant directly, bypassing Italy. The center
of trade shifted to the larger powers of the north.
"Italy was no longer the center of the commercial
7world." Rather, it had become "no more than an ac-
cessory." First the Portuguese then the Dutch became
masters of trade to the Indies. The opening of the New
World in the Americas was even more important. The
Portuguese and the Spanish began the rush to colonize
the New World, but everyone followed.
The Spanish effort to colonize the New World and
its eventual failure were crucial to the development of
the European system. Initially at least the Spanish
were most successful; but their eventual failure demon-
strated clearly how the structure of international re-
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lations had been altered by their initial expansion.
Spanish failed, in Montesquieu's view, because
they followed the Roman model too closely concentrating
too much on political empire and not enough on trade.
By emphasizing political colonization they did not rec-
ognize that the most fruitful implication of the discov-
ery of the New World was its economic wealth and commer-
cial potential not the possibilities for political dom-
ination. The aim of colonization could no longer be to
conquer peoples, as it had been for the Romans, but to
control land in order to exploit its economic resources.
The Spanish at first regarded discovered lands
as objects of conquest; people more refinedthan them regarded them as objects of com-
merce, directing their energies toward that.Several peoples were led by such wisdom, thatthey gave empire to trading companies who,governing the extended states only for trade,have made a great accessory power, without
embarrassing the principle state.
8
Of course the Spanish did not ignore the wealth of
the colonies. They sought the wealth of precious metals
available in the New World but they were inattentive to
its possible effects on their domestic economy. Their
emphasis on military power and their corollary concern
for importing ever greater quantities of precious metals
led them to create new technologies in order to exploit
the mines more efficiently, or at least in greater vol-
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umes. But failing to understand the effects the in-
creased volume of gold and silver would have on the
value of goods in the European market they glutted the
market, thereby cheapening the metals they went to great
expense to import. Since they did not develop any cor-
ollary production of commodities to encourage either
trade or consumption, Montesquieu argues, the enhanced
volume of precious metals reduced their value enough to
impoverish the Spaniards rather than to enrich them.^
Furthermore, their emphasis on political and military
domination of the natives led them to brutalize them in
order to exploit the mines. This made the natives more
hostile, creating greater problems of political control
as well as causing dissention in civilized opinion in
Europe
.
The Spanish did nothing to develop their economy
sufficiently in order to absorb the volume of precious
metals they imported. Although Spain could not circu-
late its new wealth, other European nations took the
opportunity to increase their own wealth and power at
the expense of Spain. The Dutch and the English put
the increased wealth to work, establishing banks and
forms of credit in order to expand trade networks
throughout the world. England was unique and potenti-
ally uniquely successful because it had a tradition of
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subordinating political interests to economic inter-
ests. In this respect England joined with Athens
forming an exact counter to Rome and Spain both of which
subordinated economic interests to political interests;
the modern world belonged to England, not to Spain.
The discovery of the Americas along with the open-
ing up of unknown parts of Asia and Africa dramatically
altered the basis of international power and the nature
of imperialism. The Roman model had to give way to the
Athenian model. The Spanish failed to recognize that
power in the new international system was based upon the
continual exchange of goods, not on military force. In
the modern world there are limits to the efficacy of
political expansion. Montesquieu argued that tradition-
al imperialism and colonialism were ineffective because
increasing economic expansion encouraged the spread of
forms of influence that superseded political domination.
In this context, Montesquieu argued, Spain's emphasis
on political expansion left the economic fruits of
their conquests in the grasp of the commercial powers
of England and Holland. To understand the immense im-
portance of this situation for Montesquieu's theory we
need to look at the economics that lay behind the Span-
ish form of conquest and that which Montesquieu argued
should lay behind real commercial power.
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2. The economics of the European s^y ^t^r.. The Spanish
concern for political domination was coupled with a mer-
cantilist view of wealth and power. They considered the
quantity of precious metals directly proportional to the
amount of political power. But according to Montesquieu
this view failed to understand the nature of money.
The increased trade could not be financed by increasing
quantities of gold and silver, partly due to the infla-
tionary impact of Spain's policy and partly due to the
impracticality of the metals as a medium of exchange.
According to Montesquieu the new commercial system re-
quired new forms of credit and paper money. In the new
system wealth required abstract signs which could repre-
sent both the value which the community of merchants
considered it to have and which could represent the long
term contracts necessary to facilitate and encourage the
financing of risky commercial ventures. The mercantil-
ist equation of wealth and power could fulfill neither
of these. Montesquieu saw the need for a new theory of
money and value which understood that wealth was created
by the process of exchange and the intercourse among
mere hant s
.
In Montesquieu's theory of money and exchange,
which appears in Book XXII of De L'Esprit des Lois , the
prince establishes only the 'positive' value of money.
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essentially how much its value was in relation to the
other coins of that state's currency. But more im-
portant than this money has a value relative to the cur-
rencies of other states. This relative value is subject
to fluctuations and is governed by the many factors that
converge in the international marketplace:
The monies of each state have, moreover, arelative value;' in the sense that they arecompared with the monies of other countries;It IS this relative value that exchange estab-lishes. It depends much on the positive val-
ue. It IS fixed by the most general opinion
or merchants, and cannot be by order of theprince, because it is continually changing,
and depends on a thousand c ircumst ances . 12
One state generally serves as the leader in establishing
the relative value of money. Holland, whose banks and
merchants controlled more trade than any other state in
the early eighteenth century, set the standard which all
European merchants followed.
The prosperity of the state, in Montesquieu's view,
is determined by the quantity of international trade and
by a balance between the amount of money and the total
value of commodities in the market. The value of money
remains stable only when it is mirrored by an equal
level of commodities. "Money is a sign which represents
the value of all merchandise." The state is pros-
perous only when there is an equilibrium established
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between money and the commodities which make up its
value; in other words, that sufficient money exists (and
only that amount) to purchase the commodities that exist
and vice-versa. 1^ This restricted but did not vitiate
the use of credit. Montesquieu feared the impact of in-
flation and particularly the wild speculation of the
sort of John Law's system. He wanted to limit credit
and paper money to an actual amount of commodities
(these could be projected to be delivered in the ful-
fillment of contract at a later time). Money had to be
freed from the confines of the precious metals but
should not be freed from the goods it represents in the
sense of the commodities it could be exchanged for.
The preeminence of exchange in the market means
that the individual European economies have become
mutually dependent. States play different roles in the
international economy. Some produce goods to fill the
needs of other states while some, like Holland, act as
bankers and middlemen to facilitate exchange. The cru-
cial fact of the new system is that exchange is an im-
perative. Economically, states cannot be isolated from
one another without risking being dwarfed by more eco-
nomically active states, as Spain was dwarfed by the
physically smaller states of England and Holland. '^
The fact that European nations share their economic
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destinies has more than just economic consequences.
"Now, the commerce of the Indies is not that of Spain
but of all of Europe. Montesquieu believed that
this mutual economic dependence implied a need for all
states to actively protect trade. The international
community creates a community of the nations in Europe.
The bonds of economic necessity created by commerce
have to extend to social and political bonds as well.
In contrast to the isolation of the times before the
expansion of commerce, Montesquieu describes the modern
condition of Europe as united:
Currently, the universe is composed almost
solely of one nation, wherein each people
knows what it has too much of and what it
lacks and searches to attain the means to
receive it; gold and silver are drawn from
throughout the earth. These metals being
transported throughout, each people communi-
cates with them and there is not a single
nation whose capital in gold or in silver
does not increase each year, although at
different speeds and levels in different
states . -^^
The international market could not be limited merely to
facilitating an efficient trade network but had to gen-
erate its own ethical foundation as well. Founded on
the moral logic of the mutuality of contracts the com-
mercial ethic had to penetrate the political and social
lives of individual states. Rulers had to recognize the
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beneficial effects of commerce on moeurs and manieres.
By doing this, Montesquieu believed that the diverse
interests of independent states could help develop a
peaceful universe. His conception of the universal
benefits of commerce led him to impress upon merchants
and intellectuals a consciousness of universal citizen-
ship, which he himself felt. Let us now look more
deeply at what Montesquieu considered these universal
benefits to be.
3. The universal benefits of commerce
. Montesquieu
distinguished two sorts of commerce: the commerce of
economy and the commerce of luxury."^® Whereas the
latter, he argues, is most appropriate to monarchies
the former is more appropriate to republics . "'^ In a
commerce based upon luxury merchants seek grand projects
with the aim of "procuring to the nation which promotes
it all that which serves its pride, delights and fanta-
sies." Unlike the commerce of economy, the commerce of
luxury seeks large short term gains emphasizing spending
and downplaying savings. The symbols of success are
physical signs: quantities of gold; ornamental dress;
opulent consumption, etc. . . . This economy of grand
style was clearly appopriate and necessary to court life
where action was motivated by honor and the purpose of
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rewards was to distinguish the worth of men from that
of others. The mind of the merchant dealing in luxuries
is susceptable to charlatan schemes such as John Law's
system-the promise of a great increase in wealth was
irresistable and the more outrageous Law's promised rate
of return, the more enticing the deal became. The re-
sult, of course, was to ruin some of France's most tra-
ditional families of wealth and even to challenge the
basic principles of the monarchy itself.
The commerce of economy operates on a very differ-
ent logic. The economic rationality appropriate to it
is that of the capitalist free market. Merchants begin
with little and through moderate increases in profit
grow wealthy. But the merchant must always be content
with small short term gains, even occasional losses, in
order to increase profits in the long run. "One com-
merce leads to another, " he claims in Book Twenty of De
L' Esprit des Lois on the nature of commerce, "the small
to the middling, the middling to the great, and the one
who has had so much a desire of gaining little, puts
himself in the position of gaining much." The capital-
ist merchant is more efficient than his counterpart who
deals in luxury. He must be cautious, always concerned
with saving for prudent investments with an eye toward
long range profit.
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The benefits of the commerce of economy far out-
weigh those of the commerce of luxuries. The former
encourages an international system by seeking trade
Wherever it is profitable, in the process expanding the
horizons of any particular nation. The capitalist mer-
chant is able to exploit the unlimited potentials of
world trade whereas the merchant dealing in luxuries
limits himself only to trade which leads to immediate
wealth. The commerce of luxury survives only when a
society can absorb a non-productive class, a privileged
class of nobility. So long as workers and merchants
produce a surplus to support this nobility the stability
of the state is secured. Workers and merchants must be
kept from acquiring independent means, for this removes
their incentive to work well, bringing about general
ruin in the state. The capitalist merchant is in less
danger of becoming wealthy enough to discourage contin-
ual work. The spirit of his rule does not encourage
conspicuous signs of wealth, but rather a judicious
poverty. When the proper laws are adopted, such as
those limiting inheritances, merchants and craftsmen are
induced to work continually. Montesquieu's law that the
rationality of continual small investments can lead to
maximum profits ensures that capitalist merchants will
spread their commerce wherever they can, always seeking
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new opportunities for investment and trade.
The priority of work in Montesquieu's economic
theory derives from his theory of human nature. As I
discussed in Chapter One above, the essence of human
nature for Montesquieu is a natural balance between man
and his world~a natural moderation and appropriateness
of subject and object. The activity which creates the
essential harmony is work. "Nature is just towards
..21
men, rewarding him in proportion to his efforts.
The more one works the greater the benefits nature pro-
vides. So long as man's natural efforts are encouraged
he and nature will prosper. The government must follow
this natural inclination. It must not remove those
natural incentives to work, or else work itself will be
destroyed along with the wealth of the state. But
neither should the state leave men free in the 'pure'
market; for work and wealth, as for all social goods,
contain moral imperatives to moderation. Both the ex-
tremes of riches and poverty which the market has the
potential to create, and the tyranny of despotism which
leaves no room for natural human endeavors to grow, have
the same pernicious and unnatural effect—to destroy
the supremacy of work as the preeminent natural human
. . 22
activity
.
The commerce of economy has social as well as eco-
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nomic benefits, both domestic and international. Within
states the work ethic implied by capitalist commerce
produces, if not the virtuous citizens of ancient repub-
lics, citizens who are absorbed in activities which in-
crease the wealth of the state while minimizing social
conflict. As I mentioned above, capitalist accumulation
with respect to individuals must have clear limits for
it can only be self
-perpetuating so long as merchants
do not become so wealthy as to create a desire and need
for luxuries to distinguish themselves from their fel-
low merchants. The market must not be allowed to create
extremes of wealth and poverty for this causes tension
and insecurity in the state. In order to stress this
point Montesquieu distinguishes two types of poverty,
poverty produced by despotism and poverty produced by a
scarcity of commodities. The latter is completely ben-
eficial whereas the former is utterly pernicious. Suc-
cessful commerce requires the security of private prop-
erty. Merchants must be sure that they will be able to
enjoy their profits if they are to risk their capital
in order to increase it. Despotism leads to a perni-
cious poverty because merchants are not encouraged to
work, whereas the lack of commodities combined with the
security of private property encourages a spirit of
accumulation in merchants who are certain that their
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gains will not be arbitrarily confiscated . ^3 Trade
in a despotism, then, stagnates, whereas under moderate
governments it flourishes.
The commerce of economy has other domestic benefits
as well. The ethic of moderate accumulation of the mer-
chant creates a social life which limits conflict to
manageable proportions. At the head of Book XX, Chapter
2 on the nature of commerce, Montesquieu proclaims the
overwhelming goodness of commerce:
Commerce undermines destructive prejudices,
and it is almost a general rule that wherever
there are softened moeurs, there is commerce;
and wherever there is commerce there are
softened moeurs.
Thus it is not so astonishing that our
moeurs are less ferocious than they used to
be. Commerce has brought about the acquain-
tance with the moeurs of all nations, causing
them to penetrate throughout the world: we
have compared them with each other, and this
has resulted in great benefits.
The benefits of Montesquieu's conception of a work
ethic extend beyond individual states. The spirit of
commerce limits the warlike nature of man. Montes-
quieu's idealism, however, is limited. Social conflict
is not eliminated, but he believed that commercial so-
cial relations would encourage the formal adjudication
of rival claims (at least among merchants and between
24them and the state). The ethic of contracts, that
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commercial relations can only take place if both parties
accept the fundamental rule of performing contracts
made, implies a formal-legal procedure. Merchants seek
gain according to their own self-interest. Yet they
recognize the necessity of the mutuality of their con-
dition—that the self-interests of other merchants are
also legitimate. It is illustrative to counterpose
Montesquieu's conception of the international situation
to the Hobbesian model of a state of war which was ac-
cepted by many of Montesquieu's contemporaries. In
Hobbes the ethical logic of contract tends to undermine
the realism of his state of nature as a state of war.
He must somehow produce out of the state of nature in-
dividuals capable of recognizing the logic of contract
as a foundation of civil society. This seems, however,
to contradict several of Hobbes 's most important assump-
tions about the natural condition of men. It also con-
tradicts his conclusion that ethical life does not have
any foundation other than the positive will and power
of the sovereign. Clearly, the ethic of contract es-
tablishes far stronger social and moral bonds, as
Montesquieu recognizes, than the sovereign's power ever
could. The implications for international politics is
even more crucial. Within a system of states based upon
self-interest and a permanent state of war, which Hobbes
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and other contemporaries believed was an adequate de-
scription of international politics, existed a preestab
lished ethical system based upon the sanctity of con-
tracts. As Montesquieu realized, this ethical system
could explain far more of the development of the inter-
national system than could the pure power politics view
of the Hobbesians.^^
Domestically, the commerce of economy provides the
possibilities for a stable republic. However, this is
not a pure republic. In republics based upon virtCi con
flicts are resolved organically in the processes of
everyday public action. Self-interest is understood to
depend on the public good. But in commercial republics
based upon capitalist commerce and work, self-interest,
not the public good must form the basis for resolving
conflicts. Commercial republics must give up the or-
ganic virtu of classical republics and replace it with
the work ethic of the commerce of economy. In the con-
text of Montesquieu's realism this is a minor problem.
He felt that the geopolitical situation of physically
large states and the expansion of the world commerce
already rendered classical republics obsolete. This
was the major point of his general history of commerce
which I described at the beginning of the chapter. Un-
der modern conditions the capitalist commercial ethic
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could replace the virtu of classical republics, just as
the federative republic could replace the small self-
contained republic of antiquity. The
• moeurs ' of cap-
italist commerce do not encourage the self-sacrifice of
authentic republican virtu, but they do encourage fair-
ness in dealings with others even if that fairness is
primarily formal.
Internationally, capitalist commerce has even
greater benefits than it does domestically. it provides
an ethical basis, a 'cosmopolitan ethic,' out of which
a peaceful universe can emerge.
Within the international commercial system amity
and peace, not war, must reign. The mutual dependence
of states requires a consciousness that Europe's shared
destiny is in increased dependence. Contractual ethics
are inconsistent with war. Relations among merchants
must be predictable. Merchants in England who have
contracted to buy wine in Bordeaux must be sure that
nothing will interfere with the fulfillment of the
agreement. War cannot be allowed to disrupt the free
flow of goods and states must be encouraged to protect
the property of merchants and neither encourage nor
practice piracy, common in the eighteenth century. The
creation of the armies necessary for war drains valuable
resources which could be utilized better by merchants.
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and thus, as I will show below, Montesquieu believed
that no amount of military power could render a state
more secure. In short, the mutuality of the interna-
tional system requires peace:
The natural effect of commerce is to bring
peace. Two nations which trade together ren-
der themselves reciprocally dependent: if one
has an interest in buying the other has inter-
est in selling, and all unions are founded on
mutual needs. 26
Not only the economic benefits from international
commerce but also the social benefits incline towards
peace. "The history of commerce," Montesquieu claims,
'is that of the communication of peoples." Intel-
lectuals play a crucial role in the commercial system.
The international travelers such as Usbek and Rica in
the fictional Lettres Persanes
, as well as Montesquieu
himself, must have a secure place in the international
community spreading knowledge and developing man's uni-
versal Reason. As Raphael did in Thomas More ' s Utopia
,
and the more reflective authors of the travel journals
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries reasserted,
the intellectual traveler has the task of spreading the
knowledge of all cultures on the globe to all others.
Montesquieu's comparative method was rooted in the pos-
itive value of this universal human community. It was
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method not only as scientific tool but as moral impera-
tive. By comparing different cultures one could learn
the defects of one's own and cement a universal brother-
hood based upon reason and knowledge. Francis Bacon's
New Atlantis had made the same point. Montesquieu's
theory of the benefits of international commerce raised
the Utopian notions of More, Bacon and others to the
self-conscious level of scientific theory. By implant-
ing the Utopian vision of an international community
within an economic analysis of commerce and a method of
comparing all the laws and practices of all known states
in order to draw out the best laws and political maxims,
Montesquieu produced a powerful argument for a peaceful
world order to which liberal advocates of capitalism
have often returned without recognizing, until recent-
2 8ly
,
the rather complex development Montesquieu had
already given to it.
II. International Justice and Law;
The Politics of International Citizenship
The international commercial system requires a
political parallel. Montesquieu is clear that tradi-
tional imperialism, called by the eighteenth century
"universal monarchy, " had no future in European poli-
tics. It was incompatible with the cosmopolitan ethic
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Which had been developing among merchants and which the
spread of commerce required. Yet Montesquieu was not
blind to a certain force in the doctrine of raison
d'etat. States, especially monarchies, did act on an
interpretation of national interest based upon the as-
sumptions of an international state of war. In the
current international system naked power did confront
naked power. But the international commercial system
implied a compatible political system, and Montesquieu
sought to free the interpretation of the state's inter-
est from the notion of raw power and replace it with
one of mutuality. His political theory of the state
system is no less bounded by the laws of historical
development and the actual historical development of
Europe than is his theory of commerce. In short, he
argues for international political relations wherein
the interests of states are mediated through an inter-
national balance of power and are governed by maxims of
international law derived from universal principles of
just ice
.
1. The critique of universal monarchy
. Montesquieu
declares in the opening of "Reflexions Sur la Monarchie
Uni verselle, " published with the "Considerations Sur Les
Causes de la Grandeur des Romains et de leur Decadence,
"
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in 1734, that universal monarchy is impossible in con-
temporary Europe. Here as well as in De L'Esprit de.
Lois, especially in Books IX and X, Montesquieu develops
three arguments against universal monarchy: economic,
geopolitical, and legal-moral. Woven together into a
single argument, these three amount to a complete rejec-
tion of the project of universal monarchy, based upon
power politics. In its place Montesquieu urges the
general recognition that modern Europe forms a single
community governed by necessary and generally accepted
rules of action. In the "Reflexions" Montesquieu argues
that "today all civilized nations are, if I may say it,
members of a great Republic. Riches make for power;
there not being today any nation which has advantages
that a richer power may not be able almost always to
have" (p. 21). The growth of commerce has meant a rel-
ative equality among the nations of Europe.
Montesquieu's first argument against universal
monarchy asserts that the stability of the state is
determined by its geopolitical relation to other states.
As a general rule large states such as monarchies are
more stable than smaller republics. But stability can-
not be found in unlimited military deploymment and ex-
pansion. The contemporary European policy of raising
larger and larger numbers of troops only leads to
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max-
LS
greater insecurity. Contradicted by those prudent
ims Which could be drawn from history, this policy ha,
severe consequences for the political and economic sta-
bility of the state. As one nation expands its military
force others must follow, thereby nullifying the posi-
tive benefits the initial increase might seem to have
meant for the security of the state. Furthermore,
as the state expands it requires more and more troops
in order to protect it, draining the state's resources
to an ever greater degree. The spirit of conquest cre-
ates the desire for honor and luxuries among the troops,
making it more difficult to keep them under control.
Paradoxically, then, a policy to strengthen power actu-
ally results in the ultimate ruin of the state.
The maintenance of armies is detrimental to the
state economically as well as socially and politically.
The ancient practice of pillaging a conquered people in
order to pay an army is no longer sanctioned either by
law or custom. Modern men recoil in horror at such
30barbarian practices. Hence the state must itself
furnish the economic necessities of war. This strains
the national economy both in manpower and in wealth, in
the eighteenth century French case requiring the in-
crease in already burdensome taxes on the poor.
But the changed nature of modern conquest causes
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deeper problems for the state. The modern spirit of
conquest, according to Montesquieu, must be conservation
not destruction. It must aim to preserve the conquered
area so that it can be exploited for the good ot the
conquered as well as thegood of the conqueror. Expan-
sion of this sort tends to undermine the power of the
conquering state, rather than enhance it. The mainte-
nance of occupying armies requires that wealth be trans-
ferred from the conquering state to the conquered, im-
poverishing the aggressor and enhancing the ability of
the victim to raise its defenses and eventually expell
the enemy. ^1 in Montesquieu's view, the dynamic of
conquest in modern Europe makes it impossible for a
nation to enjoy the fruits of conquest.
The history of European states demonstrates that
there are natural limits to a state's growth. The ways
in which the structure of states has changed histori-
cally is crucial to Montesquieu's argument. The small
ancient republics were inherently unstable. In their
world it was possible for a republic to subsist so long
as its power could be put in a balance with other repub-
lics of similar size. But as I made clear at the be-
ginning of this chapter the rise of forms of political
organization based upon greater extension threatened
the security of those republics.
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A new form of republican government, the federativ.
republic, however, provides a solution to the dilemma.
In several modern cases-Holland, Germany and Switzer-
land-small republics have banded together into a singl.
federative republic. Germany is the weakest because it
is formed by small monarchies rather than republics.
This causes greater internal dissension. Federative
states work best as unions of republics because monar-
chies, even small ones, establish competing centers of
political identification, making it more difficult for
citizens to form the bonds to the republic necessary
for its subsistence and more difficult for the individ-
ual monarchs to recognize and accept the general inter-
est of the republic. The German federation, then, em-
bodies a fundamental contradiction:
The spirit of monarchy is war and aggrandize-
ment; the spirit of republic is peace and
moderation. These two sorts of governments
can exist in a federative republic only by
force . 32
The idea of a federative republic reflects one of
Montesquieu's most important principles, that war and
peace cannot mix, for their spirits contradict one an-
other. War cannot be accepted as a legitimate act in
international diplomacy except under strict conditions.
The spirit of monarchy is not conducive to the
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union necessary to federative republics. Monarchies
based upon luxuries do not encourage the felicity of
moeurs and manieres. Instead, luxury encourages aggran-
dizement of the state not contentment with a modest sit-
uation. The spirit of republics, particularly commer-
cial republics, is more consistent with a defensive
orientation to force than is the spirit of monarchy.
When properly composed, federative republics present an
attractive model. "It enjoys the goodness of the in-
terior government of each, and with regard to externals,
it has by the force of association, all the advantages
of great monarchies.'
This federation is more than a mere system of
alliances. Rather, Montesquieu describes it as a
"society of societies. ""^"^ The union is secured
internally by the republican virtu of the individual
republics, or by work if they are commercial republics,
and by a balance of power between them. If one state
should aspire to supremacy, the others would bind
together against it. In order to secure the whole the
autonomy of the individual republics, especially in the
. . 35
sphere of foreign policy, must be limited.
It is clear that such nations should not be expan-
sionist. By their nature as associations they must in-
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corporate all conquered areas into the responsibilities
of the association. Montesquieu's argument that democ
racies should not conquer other states holds for feder-
ative republics as well.^^ Aggressive democracies,
he argues drawing from his study of Roman history, have
two possible courses of action, both equally dangerous.
They may choose to extend citizenship to the conquered
peoples, but the extension of the number of citizens be-
yond that natural number appropriate to them opens the
state up to the countless instabilities which Montesquieu
demonstrates in the "Considerations Sur Les Causes de la
Grandeur des Romains et de leur Decadence ." "^"^ If they
choose the alternative course, governing the conquered
territories directly, they invite the creation of a
class of magistrates too powerful and too ill-spirited
to remain within republican rule. Furthermore, as
Montesquieu's study of the Roman empire allowed him to
see, soldiers, particularly generals, do not embody the
spirit appropriate to making peaceful public policies.
War and peace do not mix.
It is important to stress the precarious nature of
republics, for this insight provides the key to Montes-
quieu's defensive orientation to force. He opens Book
of De L'Esprit des Lois , "Of the Laws in Relation
with Defensive Force," by declaring the natural insecur-
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ity of republics: "If a republic is small, it is de-
stroyed by a foreign force, if it is large, it is de-
stroyed by an interior vice." Federative republics
solve these difficulties only when they renounce offen-
sive force. If they have armies, the state must be
carefully insulated from them, ensuring that they cannot
usurp power (a major failing of the Roman republic) and
armies must not be used to expand the state beyond its
natural limits. The same principle also applies to
monarchies
.
No less than republics, monarchies should limit
their expansion. The spirit of monarchy encourages
aggrandizement. Its commercial practices based upon
pursuit of luxury and its principle, honor, seem to
imply that imperial expansion is natural to them. Gen-
erals can best distinguish themselves by conquest, and
monarchs are constantly looking to expansion to enhance
the grandeur of their power. But even for monarchies
continued expansion only leads to ruin. These limits
are reached in several ways.
The fundamental defense of the state rests upon its
ability to deploy troops along its borders quickly and
efficiently. The larger the state becomes the more dif-
ficult the maxim becomes to enforce. If a monarchy
becomes too large it will have trouble defending its
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borders. As in republics, Montesquieu concludes, mili-
tary policy in a monarchy should emphasize defensive not
offensive force:
The true power of a prince does not consist
so much in the facility to conquer as in thedifficulty that one would have in attacking
It
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and, if I dare say it, in the immutability
of this condition. But the expansion of
states demonstrates to others new sides from
which it can be attacked. 39
Monarchies require greater extension than do republics,
but their extension cannot go beyond natural limits
established by the population and wealth of the state.
If it is too small it can be conquered by larger states,
but if it is too large it will be unable to defend it-
self completely. Seams will necessarily open in its
defenses, and enemies will quickly perceive its vulner-
ability and exploit it. Monarchies, then, should not
conquer beyond their 'natural limits.' "Prudence de-
mands that she (monarchy) stop herself as soon as she
possesses those limits. "^^
For monarchies, as well as for republics, the ex-
ternal threats are compounded by even greater threats
from within. The dynamic of conquest in the case of
monarchies threatens the state with erosion due to "in-
terior vice." Political conquest, driven by the luxury
of the state, leads to the creation of decadent centers
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of luxury-particularly in the capital city. As did
many of his contemporaries, Montesquieu associated
cities in a monarchy, particularly a single capital
city, with luxury, and the rural countryside with a
more simple and natural lifestyle. The more a monarchy
conquers, the more polarized the relation between city
and country becomes. The result is to impoverish
the countryside. Wealth in the form of basic necessi-
ties is drained off from the provinces in order to main-
tain the troops necessary for either defense or further
conquest. Wealth in the form of greater and greater
luxury swells the city. The draining of resources must
surely result in destroying the internal domestic com-
merce, so crucial to rural producers. Montesquieu, the
wine producer from Bordeaux, clearly diagnosed the dan-
gers of expansion for the rural economy. His critique
of conquering monarchies calls from him some of his most
vivid imagery:
Such is the necessary state of a conquering
monarchy; a frightful luxury within the capi-
tal, misery within the far away provinces,
and abundance in the extremities. It is the
same as with our planet 7 fire at the center,
plush green at the surface, and an arid, fri-
gid, and sterile earth between.
The prudent monarchy, attentive to domestic and inter-
national pressures, must thus know when and how to limit
95
expansion.
Expansion is as dangerous to states economically
as it is politically. By establishing new criteria for
measuring the wealth of the state commerce establishes
a balance of power among the nations of Europe. in
keeping with his moral theory of natural moderation,
Montesquieu claims, "Prosperity itself sets its own
limits." And for the European states to prosper
they must embody this fundamental maxim in their pol-
icies.
The international commercial system is centered in
Europe. "Europe at present," Montesquieu claims, "does
all the commerce and all the navigation of the uni-
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verse." Within Europe the distribution of power is
determined by the extent that nations partake of this
trade. Economic power thus sets new requirements for
foreign policy. If states seek to increase their power,
conquest must be subordinated to economic development.
Government ally they must encourage their citizens to
enter trade and to develop an interest in the smooth
flow of goods. In the eighteenth century war caused
great havoc in international credit markets and wars
for control of trade disrupted the free flow of goods.
Together with the instabilities in the nature of the
international market (natural disasters, crop failures.
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etc.
. .) government policies based upon military
aggrandizement, Montesquieu believed, actually reduced
the power of the state. Over the long run military
force is ineffective; security can only be assured by a
strong commerce whether based on capitalism or on the
acquisition of luxuries. The thrust of Montesquieu's
argument is that the modern commercial system determines
wealth in a much more flexible way than mercantilist
supporters of the idea of universal monarchy thought.
Prosperity and the good of the state derive from the
advantageous participation of the citizens in commerce,
not merely from the quantity of gold and silver that
the state is able to control. Political conquest must
be secondary to economic movement.
2. Defensive force and international law . Throughout
European history, military conquest has played a far
less important role than is customarily thought. Mon-
tesquieu's theory of the laws of history led him to rec-
ognize that the fundamental changes that have affected
the course of European history have not been military.
"If histories are examined," he states in the "Reflex-
ions," (p. 21) "they will show that wars have not been
responsible for the great changes that have taken place
in Europe during the past four-hundred years." Consis-
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tent with his theory of history, Montesquieu argued
that "civil dispositions" cause European states to
change. Revolutionary changes are changes in moeurs
and manieres, not in political domination. Certainly,
politics can affect these. The traditional diplomacy
of the last several centuries had made important
changes. "Marriages, successions, treaties and edicts"
have made some difference. But in the end even these
have been less important than changes in 'civil dispo-
sition.' And it is commerce that has brought about the
most important revolution in moeurs and manieres.
When Montesquieu turns to a discussion of offensive
force in Book X of De L' Esprit des Lois he completes his
theory of the modern European state system. The inter-
national community created by commerce has its political
compliment in the prudent orientation to defensive
force and in international law and morality. Although
Montesquieu allows the use of offensive force under
certain conditions these must be clearly determined by
international law. "Offensive force," he argues, "is
ruled by the 'droit des gens' which is the political
law of nations considered in their relations to one
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another." Any use of offensive force, indeed any
use of force, must have both utilitarian and moral
j ust i f icat ions
.
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Under particular conditions 'necessity can justify
war. But here Montesquieu's emphasis on defense becomes
primary. Clearly, a state has a right to respond when
attacked. indeed, following Grotius, he goes even fur-
ther, accepting a state's right to initiate a preemptive
war, drawing the parallel, as Grotius had done, between
private and public war.^^ Just as individuals have a
right of self-defense, so does a state:
In the case of natural defense, I have a rightto kill because my life is my own, as the life
of the one who attacks me is his own: a state
makes war the same way, because its conserva-tion IS just as all other conservation. 47
Montesquieu does make one crucial addition to Grotius'
principles, that the spirit of war must be 'conserva-
tion. ' A state has no right to make war in order to
expand unless this is necessary for the conservation of
the state.
Consequently, if offensive war is undertaken strict
rules for the treatment of the citizens of other states
must be followed. The rule of conservation must apply
to both the conqueror and the conquered. In this case,
Montesquieu's thesis relies on the abstract concept of
state sovereignty as logically equivalent to a free in-
dividual. Arguing that conquering states have no right
to destroy either the population or the social fabric
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(moeurs, mani^res and customs) o£ a conquered state,
Montesquieu asserts that "society is the union o£ .en.
not the men, the citizen may perish but the man re-
48main." The society of the conquered state is not
to be dissolved by conquest and the conquering state
must respect its social and political customs.
It is crucial to recognize the combination of right
and necessity in Montesquieu's theory of war and con-
quest. The laws of international conduct follow Montes-
quieu's view of dynamic laws of history; they have both
moral and utilitiarian force. The Spanish treatment
of the natives in America is the exception which proves
the rule. Concerned more with political conquest than
commercial expansion, the Spaniards disregarded the
spirit of conservation. They enslaved the native popu-
lations and slaughtered them when they thought it best
served their purpose. Morally indefensible, this policy
also led to the decline of Spanish power with relation
to other European states. The injustices and imprudence
of their behavior made it impossible for them to enjoy
the fruits of conquest
.
Montesquieu states clearly that the Spanish case
is not an isolated one and that it represents a more
general principle. Monarchies especially are prone to
violate the prudent principles of conquest. A monarch's
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advisers must be careful to follow correct principles
rather than seek the glory of the prince. Glory, he
asserts, "is a passion, not a legitimate right.
International right and morality must constitute part
of the definition of the raison d'etat. states must
make war only when necessary (i.e., only when the 'con-
servation' of the state is threatened) and then accord-
ing to strict principles of justice. The consequences
of failing to follow the principles of law and morality
which Montesquieu articulates here will lead to the most
devastating results:
The right of war derives, then, from neces-
sity and rigid justice. If those who adviseprinces do not hold themselves to this all islost; and when (the right of war) is founded
on arbitrary principles of glory, convenience
Ibienseance) or utility, waves of blood willinundate the earth. 52
Although not as widely accepted and practiced as
Montesquieu thought necessary, the rise of general re-
spect for international law in modern Europe had pro-
duced a more peaceful and less cruel system than did
the practices of the ancients. The emphasis on defen-
sive force and the strict rules regarding the use of
offensive force cement a truly international community
in which commerce can flourish. Modern reason, reli-
gion, philosophy and moeurs, Montesquieu asserts, limit
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the brutality of 'the perpetual state of war." it is
worth repeating that for Montesquieu, Hobbes ' charac-
terization of international relations does not adequate-
ly capture the experience of the new European system.
To interpret this system in Hobbesian terms is to set
the stage morally and intellectually for immense cruel-
ties and injustices, as well as for the ruin of the
state.
Montesquieu's principles also extend beyond Europe
to include the territories of the New World. However,
there are important differences. While dismissing cruel
treatment of natives as unjust and imprudent, Montesquieu
does not outlaw either colonialism or slavery, so long
as they follow from the spirit of conservation.
If used properly, conquest of primitive nations
can be universally beneficial. It can bring more re-
fined moeurs to cruel and unenlightened nations and
prosperity to the European economy. Conquered states,
Montesquieu argues, are almost always in a state of
disarray, so that the conquest can actually benefit them
by providing a security that did not exist. If the
conquering state has the best interest of the conquered
in mind the conquest can be justified, so long as the
conqueror preserves the customs and moeurs of the nation
5 5to the greatest extent possible. The mistake made
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by the Spanish in Mexico was that they attempted only
to exploit and to dominate the native population. Had
they used their conquest in order to teach the Mexicans
the true tenets of religion and morality, leaving them
their own customs, both the Spanish and the Mexicans
would have drawn great benefits. In short, Montesquieu
allows colonial conquest so long as the conquering na-
tion accepts the responsibilities which conquest en-
tails.
Montesquieu strains his principles in order to give
a limited defense of slavery under particular condi-
tions. The legitimate right of domination includes a
right of slavery only when it is necessary to the return
of the subject people to order through the imbuement
in them of more gentle moeurs. Even in this case the
period of slavery must be short. For example, Montes-
quieu justifies the enslavement of some Romans by the
Germanic tribes after the fall of the western empire on
the grounds that they had become so warlike that they
had to be reeducated in more civilized moeurs and
manieres. In general, slavery is justified as a
colonial policy only if the would be slaves were incap-
able of establishing a stable order and the alternative
would be chaos and mass destruction.
Montesquieu's allowance for a right of conquest is
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rooted in an idea of progress which leads to the univer-
sality of the European system. On one level he agrees
with Bacon that the spread of science and knowledge
constitutes new possibilities for the happiness of man-
kind. Technology leads to improved commerce and the
subsequent spread of knowledge of different peoples.
The increase in the range of knowledge in turn encour-
ages a softening of moeurs which makes moderate govern-
ment possible. The development of new modes of scien-
tific inquiry broadens man's knowledge of the physical
universe and man's relation to it, leading to more
rational forms of social organization. The peaceful
world order that commerce and international law make
possible is the result of historical development accord-
ing to rational laws. By the eighteenth century it was
possible for this European centered system to spread
throughout the globe. If the end of conquest and even
slavery was to bring distant peoples into the fold of
this European system then it would have been justified.
But on another level, Montesquieu did not draw the
optimistic conclusions which Bacon's eighteenth century
followers were prone to draw. He was not optimistic
about the prospects of the new system. There was no
determinism in Montesquieu's view, no eschatological
vision. Commerce and international law establish the
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preconditions for a peaceful and universally beneficial
world order. However, men had to put it into practice.
Montesquieu was ' Utopian' only in the sense that he saw
that if men acted according to true principles, history
provided the possibility of a happy future, at least
for a time. But he was not a visionary. The possibil-
ity of a pacific world order resulted from the scienti-
fic understanding of history, from understanding his-
torical facts through the lens of proper principles.
Furthermore, there was considerable variety in Montes-
quieu's vision. he did not have a single vision regard-
ing the constitutions of all states. He only sought a
world in which all states and individuals would develop
their particular potentialities in peaceful harmony with
others. Under particular conditions he could be either
a monarchist or a republican, depending upon what form
of government best fit particular nations and so long
as they recognized a sense of universal citizenship
which would allow them to recognize and want to preserve
the particularlity of others.
III. Conclusion; The State System and Citizenship
Montesquieu's study of the European state system
led him to recognize the need for new modes of political
action in the modern state. Most important, the modern
105
state system required commerce, therefore demanding the
development of moeurs, manieres and laws which would
encourage it. For Montesquieu, political space has ex-
panded internally as well as externally. Politics in
the modern world must encompass more of the human mind,
the soul, than ever before. Unlike in the classical
world the modern political subject has a spirit which
makes itself known to the world through the social in-
teraction of individuals. The modern idea of citizen-
ship has become politically problematic, whereas it was
not for the classical Greeks.
There have been few attempts to understand Montes-
quieu's theory of the European system. His theory of
the benefits of commerce have recently drawn renewed
attention, specifically from Thomas Pangle and Albert
58O. Hirschman. But neither attempts to connect
Montesquieu's political economy, as he himself does, to
the international political community. Albert Sorel on
the other hand discusses Montesquieu's acceptance of
the principles of Machiavellian power politics without
59discussing the importance of the commercial system.
In the previous chapter and in the present one I
have developed Montesquieu's own view of the general
structure of the world in which the contemporary citizen
acts. Permeated by moral and physical causes this view
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acts both as a description of man's current situation
and as a program for a valuable future. Man in society
has a history which must be properly conceptualized,
understood and studied if peoples are to be known, and
their particular possibilities for the future charted
out. History is always history of a specific context
and has nothing to do with abstract theories of a state
of nature. The social world Montesquieu sees is a
European dominated one. This is not to say that he con-
sidered it 'the best of all possible worlds.' Rather,
to his mind, its being was an historical fact. The an-
cient political solutions to political and moral dilem-
mas so revered by scholars, including Montesquieu him-
self, had limited application. The classical world
which they represented was as removed from modern con-
ditions as was the image of Socrates choosing to die by
poison rather than betray the laws of Athens was from
the image of the modern courtier. Classical political
philosophy provides Montesquieu with powerful stimuli
to reflection about contemporary politics, but not so-
lutions to its problems.
Modern Europe exhibited a greatly expanded politi-
cal space, both geographically and phenomenologically
.
Geographically, Europe had become the center of a com-
munity which stretched throughout the globe, bringing
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distant cultures and peoples into its orbit. As did
many eighteenth century French intellectuals Montesquieu
often showed considerable respect for the value of dis-
tant cultures. At the same time, however, he tended to
uphold as universal principles drawn from the specifi-
cally European experience. He would not go so far as
Diderot's "Supplement to Bougainville's 'Voyage'" which
prefers the supremacy of the simple life of nature to
the complex world of European laws and mores. Rather,
Montesquieu retains faith in the traditional VJestern
mind and in the growth of modern science to solve the
enigmas that the modern world presented.
Phenomenologically, political space expanded to
include all facets of life. In classical thought poli-
tical space defined the forum in which citizens debated
the public good and in the late middle ages politics
came to be seen as a struggle between the universality
of the Church and the particularity of secular author-
ity. In this case political space could be defined only
negatively as that space left aside by the Church. How-
ever, in the early modern state political space was
broadened to include all social relationships. Calvin-
ism, by organizing Protestantism into a politically
self-conscious movement, politicized even the most pri-
vate sphere of personal faith. Early liberal thought
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attempted to disentangle the private from the public by
defining a sphere in which the individual qua individual
could be freed from the constraints of the power of the
collectivity. This is the subject of the next chapter.
Montesquieu accepted the phenomenolog ical expansi
of political space and sought to examine the specific
ways in which persona] and social life had become poli-
ticized. Politics involves a broader range of relation-
ships in the modern state than it did in the ancient
polis. The modern subject confronts networks of rela-
tions in which he must act. Moeurs, manieres, tradi-
tions, and laws all constain his action. Together,
these networks of relations form a nation's 'esprit
general.' 'Monarchy,' 'republic' and 'despotism' rep-
resent networks of laws—
' necessary relations' which
have their own dynamic, their own spirit. They call on
men to act so as to preserve them, to bring out their
best by developing their inner logic. Montesquieu
sought to discover this inner logic and to report its
requirements.
The spread of Europe was nowhere more clear than
in the development of technology. Montesquieu's judg-
ment about the value of modern technology in the new
world was not simple, as the debate between Rhedi and
Usbek about the value of Western technology in Letters
on
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CV and CVI of the Lettres Persan.. niakes clear.
Rhedi opens his attack on technology by telling
Usbek, "... I am not so sure that the profit drawn
from them [the arts and sciences] can make reparation
to men for the bad use made of them daily. "^^
gues first that the change in military technology has
made war more devastating. The invention of mortar
shells renders all cities vulnerable, no matter how well
fortified. This results in the need for a greater num-
ber of regular troops, which act to oppress the people
as much as to defend them. He concludes that "since the
invention of gunpowder, there is no impregnable city,
which is to say, Usbek, that there is no asylum on earth
against violence and injustice." After mentioning the
pernicious effects of chemistry, Rhedi goes on to attack
the value of colonialism. The compass has brought more
harm to Europe than good; but perhaps more devastating
is its effect on the natives in the New World:
But
. . .
this invention has been ruinous for
the countries that have been discovered. En-
tire nations have been destroyed, and men who
have escaped death have been reduced to such
crude servitude that the story of it makes
Moslems shiver.
Usbek replies in the following letter that there
are two ways to read history. Gunpowder has indeed
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Changed combat, but the change is really for the better.
Wars are shorter than they were formerly, and since
troops do not any longer directly engage those of the
enemy, battles are less bloody. As for the future in-
vention of cruel weapons, Usbek assures Rhedi that they
would be renounced by Princes and outlawed by interna-
tional law. "Princes have no interest in conquering by
such means. They have to be on the lookout for addi-
tional subjects, not territory ."
Usbek then shifts the grounds of the argument show-
ing that the invention of the arts and sciences has re-
inforced the work ethic and the capitalist market, even
in a commerce based on luxury, bringing about supreme
benefits to all mankind. "Softness and idleness," he
concludes, "are incompatible with the arts." Certainly
the result of the arts has been luxury, but this has
benefitted rather than harmed French society. In Paris,
all are encouraged to work in order not to be surpassed
in wealth by their neighbors. This wards off the su-
preme danger of laziness and channels individual ambi-
tion into productive work which benefits the entire
society. Usbek goes so far as to conclude, "that to
keep a prince powerful, his subjects must live in plea-
sure. He must work to secure all manner of superfluity
for them, devoting to this as much attention as he turns
Ill
to the necessities of life."^"^
In the Lettres Persanes the argument between the
costs and benefits of technology is left unresolved, but
the importance of posing the issue as Montesquieu does
cannot be underestimated. it raises the more general
question of the ultimate value of the modern world over
the ancient, a question of profound importance for other
eighteenth century thinkers, especially Rousseau, and
which taunts the radicals of the French Revolution.
Although Usbek's position finds its way into De L' Esprit
^ modified form, it is nevertheless clear
that there is nothing certain about the value of the
domination of modern European culture. If Montesquieu
never waivered in his belief that Europe could lead the
world into an age of prosperity and justice by following
the principles laid down in De L' Esprit des Lois he nev-
ertheless had little faith that European rulers would
actually follow them.
Montesquieu's theory of history sought to explain
the determinative character of history while preserving
an active and effective sphere for the human will. In
order to do this he drew on an empiricism which lead him
to accept the 'facts' of the past as well as in a ra-
tionalism that postulated order and rationality in his-
torical movement. The modern world presented men with
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an historically determined situation which constrained
them but which also opened up possibilities for creati
action. For Montesquieu, free will was as much a ' f act
'
as the balance of power or the extension of commerce.
Individuals owe allegiance not merely to their
particular states but to humanite in general. Their
particular citizenship must be informed by a conscious-
ness of world citizenship which derives from the prac-
tice of commerce and international law and morality in
the state system. In this context men owe allegiance
to universal principles of justice which can be said to
be natural, and which can be understood in the tradi-
tional language of rationalist natural law. But the
main focus of citizenship is still with respect to par-
ticular states and forms of government; it is this the-
ory which Part II of the dissertation will be concerned
with.
Montesquieu's citizen is an autonomous self acting
in a world which constrains his free action. In the
first two chapters I have developed what we might call
Montesquieu's general theory of the constraints on man's
action—the definition of man as a moral creature, the
notions of historical law and causation, and the Euro-
pean system that these historical laws have produced.
In the next chapter my focus shifts to the conceptuali-
113
nation of the political subject. m it I .ean to ex-
Plore the terms and the logic or language within which
thinkers in the early modern state captured the experi-
ence of the political subject. From there I will move
to Montesquieu's theory of the citizen-a theory which
attempts to show how the constraints of the social and
physical world and the autonomous agency of the politi-
cal subject interpenetrate.
CHAPTER III
POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE AND CITIZENSHIP-
THE ROOTS OF LIBERAL THEORY
—
Politica l knowledge and citizenship
. A theory of
citizenship requires a theory of political knowledge.
Theorists must have adequate means to describe the ways
in which the political subject could and should act in
political life—a knowledge of political self. This
knowledge is necessary in order to know the nature of
legitimate actions and the consequences of acting con-
trary to established norms. Further, the citizen re-
quires a knowledge of how his everyday life is politi-
cal; how it is influenced and constituted by public
meanings and decisions. Without reference to a theory
of political knowledge there could be no coherent con-
ception of the citizen, for there would be no way of
delimiting and describing the public roles which indi-
viduals adopt or the way in which their personalities
are constituted by public life. The purpose of this
chapter is to establish the contours of the early lib-
eral theory of the political subject and their implica-
tions for a theory of citizenship.
The central question of a theory of political
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knowledge is how does political thought inform political
action? The ancients formulated the question in terms
of the relation between practical and theoretical wis-
dom; more modern formulations involve the relation be-
tween theory and practice, or between science and tra-
dition.
The concept of political knowledge can be organized
roughly by two broad categories: the problem of poli-
tical space, and the relation of knowledge to power.
The former involves the perspective from which we view
how people participate in political life. In the early
theory of the modern state the problem of political
space seeks answers to two questions: What knowledge
is necessary to govern and what knowledge must the cit-
izen possess in order to function as citizen? Most
often in the political theory of the early modern state
the first was answered by a theory of the legislator and
the second by a theory of political obligation. The
knowledge of rule and the knowledge of obedience consti-
tute and organize the early modern theory of political
knowledge. In this chapter I will argue that the early
liberal theory which culminates in what I call the "ab-
solutist theory of political knowledge" in Bacon and
Hobbes, rigidly separates the knowledge of rulership
from the knowledge of the citizen.
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The second category of the theory of political
knowledge, the relation between knowledge and power,
concerns more directly the relation of political thought
and political practice. The central question here is
what knowledge is to be considered political? Of course
this presupposes the more fundamental question of how
the social dimension of knowledge is to be organized.
Is the ruler to be a philosopher, or is he to be inform-
ed by scientists whose direct involvement in decision
making is circumscribed by their lack of executive
power? The theory of the early modern state tended
toward the latter. I will argue that the tendency of
early liberal theory was to lodge political knowledge
outside of the space of political action, and I will
conclude that on both the level of the legislator and
the citizen, political knowledge was not fundamentally
political
.
There are two essential elements in the theories I
will describe. First, during the sixteenth century
there was a shift in the perspective of theory; the con-
ception of political space broadened from the Prince to
the citizenry. Machiavelli exhibited a concern for and
penetrating insight into the relation between the citi-
zen and the state with which all of the theorists I
describe were aware. However, his concern was the art
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Of government, and he was not fundamentally concerned
with the question of obligation. This problem was left
to the era of religious wars on the continent and to the
civil wars in England. Hobbes
' s first attempt to form-
ulate a comprehensive view of politics is De Give in
Which the reader "shall find briefly described the
duties of men; first, as men; then as subjects; lastly,
as Christians. "1 For Hobbes the central concern was
the relation between citizens and rulers within politi-
cal space. He and his followers through the eighteenth
century filled this space on the basis of a strict di-
chotomy between the knowledge appropriate to rule and
the knowledge appropriate to citizenship. This led to
a conception of the legislator "not as the agent of a
divine idea but as a man of intelligence blessed with a
golden opportunity. "2 He stood above citizens because
he had the capacity to be rational-to recognize, con-
trol and manipulate fate.
This leads us to the second element in the early
theory of political knowledge. As rational knowledge
seemed appropriate to the legislator, passion and will
provided the basis of the citizen's action. Men cannot
be trusted to act rationally; their passions dictate
behavior. The ordinary citizen is pure will, acting
rationally only under the compulsion of necessity. The
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theory of the social contract based upon an episte.olog-
ical separation between ruler and ruled introduces into
the modern notion of the citizen the problem of politi-
cal creativity in such a way as to declare its impor-
tance but to attempt to minimize its effect. According
to contract theory men can be politically creative only
once, when nature forces them to recognize that the re-
nunciation of right is the only adequate defense of
their personal safety. ^ Man's passions compel him to
one initial act of political creation which renders all
further such acts as illegitimate. In this context the
language of 'interests' attempts to give the citizen,
still a creature of will in the face of the politics of
reason, a more active role in political life.
The importance of the separation of the citizen and
the ruler is that it separates political knowledge from
the practical knowledge of action. Political knowledge
becomes the technical application of scientific princi-
ples. This is possible only if the practical knowledge
of action can be wholly absorbed outside of politics,
in introspection, the study of the self in order to
establish a foundation of knowledge, and in activity
within a non-political civil society wherein interests
can be pursued and produce a minimum of conflict. This
chapter will explain the structure of this separation
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in the early modern state on both the levels of the
preoccupation with self and introspection and the dis-
tinction between public and private which leads to the
formation of a non-political public sphere.^ i will
first counterpose Aristotle's paradigm of citizenship
to that of Jean Bodin. When viewed from the point of
view Of Classical politics Bodin 's theory rests upon
radical foundations. Rather than defining the citizen
in terms of activity in politics, Bodin defines the
citizen in terms of the opposition of public life to
private life.
I will then move to Montaigne's theory of the self
and particularly to the fundamental claim of the Essays
that all true knowledge must be directed towards action
and that the knowledge which is most important is in-
trospection-knowledge of the internal self. This lead.
Montaigne to oppose political action to this private
introspective knowledge, asserting that the only true
action of the citizen is unreflective obedience. Fi-
nally, I will turn to the absolute separation of poli-
tical knowledge and citizenship in Bacon's and Hobbes
'
theory of politics as a rational science based upon
objective principles, and the action of 'citizens' (or
more properly individuals) as based upon passion and
self-interest. For Bacon and Hobbes politics becomes a
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technical science and the action of citizens is removed
from politics.
I« From Aristotle to Bodin;
The Opposition of Public and Private
1. Social differentiation and the function of the citi -
zen. Individuals act in different social contexts;
they relate to others in a variety of ways. In their
concrete existence, ignoring the possibility of a state
of nature, they relate to others as members of families,
as producers and laborers, and as ethical beings in 'so-
ciety' and as legal beings in the 'state.' The concret
individual can only be understood as part of a nexus of
social relations, each part free in itself but at the
same time dependent upon relations of domination and
subjection from the social organism as a whole. In
short, the understanding of the individual requires
knowledge of the differentiation of action in particular
social and historical settings.
Herein lies the central focus of the traditional
theory of citizenship. Understanding the political
responsibilities of the individual requires knowledge
of how one grows into public life. How is a citizen to
be educated to function adequately in his public role?
Aristotle sets the stage for this theory of a dif-
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ferentiated politv ^ ^ -; •y. He distinguishes two principles
Of differentiation:
'growth
•
and nature . Growth in-
volves the historical development
. of life within social
corporations. The primacy of the family leads directly
to village life and then to the polis, the final stage
Which represents the culmination of temporal association
for the individual. Yet in the second order of differ-
entiation, nature, the polls is the primary sphere of
individual action. m terms of 'nature' the order of
primacy is reversed from that order dictated by moral
growth.^ The polls is the crown of man's existence;
he cannot complete his inner nature without political
action. In this sense the polls is prior to man. Men
create it but without it they do not exist as men; just
as, "if the whole body be destroyed, there will not be
a foot or a hand."^ The polls is an end of man's life
in two senses. it is the final temporal stage of his
concrete growth, and it is the purpose toward which his
nature directs his action.
All individuals participate in the state, although
at different levels of goodness and actions. Likewise,
the differences among men allow for different political
institutions.^ Individuals participate in two senses,
moral and functional. The end of the state is "the best
and highest life possible" and each participates to the
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extent ^that he can act in the •perfect practice of good-
ness. By viewing the state as requiring certain
-asses
.
functions, individuals are differentiated into cl.
It requires farmers, craftsmen, soldiers, property-own-
ers, priests and legislators
. Individuals, then,
play different roles in the state according to their
natural capabilities and occupations.' But only some
can be citizens.
Class differentiation, according to Aristotle, is
natural. The primary division within the family is
among slaves, women and men-there are natural slaves
and there are natural masters. A person's proper func-
tion can only be attained through proper forms of rule.
The necessary classes are mirrored by the structure of
the inner nature of the species. Inside men and women
there is a natural hierarchy. The soul ought to rule
the body, and the rational element of the soul ought to
rule the appet it i ve
. On this basis strict criteria
for a natural class division emerge. Slaves are those
who are incapable of autonomous rational action; presum-
ably they could not survive adequately in the world if
left to themselves. Incapable of autonomous rational
action, the slave is not irrational, but he is capable
only of apprehending rationality in others.
For women the case is somewhat different: "The
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relation of the
.ale to the fe.ale is permanently that
in Which the statesman [temporarily] stands to his fel-
low-citizens
. in other words, men rule women na-
turally as the statesman rules his equals (i.e., citi-
zens) with the difference that for citizens, the posi-
tions must at some time be reversed. The citizen is one
Who rules and is ruled by equals in turn, sharing delib-
erative and judicial decisions. Although women are not
accorded the possibility of rule, they are differenti-
ated from slaves by their rational capability and by
their functions; they are not property as slaves are.
Women have the capacity for rational reflection but it
is 'inconclusive. They are rational but they are
not suited to be citizens.
Aristotle never discloses what he means by 'incon-
clusive, '^^ but it is of great importance to his the-
ory of citizenship. At the end of Book I (Chapter xiii,
section 16) Aristotle calls women "a half of the free
population." Yet, they are not citizens. He has given
clues as to the reason, but no argument. The argument
we can surmise would rest upon the goodness appropriate
to women's functions in the household; paralleling his
argument that the slave's function in the household
derives from the nature of their soul, and that the
goodness appropriate to their characters derives from
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their particular functions as "servants in the sphere
of action." Whatever argument he may have presented,
women are ambiguous equals of men—they are capable of
partaking in the essentials of 'goodness,' but they are
not citizens.
But women are not the only ones barred from citi-
zenship. The fundamental distinction established in
Book VII, Chapter ix is that full citizens, whose life
is dedicated to the pursuit of goodness, must have lit-
tle to do with production:
Upon these principles it clearly follows that
a state with an ideal constitution—a state
which has for its members men who are abso-
lutely just, and not men who are merely just
in relation to some particular standard—can-
not have its citizens living the life of
mechanics or shopkeepers, which is ignoble
and inimical to goodness. Nor can it have
them engaged in farming: leisure is a neces-
sity, both for growth in goodness and for the
pursuit of political acti vit ies . 15
Their only place in the economy is as property owners,
the class which has the greatest stake in the proper
functioning of the polity, and the leisure necessary to
clear reflection on public issues. Citizens should be
thoroughly political, devoting their public lives to
either military service, deliberations regarding jus-
tice, or to the priesthood.
"All things derive their essential character from
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their function. This is likewise true of the cit-
izen. After rejecting purely formal criteria such as
residence and the right to sue in courts as adequate to
describe the citizen. Aristotle settles on his famous
functional definition:
rlr^t^^i ? considerations; and our fi-nal def nitions will accordingly be: (1) 'hewho envoys the right of sharing in delibera-
or:n?ixld1'%\"'-°"'r Per?^?%'Ledunf e ] attains thereby the status of acitizen of his state,' and (2) 'a state, inIts simplest terms, is a body of such personsadequate in number for achieving a self-suf-ficient existence. ' 17 (m, i, 12)
The paradigmatic case for the citizen is a democracy,
wherein he participates actively and regularly. Citi-
zenship is available in other constitutions but it is
more problematic, there being less time for individual
participation in the state. In so far as an individual
is a citizen, his life is thoroughly public and politi-
cal. Citizenship involves deliberation about and an
application of the good of the state, the public good,
embodied in the ideal of self-sufficiency.
The self-sufficient polls is one which is both
materially and morally independent and complete:
.
. .
while it (the polls) grows for the sake
of mere life [and is so far, and at that
stage, still short of full self-sufficiency].
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it exists [when once it is fully grown! for
fuVs^^?!su%l?c1eit"3!lS-^ -
The public good cannot in any sense be a sum of the
parts of the state, although they are essential to it.
It must be determined in a "public space," an intellec-
tual and physical forum determined by the constitution
and constituted by meanings and discourse available to
all citizens. Indeed, that space must be thoroughly
public, containing no private associations at all. A
more formal theory based upon the 'rights' which indi-
viduals possess within the state would define citizen-
ship in terms of private needs and claims. Where one
lives, that one has been wronged in a business transac-
tion, are essentially private criteria, just as the
economic production of farmers and craftsmen is always
bound up with the private interests of a paricular cor-
poration. The criteria of citizenship must be such as
to create a class aloof from private interest, able to
partake in purely rational discourse about the public
good. Only the individual whose life is thoroughly
public and political can perform this function.
Aristotle draws a radical conclusion from his
thoroughly public view of citizenship: the good citizen
cannot be identified with the good man.^^ in the pre-
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vious chapter (III, iii) Aristotle had established that the
identity of a state, what gives it a coherent character de-
rives from the constitution. It follows that the good man,
who 'is a man so called in virtue of a single absolute ex-
cellence," does not describe the good citizen, who serves
the sole end of "safety in the working of their associa-
tion; and this association consists of the constitu-
20tion." Even in the ideal polis the good man is not
equivalent to the good citizen. Deliberation and judicial
judgment require various sorts of tasks, and the good citi-
zen is the one who can perform the necessary task. The
criteria of the good citizen must derive from the state it-
self, not from either his private life or from his general
participation in universal virtue: "the excellence of be-
ing a good citizen must belong to all citizens indifferent-
ly, because that is the condition necessary for the state
being the best state . .
Aristotle's functional definition of citizenship al-
lows him to preserve a purely public space within which the
only admissible action is that directed to preservation of
that space. It is pure in that neither private criteria,
such as 'interests,' nor a universal Platonic 'Good' have
any relevance. The public good describes the preservation
of the public space in which citizens can freely debate and
implement public choices. As we turn now to the modern
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notion of the citizen, we find that this fundamental orien-
tation has shifted in two fundamental ways.
^ Bodin and the modern notion of the citizen . First,
the criteria of citizenship have been universalized to
include not only women, but the individual qua individ-
ual. All those who participate in public authority,
either owing obligations towards it or contributing to
its well-being now are accorded certain rights as citi-
zens (although to different degrees for different
groups). The revival of Roman law in the thirteenth
century, culminating in Renaissance jurisprudence, open-
ed up citizenship to new classes and potentially to all
classes. In this respect the most important result of
the universalization of citizenship was that economic
action became a legitimate sphere of action for the
citizen. The political ascendancy of the bourgeoisie
required a doctrine of citizenship which recognized the
legitimacy of economic activity within the boundaries
of citizenship. The individual who acts in such a way
that he enriches the wealth of the society must be con-
sidered as good a citizen as those who serve in public
of f ice
.
This leads to the second major change in the theory
of citizenship: the redrawing of the lines between pub-
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lie and private life and the tendency for the former to
be described in language more suited to the latter, par-
ticularly utilizing the language of interest and self-
interest, ^2 while at the same time theorists posed
them as antithetical spheres of action. The universal-
ization of the criteria of citizenship tended to elevate
formal criteria over the requirements of public action,
providing individuals with protection from the state for
their persons and property, while being removed from
public responsibilities.
The cost of the uni versalizat ion of the criteria
of citizenship was that it made it impossible to define
a public space purely on its own terms as Aristotle had
done. The social differentiation had new sets of boun-
daries; civil society, the world of morality and econom-
ic action took on a legitimacy it never had in the Greek
polis. Furthermore, a 'public' space arose governed not
by the public good or by universal religious principles,
but by 'social' interaction described best by the un-
translatable team of French words, 'moeurs' and 'mani-
eres.' Politics became increasingly submerged beneath
a surface of social appearances (as evidenced by the
court life in the period of the early modern state which
grew up based primarily upon appearances—fashions, so-
cial graces and politeness).
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In political thought the shift came early in the
bourgeoisie's rise to power. m the fifteen-seventies
Jean Bodin had already defined the public realm in terms
of its opposition to private interests:
But besides sovereign power there mustalso be something enjoyed in common such asthe public domain, a public treasury, thebuildings used by the whole community, the
roads, walls, squares, churches, and markets,
as well as the usages, laws, customs, courts,penalties, and rewards which are either sharedm common or of public concern. There is no
commonwealth where there is no common interest
.
. .
For nothing could properly be regarded
as public if there were nothing at all to dis-tinguish it from what was private. Nothing
can be thought of as shared in common, exceptby contrast with what is privately owned . .
.We see therefore that commonwealths were or-dained of God to the end that men should ren-der to the community that which is required
in the public interest, and to each individual
that which is proper to him. 23
By entering the public realm the head of the household
does not enter into a higher order of association which
morally encompasses the household; rather he enters a
realm of power relations by renouncing the private in-
terest in order "to treat of those things which are of
24common interest."
For Bodin, the individual who is destined to be-
come a citizen moves directly from the household into
his role as citizen:
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When the head of the family leaves h>.ohousehold over which he presides andwith other heads of fami?ies1n o?der'?o"tre.^of those things which are of cSmmon interest
an eouaTanS a' " and b:::^;3ssociate with the rest. He set<5
affairs'' V^^^ concerns to attend to public
Sn^ i ^^^ses to be a mastera d becomes a citizen, and a citizen may bedefined as a free subject dependent on theauthority of another."
There is no intermediary, such as village life for
Aristotle, between private and public life. Even while
these two spheres can be distinguished from one another,
they are both regulated by the same form of action.
Indeed, while mastership is based upon paternalistic
power and authority, and citizenship is based upon mu-
tual obligation, the fundamental root and focus of ac-
tion is the same: both public and private space are
determined by power. In the private space described by
the family the father rules over his wife, children and
slaves unchecked, whereas in public his interests and
desires are bounded by those of others. Sovereignty,
Bodin's major determinant of public space, is defined
as 'that absolute and perpetual power. '^^ The space
in which Bodin's citizen acts is radically different
from Aristotle's. Bodin describes the public realm in
a new language governed by assumptions about power
rather than about the public good or the good life. In
132
fact, Bodin defines citizenship in direct response to
Aristotle.
In Bodin* s view the ancients were incorrect to de-
fine the commonwealth "as a society of men gathered to-
gether for the good and happy life.''^"^ This defini-
tion 'falls short' by omitting the principle parts of a
commonwealth: "the family, sovereign power, and that
which is of common concern." We might note that this
is exactly what Aristotle intended to do in order to
define public space wholly according to its own nature.
On the other hand, the definition 'goes beyond the mark'
by positing 'happiness' as essential to the state. The
end of the state is internal justice and survival in a
world of other states. Happiness and the pursuit of the
good life jeopardize rather than reinforce the state's
welfare. If happiness were essential to the state "the
good life would depend on the wind always blowing fair."
The state no longer provides the space in which the in-
dividual can be fulfilled and hence truly happy.
Rather, it protects the proper ordering of life. The
highest good for men "springs from the union of action
and contemplation." The end of the state is to secure
material goods and economic well being providing the
leisure for individual contemplation, rather than that
sphere in which contemplation has its fullest meaning.
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The ideal of individual life for Bodin requires removal
of oneself from politics. Action is primarily economic
action and it is political only in a technical and neg-
ative sense. Action consists in "mundane activities
such as the administration of justice, the defence of
the subject, the provision of the necessary means of
subsistence." Once the state secures these, individuals
are free to pursue the higher good of contemplation.
For Bodin contemplation is 'the final end' of the state,
but he means this as last in a temporal chain of activ-
ities. It is essentially a final 'good' which the state
must secure:
The same principles hold good for the
well-ordered commonwealth. It is ordained to
the contemplative virtues as its final end,
and those things which are least in order of
dignity come first in order of necessity.
Those material things necessary to the sus-
tenance and defence of the subject must first
be secured. 28
The spiritual and moral results of contemplation are
clearly secondary to the role of the state as maintain-
ing outward order. Later theorists of the modern state
will remove those results completely from the state,
relegating them to a private life within civil society.
Bodin criticizes Aristotle further for defining
the citizen in terms of his participation in the state.
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Rather, he urges a uni versalization of citizenship (ex-
cluding slaves) within a public space based upon mutual
obligations. His criticism is worth quoting at length:
It is a very grave error to suppose that
no one is a citizen unless he is eligible forpublic office, and has a voice in the popular
estates, either in a judicial or deliberative
capacity. This is Aristotle's view . . .
Plutarch improved on this description when he
said that citizenship implied a right to share -
in the rights and privileges of a city-state,
implying that he meant such a share as accord-
ed with the standing of each, nobles, common-
ers, women, and children too, according to the
differences of age, sex, and condition . . .
It must however be emphasized that it is not
the rights and privileges which he enjoys
which makes a man a citizen, but the mutual
obligation between subject and sovereign, by
which, in return for the faith and obedience
rendered to him, the sovereign must do justice
and give council, assistance, encouragement,
and protection to the subject. 29
The state has become more like a private partner in a
contract than a sphere of action in which men realize
their nature. The economic metaphor does not emerge as
the grounding of a theory of political obligation in
Bodin but the fundamental assumptions of the later the-
ory do. The citizen is anyone who owes obedience to the
state in order to receive in return "justice . . . coun-
cil, assistance, encouragement, and protection." The
public is now a realm of 'interests' not of goodness.
Mature social contract theory makes explicit the shift
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that Bodin's critique of Aristotle implies: both public
and private life are governed by the same language of
'interests.' But interest implies particularity; for
an act to be in someone's interest it must be opposed
to that of others. On the contrary 'public' implies
universality, a community that transcends its particular
parts. A fundamental antinomy plagues Bodin's theory
of citizenship as it establishes the contours of debate
in the modern state; the public is defined in terms of
its opposition to the private, yet the very notion of
public implies universality and harmony. It is this
antinomy which Montesquieu's conceptualization of
1' esprit general attempts to solve by arguing for an
interpretation of law which can successfully mediate
particular interests and the universality of the public
good
.
II. Montaigne; The Self and
the Supremacy of Private Life
. . . a sound intellect will refuse to judge
men simply by their outward actions; we must
probe the inside and discover what springs set
men in motion. But since this is an arduous
and hazardous undertaking, I wish fewer people
would meddle with it. ("Of Drunkenness," II,
1, p. 244)
1.
the
A grammar of practical action . No one has
everyday life of the modern subject better
captured
than
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Montaigne. His Essa^ comprise, so to speak, a grammar
of practical action: the rules of every day life on
Which people act in ways that often seem the most ir-
rational. His major themes, life is learning to die,
skepticism with regard to intellectual wisdom and the
complexity of the subconscious motivations of human
action describe a view of persons as autonomous agents,
the knowledge necessary and proper to them is introspec-
tion. V/hether good for him or not, and Montaigne thinks
that in most cases the freedom of the self only leads to
foolishness and depraved morals, the legitimacy of par-
ticular actions must be judged from the point of view
of individual actors. In the following section of this
chapter I want to present a picture of Montaigne's no-
tion of the subject and the implications he draws for
politics.
Judgments about good and evil are relative to par-
ticular individuals and their circumstances. Montaigne
marvels at the instances when people act other than they
should. Men should never commit suicide, or so we are
told both by traditional Christian morality and the
secular platitude that men should and will avoid pain.
Yet in practice, Montaigne argues, neither of these
seems true. Men endure pain for what they perceive as
higher purposes, and they commit suicide willfully when
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life no longer poses a meaningful alternative. m "That
the Taste of Good and Evil Depends in Large Part on the
Opinion We Have of T^em" (I. 14) Montaigne describes the
motivations which lead men to suicide. That they are
justifiable Montaigne never questions. He relates
the reactions of Jews ordered expelled from Castile.
Sold into slavery by the King of Portugal, the first
shipload of exiles were treated so ruthlessly by sail-
ors that the others resolved to remain in Portugal as
slaves. Continued efforts to convert the Jews to Chris-
tianity failed. The Jews remained firm in their convic-
tions and beliefs. When the crown finally ordered that
all the children under fourteen be taken away by the
state and raised as Christians, they committed suicide,
even killing their children to thwart the crown's de-
signs. Montaigne concludes, "How often have not only
leaders, says Cicero, but even whole armies rushed to
certain death?" (p. 36). Moral judgments can only be
examined in light of the meaning particular individuals
give to their actions, not on the basis of abstract
rules
.
Knowledge then for Montaigne must be practical
knowledge, directed towards action. Rather than separ-
ate theory and practice, knowledge must merge them. In
"Of Pedantry" Montaigne decries the scholastic emphasis
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on the quantity of Knowledge. Learning to the.
.eans a
purely external acquaintance with the thoughts of others
and a causuistry which has no relevance to action. He
describes their notion of knowledge as that of a .an
who, needing fire, seeks it at his neighbor's, but
"having found a big fire there, should stop there and
warm himself, forgetting to carry any back home." He
continues by an analogy to food: "What good does it do
us to have our belly full of meat if it is not digested,
if it is not transformed into us, if it does not make
us bigger and stronger?"^! Judgment, not learning,
should be the focus of knowledge, and judgment requires
digestion. We must process it and reflect on it accord-
ing to our needs. Knowledge is related to action, to
goodness. Principles of good and evil mean nothing un-
less men have internalized them so they can be trans-
lated immediately into action. For Montaigne it is
clearly this internal action that is of uppermost con-
cern: "... in truth it is a fact that learning is
less valuable than judgment ... Any other knowledge
is harmful to a man who has not the knowledge of good-
ness . '32
2. Int rospection as the basis of knowledge
. For tru(
knowledge men must look into the soul: "The soul may
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be shaped into all varieties of forms, and molds to
itself and to its every condition the feelings of the
body and all other accidents. Therefore we must study
and look into it, and awaken in it its all-powerful
springs. "^^ The locus of the good and the useful is
now inside man; it is not to be found in learning or in
scripture. This internal knowledge is difficult, too
difficult for most men to pursue, hence the quotation
which opens my discussion. Inside the mind is a complex
of often contradictory motives and drives: "Our actions
are nothing but a patchwork."^"* By conceiving the
mind and action as a system of interacting motives and
drives Montaigne opened a new form of inquiry. A "sci-
entific" understanding of human action and thought was
now possible, indeed necessary if an absolute skepticism
regarding the knowledge of human action and hence ra-
tional and moral judgment about it was to be avoided.
A century later Locke could analyze thought into sensa-
tions deriving from external objects, and Descartes
could devise a method which stripped the mind of all
knowledge except that of itself in order to establish
the validity of the propositions the mind accepted as
35true. Both sought to disentangle the complex inter-
actions of drives inside the mind, the 'new world' open-
ed up by Montaigne's probing of the self. The following
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passage from "Of the Inconsistency of our Actions" could
be an underlying belief of many liberal psychologies:
If I speak of myself in different ways, thatIS because I look at myself in different wa^s.
til.r "^^^ in me by somewist and m some fashion
. . . i have nothinato say about myself absolutely, simply, solid-ly, without confusion and without mix^ire? orin one word. (p. 242) ^"-u ,
This dilemma of the self that Montaigne bequeaths
to the liberal theory of the subject leads to an inquiry
about a different form of knowledge than previous in-
quiry. Montaigne is more concerned with understanding
opinion than truth for truth cannot, in his view, be
disentangled from the circumstances and the ideas of the
men who fashion it. "So in the study that I am making
of our behavior and motives," Montaigne asserts in the
"Power of the Imagination," "fabulous testimonies, pro-
vided they are possible, serve like true ones."^^
Truth is less relevant to action, to what counts as
having meaning for individual human beings, than opin-
ion. Opinion clearly governs more of man's behavior,
both for good and ill, than truth: "Opinion is a power-
ful performer, bold and immoderate. "^^ In the famous
essay, "Apology for Raymond Sebond," Montaigne attacks
the erudite knowledge that takes men away from the ade-
quate pursuit of everyday life. It removes them from
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all concern for the body, destroying the necessary con-
nection between body and mind^^ 3^^,,^^^
nection between theory and practice,
.oral judgment and
action. The scholastics made moral judgments indepen-
dently of the particular circumstances of action. They
set out rules for the value of 'good' and the pure ab-
sence of pain without regard for the value they have in
actual life situations. Exercising his flare for para-
dox, Montaigne reverses their judgments: "Evil is in
its turn a good to man. Neither is pain always some-
thing for him to flee nor pleasure always for him to
39pursue." But Montaigne asserts his principle of
the self nowhere more clearly than in the "C"^° edi-
tion of "That to Philosophize is to Learn to Die":
"Life is neither good nor evil in itself: it is the
scene of good and evil according as you give them
room.""^! Applied to a view of the subject, this po-
sition has radical implications.
Unshackled to the bonds of Christian morality the
self requires other forms of control. I have already
shown that the locus of individual action and moral
judgment for Montaigne is the individual self and that
consequently true knowledge is not that which yields
abstract general principles but that which aids everyday
action and judgment. Furthermore, the epi stemological
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reference point of this knowledge is the internal mind,
the generation and movement of ideas within the mind.
Just as this opens up a new direction for scientific
inquiry into the subject, it demands a new view of moral
virtue. Montaigne responds to this need by describing
virtue as self-control, as command over the complex mo-
tivations and contradictions of the self. This notion
of virtue is a combination of the Platonic notion of
rational control over the various faculties of the mind,
and the Machiavellian notion of virtu as the drive and
the ability to overcome fortuna.
Virtue for Montaigne is not then the Christian no-
tion of performing good actions on the basis of a right-
ly ordered conscience. It is the more active and pri-
vate pursuit of mastery of the contradictions embedded
in the soul. The will must forge consistency of action
over time. Pain and evil must be accepted as sometimes
necessary but always with temperance and control.
Virtue has become in Montaigne's hands a primarily pri-
vate act of will, determined by self -reflect ion and
self
-judgment
.
This can be illustrated in Montaigne's
view of habit and custom.
Habit and custom, the major formative influences
on the person, are most often enemies rather than aids
to virtue. "Habituation puts to sleep the eye of our
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judgment," Montaigne asserts in "Of Custom, and not
Easily Changing an Accepted Law. "^^ Habit and custom
tend to wear down our rationality, and moral training
requires training of the heart, of the passions rather
than the imbuing of rational or religious principles.
"Children must be carefully taught to hate vices so
that they will shun them not only in their actions but
above all in their hearts, so that the very thought of
them may be odious, whatever mask they wear.""^"^ Habit
and custom can encourage moral behavior only if careful-
ly controlled by the individual conscience. Virtue con-
sists in the development of conscience, in a self-re-
flection which can be put into practice as self-control:
"In all things and all places my own eyes are enough to
keep me in line; there are none that watch me so care-
fully, none that I respect more."^^
Virtue is not merely the intellectual ordering of
the soul but must be reflected in the everyday control
of practical action. Extending Machiavelli
' s notion of
political virtu into the private sphere Montaigne seems
to describe virtue as an overcoming of circumstances.
In this respect it directly contradicts the complacency
of the classical Platonic model. Rather than the easy-
going immediacy of a naturally well adjusted soul, vir-
tue requires struggle. Cunning and reason are the forms
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of knowledge necessary for virtue. Virtue never merely
comes to men, or is born with them; it is never comfort-
ably seated within a person. Rather, it is constantly
mobile, always in need of being reinforced by guiding
action. Virtue "demands a rough and thorny road."^^
Machiavelli's virtC, the political imperative of the
Prince to transcend fortuna, is transferred and general-
ized as the virtue of the self. Christian morality has
been replaced as the end of individual action by a stoic
sense of worldly struggle.
But we must be careful not to ignore the synthesis
between the classical Platonic notion of the well order-
ed soul and the Machiavellian imperative to overcome
fortune. Montaigne considers virtue, as all other char-
acteristics of human action, psychologically complex.
Montaigne wants to avoid the danger inherent in the
Machiavellian virtu that it too easily justifies cruelty
J . 47 .and repression. Virtue must be instilled in the
self so that it not only avoids evil but also produces
good. The outward appearance of virtue is often falsely
taken as virtue. "Firmness in dangers (if firmness it
should be called), contempt for death, endurance in mis-
fortunes, can come to men, and are often formed in them,
through not conceiving them as they are." Virtue
requires prudent judgment based upon practical knowledge
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of particular circumstances. What seems to be virtuous
and manly action on the outside may actually be a reck-
less cruelty based upon false judgment: "
. . . when we
judge a particular action we must consider many circum-
stances and the whole man who performed it, before we
give it a name."'*^ The signs of virtue must not be
merely accidental and fortuitous, but rather they must
represent the inner being of the person. Also, it is
not merely 'rational' action. Rather the grandest level
of virtue arises from an internalization of self-con-
sciousness—a recognition deep within the soul of the
propriety and moderation of judgments and the seemingly
natural ability to be in complete control over one's
actions. Two models of the virtuous man compete for
Montaigne's favor, Cato and Socrates. The latter, most
of the time but not always, comes out ahead.
^ Private action and society . What is most important
in life is lodged in the self. in the essay "Of Soli-
tude" Montaigne makes clear that mere physical escape
does not alleviate burdens and suffering. Public life,
whether in politics or commerce, merely creates a fa-
cade; the real anxieties and traumas of life occur
underneath, in the soul: "Furthermore, by getting rid
of the court and the marketplace we do not get rid of
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the principle worries of our life . . . ambition, ava-
rice, irresolution, fear, and lust do not leave us when
we change our country-^O (pp. 175-6). Even the family
does not provide release, for "there is scarcely less
trouble in governing a family than in governing an en-
tire state ..." Escape, it would seem is not
possible for the origin and carrier of our torment is
our self :
Wherefore it is not enough to have gotten awayfrom the crowd, it is not enough to move; we
must get away from the gregarious instincts
that are inside us, we must sequester our-
selves and repossess ourselves. 52
Nowhere is the primacy of the self and its opposition to
public life stated with such conviction as in this essay
"The soul cannot escape from itself . . . therefore we
must bring it back and withdraw it into itself" (p.
176) . Only self-control, not in the superficial sense
of removal from dependence on the external public world,
but as complete dependence purely on ourselves is neces-
sary: "... let us win from ourselves the power to
live really alone and to live that way at our ease" (p.
177) . Along with Rousseau, Montaigne could have been
Emile's tutor. Real solitude is best enjoyed in isola-
tion, but it must be no less available "in the midst of
cities and the courts of kings." It is a condition of
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mind-of self-control. The properly constituted soul
is the one which "can keep itself company."
We must be careful not to read Montaigne as arguing
for an isolated self, like some later liberal theorists.
The self always exists in a society with others."
Indeed, if the self were not formed in part by its ac-
cidental surroundings self-control would not be problem-
atic. Furthermore, society (but not politics) offers
the ideal form of action for the self
—friendship.
Friendship is a condition separate from all others
with a moral priority over them. Montaigne distin-
guishes friendship from family ties, for those are
based upon law and natural obligation. Real friendship
rather, must be based upon our free will: "and our
free will has no product more properly its own than
affection and friendship."^"* Furthermore, friendship
is distinct from love, for love is too impetuous, "a
frantic desire for what flees from us."^^ Friendship
rather is an immediate extension of self and merging
with another— "a harmony of wills" as Montaigne de-
scribes it. Friendship is the only free relationship,
completely unconstrained except by mutual affection.
But the union of souls which characterizes ideal
friendship applies to one other only. It is the ideal
form of social action but it is limited. Most associa-
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tions with others are more casual, less intense, but
certainly as necessary. Ordinary social action takes
place with common people. In his actions in society,
Montaigne asserts that he seeks above all comfort. in
society one deals most often with "plain people" of
"humble and vulgar souls" (although these souls "are
often as well-regulated as the subtler ones").^^
This requires an ability to act in a plurality of ways;
to act in a way that we think of as 'social' and that
Montesquieu will later describe as characteristic of
"I'homme de 1
' esprit
.
" It is worth quoting Montaigne's
description of this plurality of action at some length:
I would admire a soul with different levels,
which could both be tense and relax, which
would be well off wherever fortune might take
it, which could chat with a neighbor about
his building, his hunting, and his lawsuit,
and keep up an enjoyable conversation with a
carpenter and a gardener. I envy those who
know how to be familiar with the humblest of
their retinue and carry on a conversation
with their own servants.
Montaigne follows this with the implication that in
58society all are equal because they are men.
As much as possible Montaigne wants to purge soci-
ety of power. Relations among men are best when uncon-
strained by artificial relations of domination and sub-
jection: "The least strained and most natural ways of
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the soul are the most beautiful; the best occupations
are the least forced." Although Montaigne's ideal
friendship for Etienne de la Boetie is the best possible
type of social relationship, what characterizes all val-
uable social relationships is their non-political char-
acter-that they pruge all elements of power. Hence men
must be cautious as to the extent they enter society.
Except in the case of ideal friendship one must self-
consciously distance oneself from others. Isolation
and retreat are not possible: "There is nothing to
which nature seems to have inclined us more than to
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society. ' Common friendships of a lesser moral
quality than the ideal must be entered into "bridle in
hand, with prudence and precaution. " ^° Therefore, men
should both follow society but reserve themselves from
it. They should follow its customs and fashions but
"the wise man should withdraw his soul within, out of
the crowd, and keep it in freedom and power to judge
things freely. There is an 'inside' and an 'out-
side' to men which must be kept counterposed to one
another. This is the essence of the struggle that de-
fines virtue as self-control. The self must at one time
live in society, yet be continuously cautious and self-
conscious of its actions.
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4. The isolation of politics: obedience as the proper
action of citizens. The benefits of social interaction
can be enjoyed in society but not in politics. In the
essay, "of the Inequality that is Between Us" Montaigne
speaks of a 'private citizen' to distinguish ordinary
persons from kings. This private citizen has noth-
ing at all to do with politics, he is comfortable in a
society purged of power and has no place in a public
realm which self-consciously debates and determines the
public good. Indeed, Montaigne is skeptical if this
sort of public life can exist. Government is a neces-
sary evil and citizens, insofar as they relate to it at
all, do so as obedient subjects, recognizing only the
necessity of obedience.
In direct contrast to society, political life is
isolated. Those who wield political power have no ad-
vantages that "men of moderate fortune" do not have, but
they do have many disadvantages. They know no friend-
ship; their subjects generally follow them out of obli-
gation and custom. Even if truly loved by the populace,
the elevation of the monarch removes him from the joys
of everyday life. Similar to Plato, Montaigne conceives
a dilemma
—
good men will not enter politics. Plato be-
lieved that philosophers had to be convinced, as he was,
that public service alone was the supreme virtue.
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Montaigne no longer had faith that that was so. For
Montaigne private life offers too many rewards, and
public life too few. Engagement in politics is merely
an obligation, never a joy. To reinforce this point
Montaigne relates the story of Diocletian. Having re-
tired from public life to pursue the ease and comfort
of private existence he was urged by citizens to return
to public rule. In response he lamented: "You would
not ask this of me if you had seen the beautiful rows
of trees that I myself have planted at home, and the
fine melons I have sown."^"^ Ease and contentment of
self are the ends of life and politics is powerless to
affect them. Politics offers no rewards of its own to
make it worthy of pursuit for the self and in fact it
tends to negate the supreme value of private life.^^
This leads Montaigne to conclude that the action
which defines the citizen is obedience. Montaigne's
defense of La Boetie in "Of Friendship" is rooted in the
ideal of the citizen as obedient to the laws (p. 144).
He states this maxim in several other places but no more
powerfully than in "Our Feelings Reach Out Beyond Us"
(I, 3). In this essay Montaigne makes a crucial dis-
tinction betv^een private judgment and public justice.
"We owe subjection and obedience equally to all kings
. . .
,
" but we owe esteem and affection only to virtuous
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ones. Our private judgment must express our "true feel-
ings" but that judgment has no implications for our pub-
lic obedience. We must obey even if we recognize the
king as a tyrant.
Let us make this concession to the political
order: to suffer them patiently if they are
unworthy, to conceal their vices, to abet themby commending their indifferent actions iftheir authority needs our support. But, ourdealings over, it is not right to deny to jus-tice and to our liberty the expression of ourtrue feelings, and especially to deny good
subjects the glory of having reverently andfaithfully served a master whose imperfections
were so well known to them, and thus to de-prive posteriety of such a useful example. 65
Citizens provide "useful examples" in two senses. The
first is in absolute obedience and the second is by ex-
pression of a private judgment which provides posterity,
"public judgment," with the sentiments and knowledge to
condemn an unjust Prince after his death. History de-
termines the true worth of a king. Men's private judg-
ments, required by the charge to men to seek truth with-
in themselves, has no application to political action.
This leads Montaigne to adopt a thoroughgoing and
unflinching conservatism. He uses the metaphor of the
"body politic" to assert that laws should rarely if ever
be changed
:
It is very doubtful whether there can be such
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nf ^ ''''
changing an accepted law,o whatever sort it be, as there is harm rn
likeTst^ '""r^"^ ^ government iske a structure of different parts joined
This is followed by an invective against innovation in
politics. ^7 Politics, unless it serves to preserve
tradition, is a poisoned pursuit. The self must recoil
from it. The subject, in order to be a good man, must
retreat into private life, just as Bodin declared that
politics as a public pursuit had no meaning unless coun-
terposed to a private life. For Montaigne, the eminent
domain of private life is not the family, as for Bodin,
but the internal mind, the soul. The self emerges in
the Essays as an end whose grandest moment is its isola-
tion and solitary judgment. As a citizen, the self has
no place: "Private reason has only a private jurisdic-
tion." His obligation is obedience not because of
direct benefits but because alternative courses would
produce worse results. Political action by private
citizens in any form loses its legitimacy. Montaigne
does not envision any positive political expression of
self as Montesquieu and liberal theorists do.
The only man with the right to act creatively in
politics is the brilliant leader, the great man who has
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the Character and knowledge "not only how to command
according to the laws, but how to command the laws them-
selves."^^ Political knowledge is an innate genius
to understand circumstances and to manipulate men to the
public purpose. Montaigne's born leader is not very
different from Machiavelli
' s Prince. What is different
is Montaigne's desire to root this transcendent leader-
ship in a theory of self; the felt need to justify the
removal of citizens from politics. Later theorists, as
we will see, felt the need as even more of an impera-
tive.
Montaigne considers that men act most often from
self-interest rather than from public spirit. But he
regrets the passing of the republican moment, the moment
of public spirit. His conclusion that men should remove
themselves from politics is more a result of his belief
in their inability to free themselves from their private
interests and the penetration of private interests into
politics—that princes are really no different from pri-
vate persons except for the few virtuous leaders. The
private self is preeminent to the detriment of politics.
Montaigne, unlike later liberals, has little faith in
the value of this situation for politics. He does not
have a theory of private property rooted in natural
right which for seventeenth century English republicans
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and for Locke, legitimates the supremacy of private over
public action (this is not by any means to argue that he
should have). Like his longing to be a part of a mean-
ingful dialogue with classical philosophy, there is a
hint of regret in Montaigne, as there will be later in
Montesquieu, at the passing of the classical republican-
ism wherein private and public interests were reconciled
in the immediacy of public action. Now, the preeminence
of the self and self-interest establishes barriers to
the immediate reconciliation of public and private
spheres—in the modern state they are in constant oppo-
sition, mediated by a civil society which is public but
not political. It is the logic of this three tiered
notion of action which liberal theory will be concerned
to work out through to the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury. In the end, the loser, as Sheldon Wolin argues,
will be the political.
III. Bacon and Hobbes ; The Opposition
Between the Knowledge of Citizens and Rulers
Bodin's definition of the citizen in terms of the
opposition of public and private life and Montaigne's
notion of self-knowledge as that knowledge appropriate
to individual action establish crucial presuppositions
of the liberal theory of citizenship. In the concluding
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section of this chapter I will show how the final pre-
supposition, the opposition of the knowledge of the cit-
izen and the knowledge of the ruler, develops in the
work of Francis Bacon and Thomas Hobbes. I have called
their theory the 'absolutist' theory of political knowl-
edge. 70
^ Baconj practical knowledge and the control of
nature. Although he was not explicitly concerned with
political theory it would be impossible to underestimate
Francis Bacon's contribution to the early theory of the
modern state. He is less important for any specific
proposals (although many of these were finally adopted
by theorists and governments at various times) than for
his being the first to clearly introduce the crucial
assumptions and orientation of the most popular attempt
to solve the enigma of political knowledge.
Perhaps Bacon's most well known contribution to
modern epistemology is his attempt to redraw the boun-
daries of knowledge and to reorient scientific method.
For our purposes the first is of greatest importance.
Knowledge for Bacon must be practical; its proper end
is the improvement of human life. To seek knowledge
71for any other purpose only leads to confusion. In
the "Preface" to The Great Instauration Bacon states
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his purpose clearly:
to^all'. Ll^nt general admonition
l^r^t i I
consider what are the trueends of knowledge, and that they seek it noteither for pleasure of the mind, or for pro-tit, or fame, or power, or any of these infer-ior things; but for the benefit and use of
chfrity?72''^^''
^^^^ perfect and govern it in
Bacon's work never loses sight of this practical goal,
as we see it echoed in the New Atlantis
. The guiding
purpose of Salomon's House is "the knowledge of causes
and secret notions of things;, and the enlarging of the
bounds of human empire, to the affecting of all things
possible. ""^^ The listing of the achievements of
Salomon's House which follows makes it clear that Bacon
had a clear vision that improvement meant prolonging
life, improving health, and making life more comfort-
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able. The goal of science was to make life pleas-
ant, and no other end would suffice as a guide to knowl-
edge .
Bacon's logic of induction reinforced this practi-
cal orientation to knowledge. Previous philosophy was
caught in metaphysical webs of its own making. The
deductive logic of syllogism created knowledge about
propositions not about things; it represents mere play-
ing with words and discourse about arguments. In this
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self-created process philosophy has left truth behind
:
For the end which this science of mineproposes is the invention not of argumentsbut of arts; not of things in accordance with
of nriS Kf'
""^^ °' principles themselves; not
^f™^ ^""^ °^ designations and
?i ^^f^"''^ 5°"^ intentionIS di ferent, so accordingly is the effect;the effect of the one being to overcome anopponent m argument, of the other to commandnature m action. '6
The traditional deductive logic of the schools more
often confuses than clarifies, creating dilemmas where
they do not exist. More important, it presumes a con-
fusion of two types of invention, those inventions of
the mind, like language, which establish 'tokens' or
"marks' of things, and those inventions which allow us
to utilize and manipulate things. "^"^ Logic, meaning
deductive logic, is not science. In the Mvancement of
Learning Bacon draws a crucial distinction between the
"Arts and Sciences" and "Speech and Arguments."^® Art
and Science must draw their meaning from nature. They
must start from things and then move, by steady progres-
sion, to "those axioms and general truths which will
lead to practical invent ion. " In the beginning we
emerse ourselves in nature so that in the end we can
manipulate it, "superinducing that nature upon any
variety of matter . . ,
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Bacon's peculiar religious interpretation of the
knowledge of nature is important as the strategy which
later liberals could use to counter the Augustinian
moral rule that man's presumption in the knowledge of
God and his works is the root of evil. Bacon accepts
that men cannot have knowledge of the inner workings of
nature, for that would be nothing less than knowledge
of God himself. In the Advancement of Learning Bacon
pronounced one of the limitations of knowledge "that we
do not presume by the contemplation of nature to attain
to the mysteries of God."^^ But this does not close
off nature as a subject of knowledge. God's will and
the essence of nature (which Bacon seems to equate) must
be accepted by faith, but nature in its positive mani-
festation must not. Nature as it appears to us and its
inner workings are two separate things, with separate
implications for human knowledge.
Bacon then draws two important conclusions about
our knowledge of nature: that that knowledge is legi-
timate if pursued correctly and that it is imperative
to do so. Bacon roots the first conclusion in the no-
tion of language as a sign. We can know nature through
language because through it we have names which distin-
guish various objects from one another. In fact, God
gave us language for this purpose. Language, as God's
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gift, iniplies a further sort of knowledge of nature.
It provides a system of names for objects of nature so
that men can use them for their own purposes. Our
knowledge of nature is legitimate insofar as it derives
from the names we give nature's objects and the use we
put them to. Language tells us nothing about the 'in-
side' of those objects; to seek that knowledge is to go
beyond man's ability, to cross the line between legiti-
mate knowledge and presumption.
Having established the legitimate boundaries of
knowledge. Bacon moved to his more fundamental claim-
that since God gave us a language to describe nature,
then he also created the imperative to utilize that
knowledge which derives from it for our benefit. In the
passage from the Advancement of Learning quoted above.
Bacon emphasizes two other limitations on knowledge:
"that we do not so place our felicity in knowledge, as
we forget our mortality
. . . that we make application
of our knowledge to give ourselves repose and content-
ment, and not distaste or repining ..." To correctly
follow God's commandments and the moral implications of
the fall does not require the restriction of all knowl-
edge of nature, as many contemporaries of Bacon thought.
Adam's fall represented human presumption in that he
sought to penetrate inside moral truth. To determine
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for himself the essence of Good and Evil was Adam's
fault, not his desire to utilize nature.
Hence, if man accepts the precepts of good and evil
as God commands them nature does not close but opens up
to him a vast facility to further the comfort of his
life and the earthly good of men. The central paradox
of Bacon's view of the relation of man to nature, so
central in the development of modern science, follows
from the severance of the 'outside' of nature which can
be captured in the names we give to objects and the
'inside' of nature which only God knows and which man
can never know. In Bacon's phrase: "Nature to be com-
manded must be obeyed."
Since God gave us a certain sort of knowledge of
nature he must have meant for us to use it. Knowledge,
as we saw above, must be directed toward action, toward
furthering man's well being. Nature then becomes a
storehouse of goods for men to use. But unable to know
the inner workings of nature, men must seek an external
description of the relationships within nature which
allow us to make use of it. This knowledge is 'causa-
tion. ' We can understand what happens in nature in
terms of what causes particular events, not their first
cause. We can never know 'why' something happens only
'that' it happens and that it recurs in regular patterns
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which we can reproduce. We can enter nature, so to
speak, in order to control it. We must follow the pat-
terns that we can see established (we ccnn never know
why or how they are established) and reproduce them di-
rected towards human purposes. Viewed in this context
Bacon's paradox makes sense. Only by obeying what we
find given in nature—patterns of interactions of ob-
jects which can be described in the language of cause
and effect—can we manipulate it for our own purposes.
But since the tools which men have to command nature
were given them by God, by utilizing them as God must
have intended (he would not have given them if he did
not mean for them to be used) we actually perfect na-
ture. The circle is complete: we obey nature in order
to command it, and by commanding it we make nature into
what it was intended to be.
2. The conjunction of knowledge and power; politics
as public science
. Within politics this view of knowl-
edge takes on a peculiar character; its political im-
plications are 'absolutist.' First of all, knowledge
must be social and public in character. The image of
the contemplative philosopher gives way to the community
of scientists endowed with the rights to govern; science
becomes arbiter of the public good. This is the ideal
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of Salomon's House in which judgment should no longer
be based upon the authority of the masters but on the
82reason of men. The authority of Plato, Aristotle
and other great thinkers must be respected but followed
only in so far as current reason and method allow. The
boundaries of science must be unlimited; knowledge ex-
ists as a complete unity in which all men can partake.
"All partitions of knowledge [must] be accepted rather
for lines and veins, than for sections and separations;
and that the continuance and entireness of knowledge be
8 3preserved. In this vision of a total science all
men, whatever their natural gifts, have a part to play.
The conjunction and ultimate unity of knowledge and
power is the most important feature of the absolutist
view of political knowledge. As Bacon makes clear in
the "Plan" of The Great Instauration the unity of
knowledge and power develops directly out of his view
of nature:
For man is but the servant and interpreter of
nature: what he does and what he knows is
only what he has observed of nature's order
in fact or in thought; beyond this he knows
nothing and can do nothing. For the chain of
causes cannot by any force be loosed or bro-
ken, nor can nature be commanded except by
being obeyed. And so those twin objects,
human knowledge and human power, do really
meet in one; and it is from ignorance of
causes that operation fails.^^
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It follows from this that the best political order is
one in which knowledge and power merge. The first book
Advancement of Learning presents this argument
more persuasively than anywhere else in Bacon's works.
Bacon first argues that the record of history bears
out that the best governments are those which have com-
bined knowledge with leadership. He makes two negative
arguments; first against those who claim that the pur-
suit of philosophy leads to military weakness, citing
Alexander and Ceasar as primary examples,®^ and second
showing that historically, knowledge prevails over ig-
norance in 'matter of policy and government.'®^ He
concludes this argument by showing, contrary to received
opinion, that learned men are citizens more prone to act
ft 7for the public good. His claim that knowledge in-
duces duty towards government better than ignorance is
illustrative of his argument in general:
Again, for that other conceit that learn-
ing should undermine the reverence of laws and
government, it is assuredly a mere depravation
and calumny without all shadow of truth. For
to say that a blind custom of obedience should
be a surer obligation than duty thought and
understood, it is to affirm that a blind man
may tread surer by a guide than a seeing man
can by a light. And it is without all contro-
versy that learning doth make the minds of men
gently, generous, maniable, and pliant to gov-
ernment ; whereas ignorance makes them churl-
ish, thwart, and mutinous: and the evidence
of time doth clear this assertion, considering
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that the most barbarous, rude, and unlearned
Ir-oZTr^ c'hLVe^rla-^-- - tumults, ^seli.
That learning produces the best governments is
further made clear in the survey of princes and of the
political and military virtues of knowledge near the end
of Book 1.89
^^g^^^ ^^^^ ^ similar basis as his
followers who ground civil society in a social contract.
Knowledge and political power must be conjoined because
shorn of all political and religious control men are
"full of savage and unreclaimed desires, of profit, of
lust, of revenge. The virtuous consequences of
knowledge—law, religion and morality
—alone can control
men's passions. History bears witness to this truth.
In this section of the argument Bacon returns to his
earlier argument that knowledge is necessary to military
success, extending the discussion of Alexander and Cea-
sar. Book I concludes with a discussion of how knowl-
edge is necessary to moral and private virtue. ^2
3. Hobbes ; the knowledge of the citizen and the knowl -
edge of the ruler . Whereas Bacon did not reflect ex-
pressly on the knowledge necessary to the citizen.
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Hobbes did, making several important contributions to
the absolutist theory of political knowledge.
Hobbes 's notion of the political subject is illus-
trative of his theory of the political knowledge of the
citizen. Hobbes claims that, "we make a commonwealth
by the act of our submission" and there is "no obliga-
tion on any man which ariseth not from some act of his
II 93own." Clearly, men retain a certain power over
their lives even in civil society; they can never relin-
quish their right to self-preservation. Moreover, and
perhaps more important, the act of alienation which the
contract represents rests upon a crucial presupposition
which implies the continuous respect for the autonomous
subjectivity of other individuals. For Hobbes, no con-
tract is valid if one of the parties can legitimately
assume that the other will not perform the promised ac-
94tion. The Hobbesian contract, we must always bear
in mind, binds individuals to each other not to the sov-
ereign. The implication of this for Hobbes is that, in
essence, the knowledge appropriate to citizens has no
corollary in the knowledge appropriate to rulers.
First, we must examine this act of political creation a
bit further.
In the act of alienation, subjectivity remains but
in a distorted form, for an individual's subjectivity
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is not obliterated but transferred. The individual
gives his right to act and create his life freely to the
sovereign. The sovereign is in a sense a super-subject,
endowed with the subjectivity of the citizens which make
it up. Hobbes makes clear in many places that the rules
which cement social life are not enforced by a stored
system of moral judgments or truth but by the power of
the will of the sovereign. Indeed, the rules have no
meaning except what the sovereign, by act of creative
will, gives them.^^
Individuals are impelled into society by their will
not their reason. Men value civil society "not for its
own sake, but that we may receive some honor or profit
96from it." To know what society is does not require
reason, but the experiencing of the misery of the state
of nature. Only when man's will is impressed will he
choose to enter the civil society:
Therefore I deny not that men (even nature
compelling) desire to come together. But
civil societies are not mere meetings, but
bonds, to the making whereof faith and com-
pacts are necessary; the virtue whereof to
children and fools, and the profit whereof to
those who have not yet tasted the miseries
which accompany its defects, is altogether
unknown
.
The knowledge necessary for an individual to act as a
good citizen is the knowledge of his own self-interest.
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The self consists of appetites (the will is but 'the
last appetite in deliberat ing
' )
, ^8 senses and endeav-
99ours. Reason, insofar as the action of citizens is
concerned, is the discovery of the best means to his
self-preservation, which remains the sole final purpose
of his action even in civil society. All possible ends
of the will, according to Hobbes, can be reduced to the
drive for power:
The passions that most of all cause thedifference of wit, knowledge, and of honor.
All which may be reduced to the first, that
IS, desire of power. For riches, knowledge,
and honor, are but several sorts of power. 100
The knowledge necessary to rule, however, is not
the calculation of means to satisfy desires but of the
means for all other individuals to satisfy those desires
that will lead to civil peace. Government is fundamen-
tally the legitiamte and necessary manipulation and re-
pression of the will of individuals:
For he that is kept in by punishments laid
before him, so as he dares not let loose the
reins to his will in all things, is not op-
pressed by servitude, but is governed and
sustained . ^01
This sort of rule requires a knowledge of individuals
as objects. The knowledge of the sovereign must be a
political science. Science, for Hobbes, is on a dif-
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ferent plane than will; it is dependent not on appetites
and desires but on language, the artificial creation
which allows men to talk to and about one another.
Hobbes describes science as "a knowledge of all the
consequences of names appertaining to the subject in
102hand." As it was for Bacon it is a knowledge of
the causal sequences which allow us any knowledge of
nature at all.
Herein lies Hobbes 's major contribution to the
absolutist theory of political knowledge: the tendency
to polarize the knowledge appropriate to the citizen
and that appropriate to the ruler. The former is the
product of the individual citizen's will and the only
form of rationality appropriate to him is the instru-
mental calculation of his own interest. However, the
knowledge of the ruler is political science which re-
quires a broader rationality which can determine what
particular ends will best serve the public good. Hobbes
asserts that individuals call 'good' and 'evil' those
objects which are desirable or hateful. In civil soci-
ety the determination belongs to the sovereign or a
judge who must arbitrate conflicts. Clearly, the crea-
tion of a public rule is far more complex than an indi-
vidual's knowledge of his own desires and requires more
than mere calculation of subjective interests.
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This characterization of the relation of the political
knowledge of the citizen and that of the ruler remains
the primary configuration until the last quarter of the
eighteenth century.
4. Conclus ion; the dilemma of the absolutist th^nr-y
of political knowledge. The aboslutist theory of poli-
tical knowledge is involved in a fundamental paradox:
that the knowledge most fundamental to the well being
of political life is not 'political' except in the most
narrow sense. For Bacon the problem comes out on an
epistemological level. By presupposing that the goal
of knowledge is a unified body of practical knowledge
and that this body of knowledge alone can produce a se-
cure life for the body politic, then how does he account
for the fact that men do not readily accept this and why
has so little progress been made toward the goal? Part
of Bacon's answer is that the method of previous science
has led knowledge astray, an that adoption of the induc-
tive method will hasten the arrival of New Atlantis.
Yet there is a deeper reason which he incorporates in
his famous doctrine of the 'idols' or fallacies of the
sciences. What is important for our purpose in Bacon's
doctrine is that the idols are interwoven with human
nature. Progress in science is difficult because men
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necessarily fall into characterist
i
c errors:
tLt°?t'^t^' it must be confessedhat It IS not possible to divorce ourselvesfrom these fallacies and false appearances
InlT"^^]^^^ inseparable from'^^ur naturea d condition of life; so yet never the lessthe causation of them doth extremelv importthe true conduct of human judgment .104
But if these are necessary to human nature an interest-
ing paradox arises. The aboslute unity of human knowl-
edge is the goal, but human nature renders the goal
unattainable.
The paradox takes on political significance when
we link it to the Hobbesian polarization of the knowl-
edge of the citizen and the knowledge of rulership. It
is natural for men to act according to their passions
and appetites, but the only solution to the conflicts
which make up politics is for a ruler (be he a king,
aristocratic council, or democratic body) to act on the
basis of an antithetical form of knowledge which must
nullify human nature.
Finally, politics and ethics (that is,
the sciences of just and unjust, of equity
and inequity) can be demonstrated a priori;
because we ourselves make the principles—that
is, the causes of justice (namely laws and
covenants)—whereby it is known that justice
and equity, and their opposites injustice and
inequity, are. For before covenants and laws
were drawn up, neither justice nor injustice,
neither public good nor public evil, was na-
172
beasts!l05^
"'^'^ ""^^^ ^^^^ it was among
Hobbes does not say, nor do I think he could, how the
state of nature could produce a man (moreover a body of
men) capable of consistently acting on the basis of a
knowledge knowable a priori which negates his own
nature
.
The absolutist theory of political knowledge is
based upon a conception of human nature which leads men
to perpetual conflict. Politics, then, would seem to
be natural to it. Yet, the knowledge which this theory
assigns to rulership allows no conflict. Political dis-
course is merely demonstration of correct scientific
principles and political action their strict applica-
tion. But this is engineering not politics.
CHAPTER IV
THE POLITICAL EXPRESSION OF SELF-
CITIZENSHIP IN THE LETTRES PERSANES
The truth of the independent consciousness is
accordingly the servile consciousness of thebondsman. This, it is true, appears at first
outside of itself and not as the truth of
self-consciuousness. But just as lordship
showed that its essential nature is the re-
verse of what it wants to be, so too servitudein Its consummation will really turn into the
opposite of what it immediately is; as a con-
sciousness forced back into itself, it will
withdraw into itself and be transformed into
a truly independent consciousness. (Hegel,
Phenomenology of Spirit
, trans, by A.V.
Miller, p. 117, #193)
Lettres Persanes is a book of questions, a
series of experiments to define intellectual horizons.
Just as the early eighteenth century French experimented
with new forms of bureaucratic organization, the poly-
snodie, and new economic structures, John Law's System,
Montesquieu experiemented with new intellectual perspec-
tives on society and the state. The death of Louis XIV
and the ensuing Regency created a comfortable climate
for experimentation of all sorts. Montesquieu embraced
the challenge enthusiastically. In the Lett res Persanes
he sought to do for social theory what Montaigne's Essays
had done for the theory of the self : to map out the
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problems and contours of investigation, and to raise new
questions and meaningful critiques, even if they were
not followed by answers.
The medium itself had to be experimental, stretch-
ing the limits of existing literary forms. Certainly,
Montesquieu had models and sources. Fenelon
' s Telemague
,
Chardin's Journals and previous epistolary novels echo
throughout the Lett res Persanes . Yet in both form and
content the work captured the spirit of the age better
than anyone had done previously. Montesquieu voiced
criticisms of politics and society that made up a vital
part of the eighteenth century French self
-interpreta-
tion. The work abounds in progressive politics and
morals from enlightened views on punishment to deist
conceptions of God and the universe. Yet the work is
more than isolated reflections. As has often been
noted, the epistolary form gave Montesquieu a freedom
to criticize without commitment, to criticize establish-
ed authorities and practices while incurring little gov-
ernment censure and persecution. His Persians could say
things with impunity about France, both directly and in-
directly, that Frenchmen could not. In this too, Mon-
tesquieu excelled his literary predecessors.
But the Lettres Persanes does contain a sustained
argument. The story it tells has meaning in itself.
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Usbek and the others are not merely mouthpieces, but
characters in a novel. They live and act in a fictional
world which does not merely represent but explores real-
ity. The reality it explores is that of the self and
freedom, and it concludes by declaring their intimate
and necessary connection.
I. Posing the Problem of Citizenship
Vision. The motif of the work is vision. Usbek and
Rica leave Persia in order to broaden their insight, to
learn 'the hard way' by experiencing new worlds and see-
ing from different perspectives . Increased knowledge
requires immediacy and completeness of vision. The more
the travelers see the easier their acquisition of knowl-
edge becomes. "Every moment," the first eunuch writes
to a slave traveling with Usbek, "brings you new things
to see. All that you are seeing diverts you and makes
you pass the time without feeling it."^ In distinc-
tion to the openness and vitality of the Western way of
life, Persia's deepest cruelty is the covertness of its
life. Despotic power presides over and enforces the
complete enclosure of life. Under despotic rule women
must be covered by veils and clothing over their entire
bodies, and for others to glance on them, even innocent-
3ly, IS punished with death. The seraglio, the symbol
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of the despotic way of life, is dark. The first eunuch
declares himself caged in, he can see nothing. The
realities of Persian life, as the selves of those
individuals who participate in it, are repressed. They
are hidden from view and can break out into the light
only through violence, especially self-destruction.
But for those who have left the seraglio in search
of wisdom and knowledge all becomes light. Rica can
only marvel at the clarity and transparency of French
life:
Dissimulation, that art so practiced and so
necessary among us, is unknown here. Every-
thing speakes out; everything is visible;
everything is audible. The heart shows itself
as clearly as the face. In their customs, in
their virtue, even in vice, something akin to
naivete is always visible.
4
It is not insignificant that Rica discovers the most
virtuous and clearsighted men in a blind man's hostle.^
His blind guide leads him through winding streets to the
furthest quarter of Paris without the slightest hesita-
tion. Vision is more than merely sensual, it represents
the power of the human soul.
Usbek and Rhedi also describe their encounters with
Western life in terms of vision. Usbek describes his
first visit to a Christian city as 'a grand spectacle.'
Like the best theater, this spectacle penetrates deep
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into the soul. "For there exists, even in the most in-
significant of details, something singular that I feel
and cannot express."^ Rhedi, Usbek
' s young nephew who
has left Persia to seek knowledge responds similarly to
his first visit to the west. By burying himself in ob-
servation and study, his eyes are opened and his vision
clarified: "In short, I am beginning to come out from
behind the clouds that covered my eyes in the land of
my birth. "^
Increased vision perfects the soul; it represents
the emergence and growth of the self. Through fiction
Montesquieu establishes a central theme of his theory
of citizenship: citizenship requires the free political
expression of the self. He is less concerned with the
formal criteria of citizenship than with the necessity
and legitimacy of individual political action. The fic-
tional setting is crucial to Montesquieu's overall con-
ception. In the ficticious despotism, models of authen-
tic action must be culled from beneath the deceptive
cover of custom and practice. The dialectic of oppres-
sion and freedom, of master and slave, describes poli-
tical action in a despotism. From the plight of citi-
zens under despotism Montesquieu learns that a theory
of citizenship must take account of a series of inerad-
icable tensions and paradoxes; it must explore the inner
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motives of political action.
The Lett res Persanes begins to do this by depicting
the various modes of the development of self
-conscious-
ness. Usbek and Rica undergo journeys leading to intel-
lectual self-consciousness while Roxane and Zelis jour-
ney toward political self
-consciousness. Within the
seraglio Usbek
' s wives journey from oppression to free-
dom. The despotic way of life leaves open only a nega-
tive solution to the dilemma of the citizen—political
self-expression in a despotism is self-destruction.
The Lett res Persanes prepares for De L' Esprit des
by posing questions, leaving to the latter to de-
velop specific answers. But the earlier work already
draws the contours of the map. The language of the
later theory is set. The inner life of the individual,
a central component of the later concept of 1' esprit,
looms as Montesquieu's central concern. It is not
enough for him to accept Aristotle's view of the citi-
zen as one who legitimately participates in meaningful
public decisions. He is more centrally concerned with
how, why and in what ways political action is possible
for individual citizens. In this orientation to citi-
zenship Montesquieu is not alone. The vision of the
citizen in the modern state, one dimension of which he
begins to develop in the Lettres Persanes , either con-
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sciously or subconsciously guided thinking about the
citizen in the eighteenth, nineteenth and well into the
twentieth century.
^ The myth of the Troglodytes . In Letter X Mirza
poses the first question of the theory of citizenship:
"whether men were happy through the pleasures and satis-
VI r-
factions of the senses or through the practice of
tue?" This manner of posing the dilemma seems to
have had a long history beginning with Plato and criti-
cally reopened by seventeenth century epi stemology . But
the differences between the ancient and modern formula-
tions were crucial. Whereas the ancients sought a unity
of mind, the modern mind was most puzzled by the opposi-
tions. Aristotle and Plato both recognized that virtues
and pleasure could not be separated. Book II of Aris-
totle's Nicomachean Ethics declares that "every study
both of virtue and of politics must deal with pleasures
and pains, for if a man has the right attitude to them,
he will be good; if the wrong attitude, he will be
bad." Aristotle cautions against a utilitarian in-
terpretation of virtue as calculation of amounts or de-
grees of pleasure or pain. Man must know what he is
doing; . . . he must choose to act the way he does, and
he must choose it for its own sake; and . . . the act
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must spring from a firm and unchangeable character
.
Aristotle would not have understood the sense of Mirza's
question. Mirza's use of 'or' is exclusive rather than
inclusive, intended to establish the logical isolation
of the two possible solutions. Aristotle's view of the
relation between pleasure or appetites and virtue, on
the other hand, denies the dichotomy. Virtue, for
Aristotle, in the fullest sense of virtuous intention
and action represents the greatest pleasure. Men are
happy because of the pleasure of being virtuous
.
Reflecting seventeenth century sensationalism,
Mirza's question implies a choice between exclusive
alternatives—sensual pleasure or virtue. Usbek ' s myth
of the Troglodytes answers by reinterpreting the ques-
tion. With the Troglodytes, virtue is clearly victori-
ous and man's innate sense of justice counters the util-
itarian and hedonistic implications of sensationalist
psychology. In Usbek ' s myth virtue once again includes
pleasure, the dichotomy dissolves. However, Montesquieu's
solution is not Aristotle's. He wants to recapture the
necessary connection between virtue and desire but in a
way appropriate to the conditions of the modern state.
Montesquieu does this by introducing the idea of what
we have come to call 'interests.' The action of the
Troglodyte citizen is animated by neither sensual plea-
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sure nor virtue exclusively, but by 'interest,' a con-
ceptualization which distills the complex motivations
of political action in the modern state to a single set
of descriptions.
At first the myth of the Troglodytes follows a
trend in seventeenth century political theory towards
replacing a contemplation of the proper relations of
justice as a grounding principle of political society
with a speculative history of natural man. Initially
the very mode of argument counters the Aristotelian syn-
thesis. Its purpose is to present a plausible picture of
the development of political society out of the material
origins of primitive man. Implied by the 'state of na-
ture' as a mode of argument is that virtue can have no
origin other than individual sensual pleasure . ''"^ In-
deed, Montesquieu was conscious that the Greek mode of
argument had to be replaced:
To carry out what you have required of me, I
did not think it proper to use much abstract
reasoning. There are certain truths that it
is not enough to impress by rational convic-
tion, they must be felt. Such are the veri-
ties of ethics. Perhaps this bit of history
will touch you more than some subtle philos-
ophy . ^ ^
'Subtle philosophy' was too abstract to provide adequate
explanation of the origin of social life. In the fic-
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tional context of the Lett res Persanes Montesquieu gives
a speculative account drawn from the accounts of the
newly discovered areas of the world in travel journals,
a popular literary form in early eighteenth century
France. When Montesquieu turns to political philosophy
De L'Esp rit des Lois speculative history will give
way to scientific history. Yet the use of the 'myth*
of the Troglodytes serves a dual purpose, especially
when we fully recognize that it is implanted in a work
of fiction.
Its first use is to answer Mirza in such a way that
the dichotomy between pleasure and virtue dissolves.
The myth clearly defends justice and virtue, not by con-
tradicting pleasure but by incorporating it. The Trog-
lodytes are clearly not happy until their 'republican'
period when virtue and justice alone give immediate
pleasure:
Above all they made them feel that the welfare
of the individual is always to be found in the
common good, and that to want to stray from it
is to seek destruction; they taught them that
virtue is not something that should cost us
effort, that it is not to be considered a
painful exercise; and that justice to others
is like charity to ourselves.
Although Montesquieu's solution bridges the gap between
pleasure and virtue, it is not the solution of Plato and
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Aristotle. The bridge is different. The recognition of
goodness and the pleasure of virtue is more immediate.
It is felt, not thought. The bridge is the same as the
innate sensation and joy that Usbek, Rica and even the
slave Jaron feel but cannot express at gaining knowledge
of new worlds. It is that inner moral sense that in
the pre-social natural state differentiates the beasti-
ality of the earlier Troglodytes from the virtuous and
happy republican Troglodytes; and throughout the Lett res
Persanes that innate nature unites, in itself, pleasure,
justice and virtue, constantly struggling for self-con-
scious expression. In the primitive world without kings,
virtue reigns uncontested. The early Troglodytes live
by customs not laws. But social complexity and economic
expansion put pressure on virtue, jeopardizing the rule
of custom. "O Troglodytes," the old man, about to be-
come their unwilling king, proclaims, "Your virtue is
beginning to weigh upon you. In the present state of
affairs, with no chief, you must be virtuous in spite
of yourselves
.
"'"^ As for Rousseau later in the cen-
tury, political society is the negation of natural so-
ciety, and synthesis can only result from bringing that
natural moral feeling, unconscious in the pre-social
state, to free, self-conscious expression. The story
of the Lettres Persanes , as we shall see, explores this
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dialectic, not through philosophy, but through fiction.
While denying that the problem of political action
can be adequately set forth by posing a dichotomy be-
tween sensual pleasure and virtue, the myth of the
Troglodytes neither returns to the classical solution
nor adopts the abstract solution of seventeenth century
contract theory. Indeed, its second purpose is to ex-
pose the real character of the social contract . -"-^
Here the fictional quality of the Lett res Persanes
and the myth of the Troglodytes is crucial to the argu-
ment. The very form of the work expresses Montesquieu's
argument. The idea of contract, when tied to rational-
ist foundations in a state of nature, can have no philo-
sophical import—it is a fiction, and fiction can teach,
raise questions, and even pose answers in the form of
mental experiments, but it cannot make philosophical
arguments. '^ Commentators"''^ have shown that Montes-
quieu was conscious of the Lettres Persanes as fiction,
indeed as stretching the parameters of literary form.
It is certainly at least as plausible to suspect that
he was as conscious of the difference between this work
and philosophy.
In his later work, as he matured intellectually,
the gap continually grew wider. To his mind, the state
of nature is most powerful as fiction. The fiction of
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the Troglodytes can teach moral truth; it can help to
bring natural moral sense to consciousness by presenting
a model which stretches the imagination and challenges
the preconceptions of the reader, but it cannot estab-
lish philosophical truth. Clearly, the historical sense
of the Troglodyte myth surpasses previous accounts of
the state of nature by HoTDbes and Locke; just as Rous-
seau's Discourse on Inequality will surpass the history
of the Troglodytes as a plausible analytic view of the
20origins of society. Yet the natural state of the
Troglodytes does not, indeed cannot, establish princi-
ples from which the proper conditions of real politics
can be deduced. Only a scientific understanding of real
history can do that. But that is the subject of another
book, a very different type of book. It can never be
the purpose of fiction.
3. The idea of 'interest.' There was, then, a real
historical importance to the Lett res Persanes 's state-
ment of the theory of citizenship. The terms of debate
shifted and Montesquieu's formulation, certainly in part
due to his influence, won out as the eighteenth century
progressed. The work of earlier thought like that of
Bodin, Montaigne, Bacon and Hobbes traced in the last
chapter, isolated private action from public action.
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declaring that a proper notion of political action had
to be based upon possible modes of private action. The
concept of 'interest' could bridge the gap between pri-
vate and public action by giving private action a legi-
timate public face. Political action could now be de-
scribed in terms of the private interests of individu-
als. We must examine Montesquieu's view of interests
more closely.
To Montesquieu the dichotomy between passion and
virtue could not adequately describe the life of the
citizen. Political by its nature that life necessarily
involves both. The citizen must perform his public
duties passionately. His whole individual self, not
merely his reason or his passion, must involve itself
in collective action directed toward the common good.
Neither passion devoid of virtue nor virtue devoid of
passion could accomplish this. The language of 'inter-
est' popular in both moral theory and international
politics in the seventeenth century gave Montesquieu
the new language he needed.
Recent studies have shown that initial formulations
of 'interest' in the seventeenth and early eighteenth
centuries did not have the narrow economic implications
21
that it took on in later liberal theory. In fact,
broadly interpreted, the concept was particularly well
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suited for the synthetic role Montesquieu wanted it to
play. As Albert O. Hirshman describes it:
When the term "interest" in the sense of con-
cerns, aspirations, and advantage gained cur-
rency in Western Europe during the late six-
teenth century, its meaning was by no means
limited to the material aspects of a person's
welfare; rather, it comprised the totality of
human aspirations, but denoted an element of
reflection and calculation with respect to
the manner in which these aspirations were to
be pursued. 2
2
"Interest" joined in a single term an individual's pas-
sions, desires and purposes, together with a calculation
of proper and effective means.
But the Montesquieu of the Lettres Persanes was not
completely a partisan of 'interest,' although he recog-
nized that it was necessary to accept the legitimacy of
the self-interests of particular individuals. In his
view it too often remained linked to selfishness. In-
terest was self-interest as opposed to justice and the
common good. "Men are capable of doing injustice be-
cause it is to their own interest to do so, " he asserts
23in Letter LXXXIII. He goes on to express one of
the central facets of the new concept of interests, that
they derive not from mere desire or whim, but from rea-
soned calculation: "It is always by reference to them-
selves that they act; no man is evil gratuitously.
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There must be some determined reason; that reason is
always a selfish one." Society, as Montesquieu sees it
is overloaded with particular interests. The more com-
plex a society is, the greater the number of possible
identifications become available to citizens. This re-
sults in a dynamic that clearly threatens the smooth
functioning of the state:
Since they [particular individuals] are liv-
ing together in society, their interests are
so mixed and confused, there are so many dif-
ferent kinds of interests, that a third party
is necessary to disentangle what the selfish
desires of the interested parties try to ob-
scure . 24
But his criticism did not blind him to the utility,
in fact, to the necessity of the concept of interest.
With this complex social organization (he is particular-
ly but not exclusively concerned with economic complex-
ity) the modern state requires recognition of a plur-
ality of motives behind individual political behavior.
He concludes that the purely virtuous man was one of the
luxuries which society could not afford, he was too un-
25productive. To Montesquieu, as to many of his con-
temporaries, it was a fact that man acted according to
self-interest, motivated primarily by desires and a
technical reason which, in good Hobbesian form, could
inform them of the most efficient means to the desired
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end. A theory of political action had to accept this;
recourse to ideals of virtuous action were at best ir-
relevant and at worst, and most often, deceptions which,
served particular selfish purposes.
The last sections of the myth o-f the Troglodytes,
wherein they choose a king, and the unpublished conclu-
sion where they rise to social prosperity, represent the
transformation of the language of citizenship. Montes-
quieu does not describe the action of the citizen in
terms of the public 'good' but in terms of the public
'interest.' The fundamental opposition shifts from be-
ing between passions and virtue to being between self-
interest and the public interest, the latter containing
the same Hobbesian mixture of desire and technical rea-
son as the former. It is in this sphere that 'inter-
est, ' for Montesquieu, takes on a more exclusively eco-
27nomic meaning.
In Letter XIV, the last part of the Troglodyte myth
which Montesquieu published as part of the Lettres Per -
sanes
, the newly chosen king penetrates the motivation
of the Troglodytes for choosing a king:
"You prefer to be subjects of a prince and
obey his laws, for they are less restrictive
than your customs. You know that from now on,
you can satisfy your ambition, acquire riches,
and languish in soft luxury, and that so long
as you avoid falling into great crimes, you
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will have no need of virtue. "28
This lament penetrates not only the self-deception of
the Troglodytes but the historical necessity of the fall
from virtue. The increase in size and wealth of the
Troglodyte community necessitates the change from the
simple virtuous republic to monarchy. As I have shown
above (Chapter 2) the change in the size and scope of
governments is a fact of modern European history for
Montesquieu. As I will show in the next chapter, his
analysis of the cycle of the forms of government in De
L'Esprit des Lois demonstrates its theoretical impor-
tance.
But as J. Robert Loy has shown Montesquieu was not
content with this pessimistic conclusion in the publish-
ed version of the history of the Troglodytes,^^ just
as he was not content with the plight of modern European
history as caught by necessity in a monarchical form of
government. In both cases he sought a way out and in
both cases economic interests provided hope. Economic
expansion can lead either to prosperity and a virtuous
society or to moral depravity.
After several generations of rulers the Troglodytes
convened the nation and decided "to establish commerce
30
and the arts." The newly chosen king raises the
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first objection, restating the original king's lament:
"Would you now prefer riches to your virtue?" The an-
swer given by one of the Troglodytes foreshadows the
theory of De L'Esprit des Lois , proclaiming that through
proper education, led by the virtuous action of the
king, riches will not be dangerous:
"My lord ... we are happy. We work on ex-
cellent soil. May I dare say it? It is you
alone who will decide whether riches will be
dangerous for your people or not ..."
The new king's reply synthesizes passion and virtue in
terms of the merging of private interest (now given an
economic meaning) with the public interest:
"We have two things to do: to deflate and
bring to naught avarice, and equally, prodi-
gality. Every man must be accountable to the
state for the administration of his posses-
sions. And may the coward who will lower him-
self to the point of robbing himself of an
honest subsistence-^-'- be punished no less
severely than the man who runs through the
patrimony of his children. Each citizen must
be a fair dispenser of his own wealth, just
as he would be of the wealth of another . " [my
emphasis
]
A new language has been drawn in which the dilemma of
the citizen can be described and debated. The primary
tension is between private interests and the public in-
terest. Private interest must be made compatible with
the public interest; the motivations of particular in-
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dividuals must yield benefits to all. virtue and pas-
sion, combined in the different interests of individuals
and of the collectivity, together draw the map of ten-
sions which describes the life of the citizen:
If you seek to distinguish yourselves only byyour wealth (which is nothing in itself) I
shall have to distinguish myself by the same
methods in order not to remain in a poverty
you would scorn. Thus I should have to over-
whelm you with taxes, and you would use a
great part of your subsistence in keeping up
the pomp and glitter that would serve to make
me respectable. At present I find all my
wealth within myself, but then, you would
have to wear yourself out to make me rich,
and these riches, of which you make so much,
would give you no pleasure for they would all
flow into my treasury. O Troglodytes 1 we
can be united by a lovely tie: if you are
virtuous, I shall be; if I am virtuous, you
will be.
II. Paris and Persia; The Quest for Knowledge
1. Rica and Usbek : the modern 'savant.' In different
ways Rica and Usbek demonstrate the role of reason in
the development of self-consciousness . Both set out to
increase the range and depth of their knowledge. Curi-
osity, observation and reflection guide their discovery.
Their quest becomes a passion, determining and consuming
their lives. Usbek, the older and more reserved, speaks
for both of them:
Those who like to learn are never idle. Al-
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though I am occupied with no important affair,
I am nonetheless continually busy. I spend my
life examining. In the evening, I write what
I have noticed, seen, or heard during the day.
Everything interests me; everything astonishes
me. I am like a child whose still sensitive
organs are keenly struck by the most insignif-
icant objects.
Indeed, they are children in a storm of stimulation,
guided by a somewhat nai've faith that truth will issue
in the end. Persistent reflection and freedom from
prejudice are alone necessary.
Yet the naivete takes its toll. Rica, at once more
daring and free, remains somewhat superficial. He is
puzzled but offers few solutions. He enters French life
more fully than does Usbek, adopting its dress and some
of its manners. But his criticisms, when not mere won-
der and amazement, are more impetuous than carefully
reasoned. He is, indeed, the 'free spirit' that Usbek
3 3
considers him. A "lively wit and natural gaiety"
make him more apt to be comfortable in Parisian socie-
ty, wherein the 'free spirit' is the prototype of
the successful mnan.
Usbek is, on the other hand, more stern and reflec-
tive. Carefully reasoned questions and arguments, along
with moral declarations, make up the bulk of his let-
ters. He is the demanding theoretician and stern moral-
ist. In short, Usbek and Rica represent two sides of
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the modern "savant"—the phi losophe—the intellectual
ideal of the age of enlightenment. But for Montesquieu
something is still missing. Even Usbek
' s sophisticated
theorizing remains naive. He has a tragic flaw, a con-
tradiction deep in his character. No matter how sophis-
ticated his reason his sentiments destroy him. His en-
lightened views crumble in the face of his traditional
way of life. Despotism is incompatible with enlighten-
ment. His enlightened views isolate him from Persian
life and the life of the seraglio, which he cannot
leave, holds him there.
2. Usbek; the master in search of the world . Usbek
'
s
drive for knowledge is genuine although the initial
motives for his departure from Persia were political
rather than intellectual. At the Persian court Usbek
had represented virtue to the king, making enemies,
including the king, rather than admirers. Virtue and
despotism are incompatible. At first Usbek used study
as a pretext for isolating himself from his enemies,
and only in this process of learning did he develop the
drive for knowledge: "I pretended to possess a great
devotion to learning and by dint of pretense, such de-
35
votion actually came to me." After threats from
his enemies the philosopher's cloak provided a pretext
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for exile. Throughout all of his travels, however,
Usbek remains part of the Persian way of life; there
are important ways in which he never leaves it. The
tension between the genuine search for knowledge and
exile from a beloved and preferred way of life con-
stantly tears away at Usbek.
His concerns are aristocratic. Most of his reflec-
tive letters deal with religion, court politics, aristo-
cratic political morals and abstract political theory.
Early in his travels, Usbek is reluctant to question and
even an intellectual break from his traditional way of
life is difficult. Indeed, his questioning begins with
the desperate desire to reaffirm the most traditional
aspect of his social life—religion:
I cannot, divine mullah, calm my impatience.
I could not possibly awaith thy reply. I have
doubts. I must trace them down. I feel that
my reason is straying; guide it back into the
straight path. Come and enlighten me, spring
of light. With the divine pen, blast, as with
thunder, the problems I am about to propose to
thee. Make me ashamed of myself, cause me to
blush at the question I shall put to thee. 36
Usbek 's reason has indeed begun to wander. Letters XVI
through XVIII, spurred by Usbek ' s religious doubts, set
up the tensions of his initial intellectual conscious-
ness. Why, he asks the mullah, does God prohibit eating
certain meats? Are not the dietary laws really reflec-
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tions of our own sensual likes and dislikes? Do not
these religious precepts really derive from the senses?
Usbek wants a convincing answer not wanting to believe
the heathen, worldly philosophy. Yet, his pleas are
desperate; his doubts are real. His nature is beginning
to break through. The more he questions, the more he
allows his doubts about past and present to become con-
scious, the more his reason is perfected.
Living in Paris Usbek ' s developing views begin to
isolate him from his intellectual tradition. He begins
to reflect on events in Paris and on theoretical issues
raised by Western traditions of thought. Several let-
ters demonstrate that these observations are leading
him to break from his traditional life, to question and
arrive at truth through his own reasoning, not through
the traditions of his past. Again, religion holds his
attention first; religious toleration is his first en-
lightened position. Christians should not be counted
'infidels' and they warrant tolerance rather than re-
pression. They do not actively deny the Moslem faith
but rather they are merely ignorant of it. "They are
more like those unfortunate people, " Usbek declares,
"who lived within the shadow of idolatry before the
divine light came to illumine the face of our great Pro-
37phet . " Christians are actually like Mohammedans,
without the prophet. Usbek goes on to remark that the
truths reflected in their doctrines, however, parallel
those of the Koran. Indeed, this is only the beginning.
His statements supporting religious toleration grow even
bolder as his experience of Paris widens.
Later, Usbek
' s reflections turn towards politics
and criticisms directed at Persia and despotism become
harsher. His previous hesitant posing of questions
pitting Western ways against those of Persia give way
to open criticism. Usbek applies the condemnation of
amoral Machiavellian power politics to the despotism of
the sultans:
The unlimited power of our sublime sultans,
which knows no other law than its own, pro-
duces no greater number of monsters than that
unworthy sort which hopes to bend to its will
justice, rigidly inflexible though it may
be
.
In Letter CII the criticism explodes his surface accep-
tance of Persian politics. In order to describe the
proper monarchy in Europe, Usbek counters the despotism
of Persia. The Persian monarch's power is too great and
too arbitrary. He takes the lives of subjects at his
40
whim. Nothing is left for the citizen but rebellion.
Foreshadowing Usbek ' s own future, this is more than cas-
ual i rony
i
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^ Usbekj the bonds of despotism . Usbek has left
Persia physically but not emotionally. Even as he gains
knowledge, learning to question on a broader and more
sophisticated basis, he remains perpetually anxious.
He is unable to break from the despotic way of life.
He cannot accept the absence of his wives and his as-
sertion of power over them. He confesses that he is
jealous of his wives but does not love them: "It is
not so much that I love them, ... I anticipated love
and destroyed it by loving. ""^^ Fear and jealousy
keep him tied to the seraglio, no matter how far away
he is either physically or emotionally. Through his
selfless agents, the eunuchs, he rules as a paternalis-
tic tyrant, at the same time that he develops a philos-
ophy at once more tolerant, humane, and more appropriate
to a free, moderate government. A contradiction between
reason and passion, enlightenment and despotism, remains
the determinant of Usbek ' s character throughout his
journey. He is caught between the two poles of Troglo-
dyte society. On the one hand, he is the virtuous cit-
izen who exposes corruption at home and who praises
friendship as the finest form of human felicity. On
the other, he remains the cruel master who threatens to
destroy life for the slightest disobedience to his rule.
Throughout the book his life remains a contradiction
—
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one which recurs and animates the entire book. Usbek
is both master and slave. His mind and his reason un-
leash an unfettered spirit and capacity for reflection;
but his passion and his power enslave him.
Friendship offers the only consolation for the
struggle in Usbek
' s soul. The torment over his wives
leaves him totally isolated; despotic power both iso-
lates and destroys. As a form of human relation it is
incomplete. Usbek ' s only consolation is to confide in
his friends. To have company in open dialogue and in-
tellectual exploration—to know he has comrades—com-
forts Usbek. In contrast, the closed society of the
East with the isolation of its members is a perversion:
This Asiatic sobriety derives from the dearth
of intercourse between people. They see each
other only when forced to do so by ceremony.
Friendship, that sweet bond of hearts which
creates a gentleness of existence here, is
practically unknown to them. They withdraw
to their houses where they always find a so-
cial company awaiting them, so that each fam-
ily group lives, so to speak, in isolation. ^2
Usbek ' s isolation is broken by the intercourse with
strangers in Paris and by the letters he exchanges with
friends. Ibben's concern for Usbek ' s well being and
declaration of friendship as a basis of universal citi-
zenship in Letter LXVIII must be a great comfort. The
positive, open side of Usbek ' s life leads to reflection
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and intellectual proaress. Vt^i- v.-: „ « i»Fiuy Yet, his subconscious emo-
tional life remains closed and individual. By the end
of the book it overtakes him.
The real victor in the Lettres Persane.. is despot-
ism. In one way or another it destroys those who make
it, or have made it, a way of life. The only solution
is to leave it, as Rica does. But Rica is young, a new
generation free to experiment with different ways of
life (as is Usbek
' s nephew who decides he must leave
Persia in order to travel). He immerses himself in
French life, adopts its clothing and its ideals (often
a radical version of them) and, late in the book, re-
sists Usbek 's pleas to return to Persia. The combina-
tion of youth and freedom provides some hope of choosing
one's own way of life.
But Usbek is already tied to a way of life. Its
bond is tradition—Usbek cannot imagine breaking from
it. As the Troglodyte myth implies, and Montesquieu
will canonize in De L' Esprit des Lois , the self becomes
fixed within a particular way of life. To accept a role
in a particular society, to legitimate a form of rule
through the practice of it, is to lock the self into a
tradition. There is still freedom. Usbek goes quite
far towards questioning and rejecting despotism as a
legitimate form of government. Yet his reason cannot
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undo his earlier emotional development. His past grasps
him in ways he cannot master. He can understand and
even in principle control his present environment, but
he cannot reform his sentiments. And in the end his
emotional past, the spirit of despotism, wins. The
working out of the dialectic of despotism in the serag-
lio finally destroys him; it obliterates the self.
Preoccupied with the final chaos of the seraglio, Usbek
writes :
I am living in a barbarous climate, in
the company of everything that vexes me, far
removed from everything that interests me. A
somber sadness seizes on me; I am falling into
a frightful oppression. It seems to me that
I am destroying myself and no longer find my
own personality except when a dark jealousy
ignites within and gives birth in my soul to
fear, suspicion, hate, and regret.
III. Citizenship Under Despotism;
The Dialectic of Master and Slave
1. The descent into the seraglio . The dialectic of
master and slave grows more complex as its focus moves
from the aristocracy of Usbek to the underworld of eu-
nuchs and wives. Their struggle for self-expression,
to wrest power over their own lives away from their
master, is more difficult, more violent and more
dest ruct i ve
.
The dialectic is fully at work in the seraglio.
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All is distorted there. Concealed power confronts con-
cealed power. Only a heightened self
-awareness and
transparency of vision offers any hope of warding off
the destructive consequences of the contradictions. But
this solution is not available to the characters. Des-
potism only allows one solution—rebellion and death
together with destruction and chaos. Repression must
give way to freedom. If the self is distorted by power
relations it must nevertheless somehow express its free-
dom. Political expression of this freedom can go only
in one direction. Roxane ' s rebellion and suicide are
the only possible outlets for the utterly constrained
self. It is as if the psychic energy bound up in the
self is intensified as it is repressed. When unleashed,
it is with furor. As Rica's depiction of French manners
makes clear, the free self is felicitous and tranquil;
as Zelis's descriptions and Roxane ' s actions make clear,
its repression leads to destruction and death. The only
authentic expression of self in this extreme oppression
is self-destruction. Roxane ' s suicide, although the
culmination of deceit, is noble and virtuous. She, in-
deed, represents the most virtuous member of the sera-
glio; but her virtue is not what Usbek praises. It is
not her willing submission to the manners and moeurs of
despotic rule but her rebellion. Her taking a lover,
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seducing the eunuchs, and committing suicide are modes
of her self-expression. Her rebellion against despotic
rule expresses a natural human virtue. Given the way
of life in which she is caught, virtue requires her own
self-destruction. The repression of the self in the
seraglio is not only cruel it is inhuman. The cruelty
of the evil Troglodytes echoes throughout the seraglio:
you have no right to live, for your cruelty is inhuman.
The eunuch most clearly represents this inhumanity; he
is the symbol of humanity made inhuman by man—the es-
sence of despotism.
ll The eunuchs; slaves as masters . The dialectic
involves the entire cast of characters of the Lettres
Persanes. All are both masters and slaves; all are
motivated and eventually destroyed by the contradic-
tions. Usbek, political master over his wives, remains
their emotional slave. As his enlightenment renders him
more master of himself, his wives become more masters of
his passions. The black eunuchs represent the dialectic
more clearly yet in a more complex form than Usbek. Un-
like their master, they have been raised from the lowest
of slaves to the most despotic of masters. Indeed, the
cruelty grows as their consciousness of their position
grows. They are truly caught in the center between
204
Usbek and his wives. Their only possible response is
absolute Obedience to the former and absolute mastery
over the latter. Vis-a-vis Usbek, they resent their
position at the same time that they relish its power.
Their relation to Usbek 's wives is similar. They are
slaves destined to serve the women's needs and whims.
Yet, they are the enforcers of tyranny over them. Their
self-interpretation is wracked by contradictions: they
are men but they are not 7 they are slaves but with the
power to oppress their masters. They can only express
love through cruelty.
The eunuchs are pure functionaries denatured both
physically and morally. They have no self. Conscious
that their position requires power and cruelty, Usbek
'
s
chief black eunuch's teacher can describe himself with
the utmost clarity: "I am a slave," he would say to the
women under his guard, "but I am slave to a man who is
your master and mine, and I make use of the power he has
granted me over you." He continues by legitimizing his
rule and in the process denies his own selfhood: "It
is he (the master) who punishes you and not I, for I am
only the arm of the master. "^^ His nature has not
actually been removed from him but it has been distort-
ed. His passions still exist, indeed they are intensi-
fied because they cannot be satisfied. Describing his
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initial thoughts after the fateful operation, the first
eunuch describes his torment:
I hoped to be delivered from the seizure oflove by my impotence to satisfy it. Alas forme. The effect of passion was snuffed out inme without extinguishing the cause, and farfrom being comforted, I found myself surround-
ed by objects that provoked my passion without
cease
.
. .
The same women whom I was temptedto behold with such tender eyes, I could look
at only with severity. 45
The eunuch's self definition is plagued by contradic-
tions as are all those who live under despotic regimes.
But the eunuch is compensated for his impotence.
The passion of love intensified by the conditions of
slavery expresses itself as the power of command and
punishment. "I remember always that I was born to com-
mand them, and it seems to me that I become a man again
when I can still do so." Now that the chief eunuch has
become old he consoles himself by exercising power, re-
capturing his sense of manhood by punishing. Yet his
sense of justice and moderation, which Montesquieu con-
siders natural to virtuous action, is gone. The chief
eunuch wants, indeed needs, to oppress his subjects.
He must somehow express his inner nature, but he cannot
do it in natural harmony with others but only through
oppression—by making someone else his slave. The only
consolation he can give to Jaron upon the latter' s cas-
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tration is that the satisfactions of nature now denied
him can be recaptured through command: "I thought of
you as having a second birth and taking leave of a ser-
vitude in which you always had to obey, to enter another
kind of servitude, where you were to command. "^^ The
education of a eunuch must parallel the education of a
despot. The description given by the chief black eunuch
of his teacher and his education in Letter LXIV illus-
trates the development of the eunuch's self
-interpreta-
tion :
It was under that great teacher that I learn-
ed the difficult art of commanding, under him
that I learned to conform to the maxims of
inflexible government. Under him I studied
the hearts of women; he taught me to take
advantage of their weakness and never to be
surprised at their haughtiness.
The art of commanding which becomes the sole joy
of the eunuchs is the art of manipulating women as ob-
jects. Such objectivity and manipulation bring joy and
satisfaction. V^hile overt sensual pleasure has been
denied to the eunuchs, its loss found compensation in
the psychological pleasure of forcing women to regard
themselves as objects for manipulation. Furthermore,
the eunuchs are aware of this aspect of their position.
They justify their cruelty by regarding themselves as
the center of human relations; as above both men and
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women, as their real superiors. Jaron, the young eunuch
about to return to the seraglio to reinforce the guard,
knows well what he must do:
It seems nature placed women in a state ofdependence and then withdrew them from it.
Disorder arose between the sexes because their
rights were reciprocal. We (eunuchs) have
entered upon the plane of a new harmony. Wehave put between women and ourselves, hate:
and between men and women, love.
Like the chief black eunuch and his teacher, Jaron feels
'a species of triumph' at the manipulation and oppres-
47sion of the women. It is the eunuch's true self-
interpretation.
The condition of the self in the seraglio, partic-
ularly in the eunuch's position, resembles a psychoana-
lytic situation. Deprived of the possibility of sexual
fulfillment by the paternalistic master, Usbek, the eu-
nuchs must seek other forms of sensual pleasure. Us-
bek ' s repression of the eunuchs is complete. "For what
are all of you, " he declares to the first white eunuch,
"if not base tools that I can break at my fancy
—
you,
who exist only for as long as you know how to obey; you,
who exist in this world only to live under my laws or to
48die so soon as I shall order." He considers them
as objects, but as objects which threaten his exclusive
right to his sexual property. For despite the disclaim-
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ers by all, including the eunuchs themselves, that the
eunuchs are not men, they must in some way express thei
nature. Their feelings and passions remain, although
they cannot be satisfied in normal ways. The first
black eunuch hints that his severity towards the women
is related to his hatred of his master:
As the crowning stroke to my misery, I had
ever before my eyes a happy man. During thesetroubled times, I never led a woman to my mas-ter s bed, I never undressed her without re-turning to my room with rage in my heart andhorrible desolation in my soul . . . The same
women whom I was tempted to behold with suchtender eyes, I could only look at with sever-ity .
Those feelings that naturally would have been love
turned to hatred. Could the joy which the eunuchs feel
at oppressing Usbek
' s wives be displaced hatred for the
master who has deprived them of humanity?
We must be cautious not to take this interpreta-
tion too far; we must not add our own preoccupation to
the Lett res Persanes
. The language of psychoanalysis
serves as a useful metaphor to describe the complex in-
teractions among the characters of the seraglio. Yet
Montesquieu clearly saw that no matter how deep the re-
pression of the self, some form of self-expression was
necessary. Citizenship must harness the power of indi-
vidual self-expression. Different forms of government
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and ways of life require certain forms of behavior.
But the stable polity requires that the behavior be the
authentic expression of the self. As Montesquieu shows
De L'Esprit des Lois self-expression is not the same
in all forms of government; human nature manifests it-
self according to various social forms and customs.
There is no discontinuity in this respect between the
Lettres Persanes and De L'Esprit des Lois . The former
states the problem by exploring the most extreme form
of repressive rule—despotism. Here the dialectic is
clearest. Social life requires certain types of per-
sonalities, all authentic expressions of individual
selves
.
Montesquieu's view differs from Plato's (although
clearly inspired by it) because the self, the 'spirit,'
for Montesquieu, involves self -interpretat ion and inter-
subjectivity. Individuals express themselves in partic-
ular ways primarily because of their perceptions of
their relations with others, constituted by the cultural
traditions which they share. Montesquieu is more con-
cerned than Plato with the possibilities for existence
of particular types of personalities, rather than with
fully describing and defining the abstract personality
type. The self of Montesquieu's psychology requires an
engagement with historical circumstance and laws that
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Plato's democratic, timocratic and oligarchic men do
not. Plato's men act out of trained habit, Montesquieu's
out of interpretations of their interests. Montesquieu
recognizes more fully than Plato the impossibility of
escaping the social forms of self-expression. Hence,
he considers action more at the heart of the human con-
dition than contemplation. The development of the dia-
lectic of master and slave in the Lettres Persanes dem-
onstrates a fundamental assumption of Montesquieu's
theory of the citizen: the natural drive for freedom
and self-expression, necessarily repressed by social
structures, cannot be destroyed but must be 'sublimated,'
reappearing in different forms of action.
3. Masters and slaves; the reversal of roles . The
relation between the eunuchs and Usbek
' s wives demon-
strates most clearly the dialectic of master and slave.
Depending upon the particular situation, each can either
be master or slave. Even Usbek, so blind to so much
else in the seraglio, recognizes the complex, dual
relation:
You (eunuchs) command and you obey them (his
wives); you carry out blindly all their de-
sires, and in the same way, you make them
carry out the laws of the harem. You find
your glory in rendering them the lowliest
service; you yield with fear and respect to
their legitimate commands; you serve them
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like a slave of their slaves. But, by an
exchange of authority, you command as masterlike myself, whenever you fear a weakening ofthe laws of decency and modesty. 50
The relation is one of jockeying for position. Both
must manipulate circumstances and each other to their
own advantage. "There exists between us something like
an ebb and flow of dominion and submission," says the
51first eunuch. The eunuchs continually exhort Usbek
for greater power to punish his wives, while the women
manipulate their husband's passions in order to exact
revenge on the eunuchs. To Usbek ' s wives, the 'fright-
ful eunuchs
. . . are not men at all."^^ As we have
seen, the eunuchs hate the women just as much. "I have
detested them ever since the moment I was able to con-
sider them objectively," says the first eunuch. He
can oppress them with zeal and a 'secret joy.' Yet
there are costs. Just as the women become masters over
Usbek, they become masters over their eunuchs. Each
views the other as an object. Both use their slavery
to assert their mastery.
But the wives' assertion of self is not so tightly
bound to their domain over the eunuchs. Their master-
ship over them is primarily a defensive game against the
brutality of Usbek ' s functionaries. There is another
form of self-expression possible for them—active re-
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bellion against their real master. Intellectually,
Zelis penetrates the master-slave relation. But as is
characteristic of the social relations in the Lett res
Persanes, the real rebellion must come from the oppo-
site of rebellion, the one least likely to rebel; from
Roxane, Usbek ' s most virtuous wife. She is exactly op-
posite from what her master believes her to be. These
two women represent the element of self-expression which
is missing from Usbek and Rica: the authentic expres-
sion of passion. The most pervasive theme of the Let -
tres Persanes is that freedom is incomplete without the
freedom to love, and that the freedom to love requires
free, moderate government. This is the central theme
of the second important myth that Montesquieu includes
in Letter LXVII— "the History of Apheride and Astarte."
Their love moves in and out of slavery, continually
struggling against the confines of despotism. Eventu-
ally, their sincerity convinces their final master that
their love makes them worthy of freedom. Without the
passionate expression of self, unsuppressed by artifi-
cial political power, human beings are incomplete.
Usbek justifies the oppression of his wives on the
basis of custom and nature. The seraglio protects the
women from their own nature. Usbek ' s wives are faithful
not because of their nature but because of the force of
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the seraglio. Zachi
' s test of will by seducing a white
eunuch^^ is written off by Usbek as an aberration.
In Usbek 's mind most of his wives consider the seraglio
a "happy shelter against the attacks of vice, a sacred
temple where your sex loses its weakness and becomes
invincible despite all the disadvantages of its nature."
Later on, Usbek consistently defends the Persian treat-
ment of women against the "brutish impudence" of the
Parisian women.
Yet the rebellion is more widespread than Usbek
suspects. The first expression of self by the women in
the seraglio is the disorder described by the chief
black eunuch in Letter LXIV. Here, the women are caught
in narcissistic assertions of power. The wives all de-
mand preference because of their own individual quali-
ties; one more beautiful, one richer, one more loved by
the master. Their first general expression of hostility
is against themselves, not their masters. Characteris-
tically, the only solution envisioned by the eunuch is
punishment, to tighten the web of repression; and Usbek
is only too willing to concede. Despotic repression
must be continuous. The self must be caged so that
even partial and momentary escape is not possible. Any
sign of self-expression must be crushed; any infraction
of the rules must be severely punished. Only fear, the
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psychological principle of despotic power, succeeds in
controlling.
Rica, not Usbek, recognizes this and foreshadows
the disaster about to overtake the seraglio. in doing
so he echoes the major themes of the work. The repres-
sion of nature in the Persian treatment of women dis-
torts them and their relations with men. Self-expres-
sion is necessary to them, but it is only available to
them under despotism through fear:
With us their (women) characters are allthe same because they are forced into a mold.
We don't see people as they really are but as
they are forced to be. In that servitude ofheart and mind there is talk only of fear,
which has but one language, and no talk of
nature which expresses itself in such varied
ways and appears under so many forms
. [mv~
emphasis
]
Parisian life has shown him another model where women
are free. In all ways the veils are lifted. Only by
leaving Persian life altogether and entering Parisian
life can Rica recognize the true natural equality of men
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and women. But Usbek cannot leave the seraglio and
he cannot understand Rica's enlightened view of women.
The letters immediately following Rica's describe the
confusion in the seraglio and Usbek ' s exhortation to
his wives to beware that their insolence must be pun-
i shed
.
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But inside the harem Usbek
' s wives continually
become more daring. In Letter CXLVII the grand eunuch
informs Usbek that anarchy and open rebellion reign.
Zelis on a journey to a mosque let down her veil in
sight of a crowd, and Zachi was caught in bed with one
of her women slaves. Men are caught in the seraglio,
and even many eunudhs and other slaves have been won
over. Usbek 's only response is to order greater
punishment
.
The punishment is destined only to drive the women
to further action. Earlier, Zelis had foreshadowed the
end. As early as Letter CXII she began to penetrate her
master's rule:
Nature, industriously bent on the wel-
fare of men, has not limited herself to givingdesires to them. She wanted us to have our
own and chose that we should be the living
instruments of men's felicity .... And yet,
Usbek, you must not imagine that your lot is
happier than mine. I have enjoyed here a
thousand pleasures unknown to you. My imagi-
nation has worked untiringly to make me appre-
ciate them properly. I have lived, and you
have only languished.
Even in this very prison where you hold
me, I am freer than you. You could not pos-
sibly redouble your concern for guarding me
without my drawing pleasure from your worry.
Your suspicions, your jealousy, and your
heartaches are all so many proofs of your
dependency
.
Later, her final letter penetrates her relation to Usbek
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even further. The cruelty inflicted on her cannot take
away her joy at having asserted her independence and in
the process her master's destruction:
From a thousand leagues distance, you judge meguilty. From a thousand leagues distance, you
are punishing me
. . . It is the tyrant who
offends me, not the man carrying out his ty-
ranny .
You can, at your fancy, double your
cruel treatment. My heart has found calm
since it is no longer able to love you. Your
soul has brought its own debasement on itself,
and you are becoming cruel. Be assured that
you are not happy.
Zelis, not Usbek, has won—the slave has freed herself,
and the punishment inflicted on the master is greater
than the cruelty he caused to be inflicted on his
slaves
.
Yet Zelis' reaction lacks something fundamental.
While accepting her triumph she accepts the relation
with Usbek. Her pleasure comes from her power to man-
ipulate her husband to her own advantage. Having
learned to be content with the mutually destructive
relationship she has no wish to change it.
Roxane ' s reaction, however, goes further. Her
actions have a quality which those of other characters
lack—reflexivity. As is the case with the other wives
and eunuchs she can only recognize herself through her
master, reflecting a central tenet of Montesquieu's
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theory of man, that men (and women) can only recognize
themselves through others. Moderation, which Montes-
quieu establishes as the general moral rule, demands
that judgments be made by relating the self to others.
The dialectic of master and slave in the seraglio dem-
onstrates the disorder and destruction which occurs
when moderation is lacking. Rather than recognizing
their common humanity in others, the characters in the
seraglio recognize others as either impediments to their
actions and desires or as tools to satisfy them. Within
the despotic way of life social relationships are in
essence technocratic—one's relationship with another
is determined solely by how that other can be useful to
your own ends; one remains both master and slave. Zelis
can penetrate the unnaturalness of this utilitarian per-
spective on social intercourse but remains in it. She
remains content that the contradiction in her character
between her submission to and domination of her master
is mutual. She does not act against it. Only Roxane
rises above it, recognizing the contradiction as part
of her social situation, leaving her free to assert her
natural self. She has indeed abjured Usbek ' s (and des-
potism's) laws and asserted the law of nature.
Zelis 's self -assertat ion is less dramatic than
Roxane' s. In Usbek 's own eyes his most faithful and
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virtuous wife, Roxane is in fact the most assertive.
She manipulates the master-slave relation in order to
assert her freedom and independence. Her rebellion and
suicide are indeed virtuous, the only truly virtuous
acts in the seraglio. She has led the rebellion and
even more than Zelis has turned the psychology of des-
potism back on her master. All along she sought a way
to natural self-expression. So long as the veils seemed
to cover the situation, so long as her virtue seemed to
be that prescribed by the customs of despotism, she was
able to manipulate Usbek ' s jealousy to her own advan-
tage. But this alone does not satisfy her. Along with
her suicide her final letter declares her freedom and
the struggle of all the women for free self-expression:
How could you have thought that I was naive
enough to imagine that I was put in the world
only to adore your whims? That while you pam-
pered yourself with everything, you should
have the right to mortify all my desires? No!
I might have lived in servitude, but I have
always been free. I have rewritten your laws
after the laws of nature, and my spirit has
ever sustained itself in independence ....
My language, no doubt, seems new to you.
Could it be that after having overwhelmed you
with sorrow, I should even yet force you to
admire my courage? But it is finished. The
poison consumes me. My strength is leaving
me, the pen falls from my hands. I feel even
my hatred weaken. I am dying.
With these lines the Lettres Persanes ends. Cer-
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tainly, Usbek would not have understood her new lan-
guage. She has given new meaning to the seraglio; one
closer to a human nature which reflects the natural as-
piration for freedom. But having raised her virtue to
self-consciousness, she must die, for her action has
destroyed her master, but not the form of repression.
Despotism is the real victor. In it the only self-con-
scious assertion of nature is death. We can guess that
once Usbek receives Roxane's letter he no longer thinks
of going back to Persia. There is nothing to go back
to. Despotism can only end in self-destruction for both
master and slave.
In terms of the ideals of public action which
Montesquieu develops in De L' Esprit des Lois
, which we
shall discuss in the next chapter, the despotic regime
could have no citizens. All Montesquieu's work is ani-
mated by the fear that the spirit of despotism will
invade government. Indeed, careful and complex insti-
tutions, often too complex, are necessary to prevent
its intrusion. The citizen is caught in a dilemma: to
assert oneself in such a way as to support political
stability and the public good, while recognizing the
validity of self interest as free according to its own
nature. The classical categories are not helpful for
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the self can no longer be understood as a simple func-
tion of one's place in society. The choice cannot be
simply between the private good or the public good.
The modern citizen must be both self-interested and
public spirited. Both of these categories are new with
the rise of the modern state. Both public and private
action are expressions of the self, and it is the com-
bination of this expression of self which classical
philosophy did not know. In De L' Esprit des Lois the
concepts of '1 'esprit' and the principle of a form of
government will forge new ground in a theory of citi-
zenship. The contours of legitimate public action must
be the expression of self within a particular social and
political setting.
CHAPTER V
CITIZENSHIP IN MODERATE GOVERNMENTS-THE UNIVERSAL POLITICS OF DE L ' ESPRIT PES T.OT...
The Lettres Persanes begins to probe the nature of
the internal rationality of subjectivity, attempting to
show that the self strives for freedom and that subjec-
tive action is a product of the dialectical confronta-
tion of the individual self with the outside world of
social and political institutions. The "Considerations
Sur Les Causes de la Grandeur des Remains et de leur
Decadence," takes on a different dimension of the prob-
lem, arguing that human history itself, while seeming
to be purely subjective and accidental, likewise has a
rationality to it which can be described in terms of
general laws and causes. However, De L' Esprit des Lois
seeks a universal description of the rationality of the
social world. But the fictional mode of the Lettres
Persanes which approaches a psychoanalytic perspective
on the rationality of the subject, and the history of
the decline of Rome which explains a method of capturing
the internal dialectic of historical development, uses
specific concrete details to demonstrate that rational-
ity. De L' Esprit des Lois goes further.
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The subjective dimension of individuality requires
freedom, as the Lettres Persanes demonstrates. Like-
L' Esprit des Loi
.
does not ignore this dimen-
sion. Liberty remains the supreme value of political
and social life. But Montesquieu's concept of 1' esprit
general is complex: indeed too complex, for it is
plagued by a fundamental contradiction. The dialec-
tical rationality of subjectivity described both in
Montesquieu's moral theory as well as in the Lettres
Persanes tends to give way in De L' Esprit des Lois but
its various components are not reconciled. The concept
of 1' esprit recognizes that subjective action is crucial
to social life; this is the essential notion of the
'principle' of a government. But 1 'esprit also contains
a more formal view of political inst itut ions . These
two aspects of 1' esprit are incompatible and lead to con-
tradictory implications for the theory of citizenship.
The concept of 1' esprit general describes what
might be called a 'universal politics.'^ It unifies
under a single term all of the particular elements of
social life. Not only a nation's past—its customs,
traditions and laws—but also its present— its economic
structure, current constitution, and class structure
—
come together into a single system of relations. They
are all 'laws' in the sense that their connections are
223
regular patterns that can be understood by an observer.
In view of a theory of citizenship, 1 'esprit general
contains two crucial dimensions, the requisites of
political action and the institutionalization of a con-
stitution and political organization. Montesquieu de-
fines the first in terms of a political education nec-
essary to encourage appropriate behavior in citizens,
both in their public and private lives, and in terms of
the concept of the 'principle' of a form of government.
The institutional dimension is described by a complex
system of interconnected relations of particulars, in-
cluding both moral and physical causes, as well as con-
stitutional balance among class interests. The purpose
of this chapter is to trace these two dimensions of
1' esprit general, to demonstrate how Montesquieu util-
izes the ideology of the ancient constitution and the
conservative idea of tradition to unify them, and fi-
nally to draw the implications for the theory of citi-
zenship. The conclusion of the dissertation will con-
tinue the discussion of Montesquieu's theory of citizen-
ship in general and will draw some conclusions for a
contemporary theory of citizenship.
I. L'Esprit as Political Action
1. The 'principle' of a form of government . Chapter
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. riti
Two of Book I of De L' Esprit des Loi
.
seems to affi
the Hobbesian method of arguing from a state of nature
governed by natural laws which "derive uniquely from the
constitution of our being" (p. 235). His picture of
this state of nature seems like the reverse of Hobbes
.
Men have no positive laws to hold their ambition in
check, as in Hobbes
' s state of perpetual war; but the
result of this, according to Montesquieu, is mutual
perception of weakness. But Montesquieu's critique of
Hobbes is deeper; indeed, it is another version of his
critique of rationalist contract theory, similar to the
critique he articulated in the myth of the Troglodytes.
Montesquieu's model of the transition to civil society
appeals to a model of growth based upon the needs and
'sentiments' of men. Speculative ideas must come to men
after considerable social and historical development.
Each law of nature develops as a plausible consequence
of man's nature. There is no rigorous deductive logic,
but rather, the inquiry seems guided by a notion of
temporal experience. It is more akin to a notion of
political anthropology than to an abstract rationalist
foundation of society.
Montesquieu's view of the psychology of the citizen
is embodied in his theory of the principle of a govern-
ment. The fundamental purpose of the principle of a
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government is to establish the basis on which individu-
als can participate in a public life which derives its
meaning and legitimacy from the context of their freedom
to pursue their private interest.
Each government has a principle which activates
it—which sets it in motion. This principle represents
the psychological orientation which individuals must
have in order for their personal self
-understanding s to
be consistent with the public interest. Within each
government this principle unites action in civil society
with action in the state. Virtue in a republic, or
honor in a monarchy, makes demands on the political and
social structure which unit them into a general system.
Commerce provides a clear example.
In Book V, Chapter 9 Montesquieu asserts that "it
is necessary that the laws favor commerce to the utmost
extent that the government can." Yet it must be forbid-
den to the nobility and reserved to the non-noble popu-
lation. If necessary it must be forced on them. The
court life of the privileged noble, necessary to monar-
chy and based upon the principle of honor, requires that
the nobility remain free from the obligation to work in
order to pursue the rewards of court life. The com-
merce which the common people engage in must be control-
led with the purpose of creating a surplus in order to
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support the non-productive noble class. As Montesquieu
puts it, the purpose of commerce in a monarchy must be
directed "to the end that the subjects may be able,
without perishing, to satisfy the continually growing
needs of the prince and his court. ""^ in order to
further this purpose taxes must be kept moderate. The
laws must balance the needs of the king and the court
without being so heavy that they discourage the spirit
of work, either by allowing too great affluence among
commoners or too severe poverty.
In a republic, on the other hand, commerce has a
more complex effect. The spirit of commerce tends to-
ward economic expansion and the production of luxuries
which undermines the simple manners required of repub-
lican virtue. Yet when guided by the proper spirit of
moderation and work commerce can be beneficial to a re-
public. Montesquieu repeats here the praise of the
commerce of economy which his political economy of the
state system had led him to in earlier essays. "The
spirit of commerce," he asserts, "encourages the spirit
of frugality, of economy, of moderation, of work, of
wisdom, of tranquility, of order and of rule." Wealth
has no evil effects in a republic so long as it is
directed towards commerce. Unlike monarchies wherein
commerce is a means to the sustenance of an unproductive
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class, in republics commerce is the supreme end of the
political economy, and all laws should be directed to
sustain it. Evil results, in Montesquieu's view, not
from riches themselves but only "when the excess of
riches destroys this spirit of commerce."^ if any
semblance of republican virtue is to remain in modern
republics, the pure principle of republics, what
Montesquieu calls 'political virtue' must be commingled
with the commercial spirit. At times he even seems to
speak as if the spirit of commerce must replace the
spirit of self-sacrifice for the public good which he
calls political virtue:
In order to maintain the spirit of commerce,
it is necessary that the principal citizens
do it themselves; that this spirit alone
rules, and may not be crossed (croise) by any
other; that all the laws favor it; that these
same laws, by their provisions, divide for-
tunes in the same measure that commerce pro-
motes them, thus giving each poor citizen
enough (grande aisance) so that he will be
able to work as the others, while keeping
each rich citizen at a level of such medioc-
rity that he must work in order to conserve
or to acquire.
What the principles of both monarchies and repub-
lics share is a certain form: each must reflect, and
be reflected in, the manners of civil society. It must
describe the citizen's action in society far more than
in politics. But a peculiar situation results for the
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principle of a government, as I will show later in this
chapter. Vrtiile showing that the action of the citizen
constitutes politics, Montesquieu tends to argue that
this action (paradoxically) takes place in a sphere
which is public but not political. This renders the
actual relation between society and the political
sphere problematic.^
.
In Montesquieu's eyes the most important implica-
tion of the principle of a government is that it allows
for discussion about the liberty of the citizen in a way
that does not undermine the security of the state. The
principle allows Montesquieu to describe how states re-
tain a coherent identity and stability over time by
guiding an explanation of how citizens constitute the
government. Machiavelli had argued that the orientation
of citizens towards the rule of the Prince was crucial
to the stability of the state. But he described their
mutual relation purely in terms of antagonism and power.
The citizens checked the ambitions of the Prince as the
Prince sought to manipulate the beliefs of citizens.
Social coherence over time would result from the wide-
spread acceptance of a civil religion. Indeed, civil
religion provided the sphere within which Machiavelli
argued citizens could recapture a spirit of republican
virtue. Within a civil religion a common identity
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shared by both the citizens and ruler could emerge. In
this sense the 'principle' of a form of government de-
scribes a kind of civil religion, except giving much
greater emphasis to its origins within the historical
context of particular nations. The concept of the
principle of a government allowed Montesquieu to retain
Machiavelli's insight that the self
-interpretat ion of
citizens had to constitute political rule while explain
ing more fully the roots of social cohesion. In short,
the principle demonstrates why legitimacy is crucial to
providing for both stability and social cohesion.
2. The role of political education . In general, the
principle can be specified for each form of government.
In a particular government the principle derives from
the general nature of the government and is related in-
timately to the general spirit described by the moeurs
and manieres peculiar to that particular society. Edu-
cation, the major purpose of which Montesquieu describe
7as to prepare men to be good citizens, must consis-
tently reproduce the principle in the citizens. This
education is conceived experient ially since citizens
receive it by acting and observing the world. By edu-
cation of the citizen according to a principle of gov-
ernment Montesquieu clearly means not merely narrowly
^30
political or intellectual education but emotional and
moral education as well. Our orientation to others
distinguishes different types of education, producing
different moeurs and manieres within different types of
governments
.
.The moeurs and manieres which derive from education
according to the principle of monarchy exhibit a com-
plexity that those of republics and despotisms do not.
Honor derives from our orientation towards others as
perceived always through ourselves. All actions are
reflected through our own self-esteem, our own amour-
propre. All components of honor—nobility in virtues,
'franchise' in moeurs and politeness in manners—derive
from turning the self back on itself; from self -absorp-
tion, not direct concern for others.
The virtues that one shows (montre) to us
there are always less that which one owes to
others, than that which one owes to oneself:
they are not so much those that call us to-
wards our fellow citizens, as those which
distinguish us from them.^
Education in a monarchy is a social education in which
the person learns to identify self as always in competi-
tion with other similar selves for favors and recogni-
tion granted by the crown. It is not, indeed cannot,
be political; it is an education for a non-political
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public. The nobility is the recipient of honors, not
their creators. Montesquieu describes its chief concern
as the training of the heart, the grooming of the pas-
9
sions. Education in a monarchy takes place in soci-
ety itself, for only there can the citizens learn how
to distinguish themselves from others.
Education in general is defined by Montesquieu as
"consisting principally in living with others. "'^
Hence, education has a crucial social function for a
monarchy, but it must have little or no role in a des-
potism. Fear, the principle of despotic states, re-
quires isolation not amity. As the Lettres Persanes
continually made clear, despotisms run most smoothly
when people are completely isolated from one another.
Despotic regimes fear the mutual felicity which charac-
terizes moderate regimes. As the discussion in the last
chapter demonstrates the orientation of selves to others
in a despotism is purely technical, as objects to be
manipulated for one's own purposes. In a despotism cit-
izens, if the participants can actually be called citi-
zens, do not learn to live with others, but are forced,
through the principle of fear, to live against others.
Education is most important in a republic whose
principle is political virtue. Action which produces
republican virtue is exclusively other-directed, it is
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self-renunciation in favor of the public interest.
Citizens must love the state and thereby each other.
For example, unlike its place in a monarchy the family
has a major role in republican education. It must teach
children those moral rules which will lead them to iden-
tify their private interest with the public interest.
On the death of a comrade in war, the Troglodyte repub-
licans fought with fury to avenge simultaneously the
death of the beloved friend or relative and the attack
12
on the state. In peace, sons and neighbors would
rise early in the day in order to complete a neighbor's
work before he awoke. In the minds of citizens, public
and private duties are thus in principle indistinguish-
able .
The importance of Book IV of De L'Esprit des Lois
on education cannot be overestimated for Montesquieu's
theory of citizenship. Education based upon the prin-
ciple of the government produces the subjective spirit
of the society. By 1 'esprit Montesquieu means the eth-
ical and moral orientation of action. (The second half
of this chapter will show that he also uses it in a
contradictory sense.) It represents the way people must
act in order to be virtuous in a particular society, all
societies having their own particular spirit. This
spirit governs a society by establishing rules of sev-
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eral types: rules which guide the making of laws—all
laws must be appropriate (convenable) to the spirit; and
rules which guide social action in civil and political
society—e.g., commercial and moral relationships among
individuals in everyday life. in addition, 1' esprit,
as a conceptualization of these relationships, makes the
meaning of social institutions and practices objectively
available. In other words, it provides the basis on
which institutions in a particular society are to be
judged both useful and legitimate. It establishes the
grounding principles—the universe of moral discourse
—
which must be subjectively incorporated by each and
every citizen in order for it to be possible to deter-
mine the proper direction of state power and the ade-
quacy of particular laws in a particular society.
3. Liberty and Montesquieu's analysis of power . The
subjective dimension of social life which Montesquieu
uses the concept of the principle to describe culminates
in his notion of liberty. More than any other notion,
the concept of liberty unifies the principle with the
form of government. Liberty is necessary in order to
preserve the autonomous interests and aspirations of
individual citizens while providing for the security of
the state as a whole.
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We can now appreciate fully Montesquieu's idea of
liberty 'for the citizen' ('dans le citoyen')!^ ^
consequence of the principle of a government. The con-
cept of the principle implies that citizens are autono-
mous individuals making their own judgments on the
basis of perceptions of their particular interests and
desires. For Montesquieu, this autonomy must have a
social side—these personal judgments must be based upon
a socially constituted self
-interpretation. Citizens'
actions must conform to certain norms and practices
which grow out of their nation's history and culture.
The root of Montesquieu's notion of liberty is the rec-
ognition that the government must respect this intersub-
jective cultural and social realm. One of Montesquieu's
central principles, which he holds to as firmly as any
of the philosophes, is that the mind should not be co-
erced by the laws."'"^ Neither should the collectivity
infringe on the citizen's physical well being or on the
integrity of his individual person without public jus-
tification. Hence, in Montesquieu's eyes the greatest
threat to the liberty of the citizen is that of unfair
or irrational punishment. It represents a deceit on
the part of rulers which undermines the int ersubject i ve
bases on which the legitimacy and the stability of the
polity rest. Criminal punishments then must be careful-
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ly constructed in order to protect individual integrity,
both physical and intellectual. The overall interpre-
tive principle of clarity and fairness in punishment
which guides Montesquieu here has become the foundation
of theories of punishment in the modern state:
It is the triumph of liberty, when the crimi-
nal laws derive each punishment from the
peculiar nature of the crime. All arbitrari-
ness is eradicated; punishment does not in theleast derive from the caprice of the legisla-
ture, but from its own nature; and this is not
the man who does violence to man. 15
More generally the liberty of the citizen consists
in certain rules of right: religious toleration; mod-
eration and care in the accusation of crimes; strict
specificity of the crime of lese-majeste ; and freedom
of thought. But Montesquieu is careful always to stress
the point of view of the citizen. Hence, his notion of
liberty also contains a less formal dimension. Liberty,
he insists, is as much a matter of perception as of
fact: "It consists in security, or in the opinion that
one has of his security
.
""'•^ Mere formal liberty em-
bodied in the constitutional separation of powers is
insufficient to create and describe liberty. "It can
happen, " declares Montesquieu, "that the constitution
will be free, and the citizen not—the citizen can be
1
7
free, and the constitution not." The citizen and
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the constitution must be free both 'in right and in
fact.' In other words, liberty depends on adequate
institutional and constitutional protections, as well
as on the recognition by citizens that they are in fact
free. If either condition is lacking, liberty dis-
solves. Liberty requires both what Montesquieu calls
'philosophic liberty' and 'political liberty:'
Philosophic liberty consists in the exercise
of his [citizen's] will, or at least (if it
is necessary to speak of all systems) in the
opinion that the citizen has that he is actu-
ally exercising his will. Political liberty
consists in the security, or at least in the
opinion that a citizen has of his security. 18
Liberty is a central element of a universal theory in
which right and interest are carefully enmeshed, each
in the other. The theory of the citizen requires both
a formal theory of citizenship as a theory of rights and
obligations, and a theory of political action that re-
flects the subjective elements of the person qua person.
One of Montesquieu's central and most famous argu-
ments is that liberty, one of the ends of the constitu-
tion, belongs to moderate governments. Since power nec-
essarily has limits and it corrupts those who have it,
the constitutional device necessary to protect liberty
is that ' le pouvoir arrete le pouvoir.'^^
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Political liberty is found only in moderate
governments. But it is not always such in
moderate states: it is there only when power
is not abused; but it is an eternal experience
that each man who has acquired power is driven
to abuse it; he uses it until he meets its
limits. Indeed, even virtue has need of
limits. 20
We must not confuse Montesquieu's argument with Hobbes's
argument that men are by nature driven by an insatiable
thirst for power. It is crucial to understand how they
are different.
Montesquieu is not arguing that men by nature seek
power, but that power tends to corrupt those who have
it. This is radically different from Hobbes's argument
that the natural drive for power requires an absolute
sovereign to hold it in check. Hobbes's absolutist con-
clusions follow from the natural psychology of men—that
their innate aggressiveness and the necessary struggle
for social survival requires the formation of a politi-
cal power sufficient to repress the drive to assert
power over others. He defines power in purely instru-
mental terms as the successful manipulation of objects,
saying nothing about its internal dynamic. Since all
men act on the same power drive, men must address each
other as objects to be manipulated. The argument is
self-fulfilling. If one accepts Hobbes's assumption
about human nature, there is no choice but to act ac-
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cording to it. Presuming others will act the same way,
a fundamental point of Hobbes's theory, anyone denying
it would be at a severe, indeed fatal, disadvantage.
The subject has no choice but to act according to the
principles of pure power. Social relations, then, con-
sidered by either individuals or the sovereign, must be
objects of manipulation. In the Lettres Persanes
.
Montesquieu argued that this instrumental view of citi-
zens was characteristic of despotism; but as this chap-
ter will show, this is not true of free governments.
Hobbes's nominalism is the consistent and necessary
outcome of his view of the psychology of power.
Montesquieu's argument about the checking of power
in the state, however, is of a very different sort. His
argument that once men attain power it corrupts them
describes the dynamic of power, not the psychology of
the men who hold it. Further, it implies a central
distinction that Hobbes's theory denies between power
and authority. If power can be corrupt, there must be
limits which define its legitimate use. Indeed, for
Montesquieu, power and authority, coupled in the concept
of law, are the defining concepts of the state. The in-
ternal dynamic of power, which is that it is self-per-
petuating, tending towards a pattern of continual and
unlimited expansion, leads to conflicts with authority,
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the state's principle of legitimacy. Liberty must then
consist in preserving the balance between power and au-
thority, defining and protecting the sphere of legiti-
mate public action from tyranny. Public space, then,
must incorporate a balance between interest and right.
By collapsing power and authority in the absolute
sovereign, Hobbes is caught in a fatal solipsism. His
conception of politics dissolves right into interests,
leaving no room for public discourse about the public
interest. In Hobbes' Leviathan the public interest can
be defined only in terms of the private interest of the
sovereign. The sovereign even creates the language of
debate out of his own will; public meaning is what the
sovereign chooses. Men cannot talk to one another with-
out being dependent on the sovereign's will. Hobbes
'
s
argument moves from the completely private (natural man)
to the completely public (leviathan), in the process
depriving both categories of meaning. As Bodin recog-
nized more than half a century before Hobbes, public
space has no meaning if not counterposed to private
space, an insight which Montesquieu revives. There
is no public interest if there is not private interest
and vice-versa. Where there is no distinction between
public and private, the modern state becomes a tyranny,
or in Montesquieu's typology a despotism. Montesquieu's
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theory of liberty as dependent upon state power, then,
rejects rather than confirms Hobbes ' assumptions . ^2
He is concerned with the internal dynamic of power and
its institutionalization. Power does not include the
whole dynamic of human psychology. Thus, Montesquieu's
doctrine of the checking of powers in the constitution
(unlike that of the American founders) rejects the Hob-
bessian characterization as descriptive of human psy-
23
chology.
In order to unify politics from the point of view
of the citizen and from the point of view of the state,
the concept of 1' esprit general must describe how indi-
vidual action can have public meaning. Montesquieu's
notion of liberty tries to do this by demarcating the
private life of the citizen in which he acts legitimate-
ly according to his own perception of his interest with-
in publically prescribed and clearly articulated limits,
from the public life of politics. L'Esprit general must
somehow unify this private sphere with the public sphere
of politics. Next I will develop Montesquieu's notion
of political space which constitutes the second dimen-
sion of 1' esprit—the institutional framework out of
which laws emerge.
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II. L'Esprit as Political Space
1. Liberty and the notion of I'esprit general . L'esprit
general is a nexus of all relations both physical and
moral: "Several things govern men: climate; religion;
laws; maxims of government; examples of past events;
rom
moeurs; manieres; I'esprit general results f
24these." This spirit characterizes the particular
society, the 'nation,' each distinct from all others
because of a different configuration of such causes.
Oriental nations are governed more by their physical
causes in general and strict political laws; their
moral laws tend to atrophy and their societies remain
unchanged in basic structure for long periods of time.
England, on the other hand, combines felicitous physical
circumstances (on the water, temperate climate) with
judicious legal and intellectual traditions producing a
greater level of freedom than any other nation. France
combines a wide ranging climate (and hence diverse eco-
nomic possibilities) with an abundant population and a
solid constitutional tradition which allows for the
emergence of the best of monarchies. This relativism
of possible regimes based upon different configurations
of the same basic range (or 'types' in more modern lan-
guage) of causes is one of Montesquieu's most important
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arguments, for it alone establishes the grounding on
which particular polities can be understood.
To the extent that any one of these causes
acquires greater force in a nation, the othercauses are weakened. Nature and climate
virtually dominate savages, manieres governthe Chinese, laws are the tyrants in Japan,
moeurs once set the tone of life in Sparta,
as did their maxims of government and ancient
moeurs for the Romans. 25
Certainly there is an implied hierarchy among various
causes. Although each society is to be accepted on its
own terms, those in which moral rather than physical
causes predominate are closer to Montesquieu's ideal of
good government, i.e., moderate government. But general
classification on moral terms is fruitless and mislead-
ing. Moral judgments must be made on the level of par-
ticular societies, determining how closely they approx-
imate moderate governments and what physical and moral
factors are involved in each regime.
Liberty is a yardstick for measuring the extent to
which the circumstances allow the citizens to be free.
"I would want to discover," Montesquieu says in conclu-
sion to Book XI on liberty in the constitution, "within
all moderate governments that we are acquainted with,
what is the distribution of the three powers, and to
calculate by it the degrees of liberty that each of them
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26may enjoy." Liberty of the constitution, institu-
tionalized in the separation and systematic balance of
powers, is a precondition of moderate governments which
establishes a basis of judgment of them.
In keeping with his general distinction in viewing
liberty from the point of view of the citizen and the
point of view of government, it is important that we
keep in mind his distinction between this form of lib-
erty and the liberty of the citizen. The liberty of
the citizen, as I suggested above, requires the spirit
of moderation above all with regard to punishment.
This distinction derives from the dual nature of the
modern political subject—as simultaneously actor and
ruled. Inappropriately severe punishments will delegi-
timize rule, possibly precipitating revolution and cer-
tainly causing the government to degenerate into a des-
potism. Liberty, then, consists in both a formal con-
stitutional balance of the various powers that make up
the state as well as a spirit of moderation emanating
from the legislation; both are constitutive of Montes-
27quieu's notion of liberty. In short, liberty de-
fines the moral contours of the modern political space.
2. The forms of government . The language of theory has
changed in order to retain the empirical force of the
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forms of government while finding a new way of describ-
ing the moral content of government
. Forms of gov-
ernment no longer describe the central moral predicament
of politics as they once did. Having indicated a neces-
sary relativisation of argument about the forms of gov-
ernment, Montesquieu must rewrite the moral language of
politics in terms which take into account the historical
development of particular polities.
Chapter Six of Book XI, the famous chapter on the
constitution of England, marks a decisive shift in the
language of modern political theory. Whether the de-
scription of the English constitution is correct or not,
the importance of the formulation of the argument is
clear. Having simplified the typology of governments
from those of classical through Renaissance theory,
Montesquieu has hinted that the very mode of argument
must be replaced. The very nature of the modern state
has come to limit the moral descript i veness of the pre-
vious forms of government.
The primary function of the forms of government in
Montesquieu's new typology is to organize the institu-
tions of society into a coherent framework. In short,
they provide a general description of the political
space of particular societies. Political space, in this
sense, is not merely the physical forum of Greek democ-
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racy, but a more ontological dimension of politics which
combines the psychological, physical, legal and moral
orientations of legitimate political actors. In a re-
public, that space must be opened to all citizens—all
must have access, at least formally, to state power. A
monarchy organizes the state around a single person
according to fixed rules (laws); its political space is
clearly delimited by the rule of laws which are simply
stated and clearly presented. They must not confuse
citizens. Legitimacy in a monarchy is determined by the
clarity of this space, that the monarch acts according
to publically known rules. Political space is least
bounded, finally, in a despotism. Its limits, or lack
of limits, are set by the power and the will of the
despot. In a sense public space has no meaning at all
in a despotism, for the distinction betv/een public and
private life, without which public space would have no
meaning, may be dissolved at any moment by despotic
action. The citizens (if indeed there are any) can
never be sure of the limits of public action and hence
can never be secure in private. The seraglio of the
Lett res Persanes
,
Montesquieu's fictional picture of the
despotic way of life is thoroughly politicized. Even
when Usbek ' s wives stand before him in the "simplicity
2 9
of nature" they do so because of Usbek ' s power over
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them, not because of their own choice. Echoing Montes-
quieu's ideal of justice, public space must be defined
by the public limits on power. Absolutist monarchy is
more akin to Montesquieu's description of despotism than
of monarchy, for in the end it knows only private lim-
30Its. Although both Bodin's and Hobbes ' sovereigns
are technically limited by natural law, political pru-
dence, and, in Bodin's case by the fundamental laws of
the kingdom, there is no public means of debate, no
clear binding rules for the limitation of power which
can be known by citizens. Constraints on the monarch's
power ought to be obeyed by the monarch (for Hobbes as
well as Bodin) but he also must be free to ignore them.
In a despotism, power is free but citizens not. In both
republics and monarchies, citizens are free only when
power is not.
In Montesquieu's view the central moral distinction
between different governments is between despotic and
moderate regimes not between the particular forms of
government per se. In this sense only despotic regimes
have a 'moral,' or more correctly 'immoral,' nature
which is specific to it. Both monarchies and republics
as forms of government have several legitimate varia-
tions. The crucial determinants of the legitimacy of
rule are not intrinsic to these forms of government
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themselves, as they were, for example, for Plato.
Rather, the moral content of governments is described
by two principles which transcend the particular forms
of government—liberty and moderate rule.
The general end of all states is security over
31time. To this end the form of the government is
crucial. The principles of action must be in accord
with the constitution. Each form has a variant which
serves the purpose well—the federative republic and the
pure monarchy based upon the privileges of intermediary
powers (nobility). But both of these have a common
characteristic which to Montesquieu is most important
—
both variants survive because they preserve moderation.
Indeed even these variants will have to be modified
according to the particular circumstances of a nation:
climate, geography, demography, etc. . . . Hence the
chapter on the English constitution is descriptive of a
remarkable hybrid ("a republic under the cloak of a mon-
3 2archy") which has had great success over time. But
it also has another point as well: to describe an exam-
ple of the internal mechanisms of government, the sep-
aration of powers, which are necessary for stability and
liberty in the modern state, regardless of the form of
government . Again we can understand Montesquieu's argu-
nt more fully by tracing how it is similar and differ-me
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ent from the classical Greek theory.
Montesquieu's use of the language of the forms of
government has a dual purpose: to simultaneously answer
Machiavelli's use of the forms of government as merely
a descriptive formulation of the rules necessary for the
preservation of the state, as well as Bossuet
• s that the
proper form of government, absolute monarchy, derives
from God's will and is his earthly agent. Plato's for-
mulation certainly provides an alternative, including
within each government its moral opposite. Democra-
cy, aristocracy and monarchy, for Plato, have no meaning
unless counterposed to their corrupt forms; the failure
to attain the end of security is necessarily linked to
moral depravity. Montesquieu's view is similar. The
failure to achieve security has necessary moral as well
as political implications. Corruption of a government,
he argues, is always precipitated by the corruption of
its principle (Book VIII), just as for Plato the form
of government becomes corrupt following the corruption
of the psychology of the citizen. The depravity of gov-
ernment must be explained by its own internal dynamic,
as Montesquieu explained the fall of Rome. Yet the
moral consequences for Montesquieu are different than
they are for Plato. So long as the government remains
moderate it can freely shift from republic to monarchy
249
or to some combination (such as England) whereby the
legislator corrects for the changes in the general spir-
it. The language of the forms of government cannot de-
scribe adequately the moral shift, as it could for
Plato. For that, Montesquieu requires the more general
ends of government, liberty and moderat ion, which
although not absent from ancient republics, are more
appropriate to the modern state.
Political theory must adopt a new focus in order
to describe the moral content of the modern state. The
moral shift consequent of the decay of governments is
from a moderate government to a despotism. "Democracy
and aristocracy are not free states by their nature,"
Montesquieu insists. Rather, "political liberty is
found only within moderate governments."*^^ Plato's
transcendentalism could explain neither the subtlety of
the moral implications of bureaucratic organization nor
the implications of the complexity of public life in the
modern state. Neither could Machiavelli nor Bossuet.
Given the nature of the modern political subject, liber-
ty must become an irrepressible concept in the modern
theory of the state. In Montesquieu's account even mon-
archy, in which liberty has not been traditionally ac-
cepted as necessary, must rely on the spirit of liberty,
although developing it only indirectly:
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The monarchies that we know do not have lib-
erty as their object directly, as those of
which we have just spoken; they tend only to
the glory of the citizens, the state and the
Prince. But from this glory results a spirit
of liberty which, in these states, is able todo as great things, and perhaps to contribute
as much to goodness as liberty itself.
The three powers are not there distrib-
uted and founded on the constitutional model
of which we just spoke (England). They have
each a particular distribution according to
which they more or less approach political
liberty; and if they do not approach it, the
monarchy will degenerate into despotism. 36
The overwhelming moral importance of moderation is
reflected also in the beginning of Book XXIX, the book
which concludes the theoretical discussion of De
L' Esprit des Lois and which many commentators believe
37IS the true end of the book. Here, Montesquieu
declares that the intent of his major book, his life's
work, was to prove that "the spirit of moderation ought
to be that of the legislator; the political good, as the
moral good, can always be found between two limits. ""^^
The moral spirit of moderation must permeate the esprit
general of any nation regardless of its particular form
of government.
L' Esprit general is the central discovery and or-
ganizing principle of De L' Esprit des Lois . In so far
as it sets forth a conception of political space it de-
scribes an interlocking set of institutions and insti-
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tutional relations, physical, social and political,
unified into a single system according to the particular
circumstances of each particular state. This general
attempt to explain social and political life from a
single unified perspective is held together by the two
fundamental moral concepts, liberty and moderation.
Can Montesquieu devise a new language to describe these
ideas? It is to his attempts at this definition to
which we now turn.
3. Citizenship in moderate governments . At the begin-
ning of Chapter Six of Book XI, "Of the Constitution of
England," Montesquieu defines political liberty 'for the
citizen' as:
. . .
this tranquility of spirit which derives
from the opinion that each has of his security;
and in order that one have this liberty, it is
necessary that the government be such that a
citizen does not fear another citizen.
The state must secure the citizen's person and property
so that he is free to act without fear. Just as fear
governs despotisms, the opposite principle governs mod-
erate states. The private life of the citizen must be
free from arbitrary political repression. Liberty does
not necessarily manifest itself as participation in
political decisions but as the freedom to utilize one's
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property, including one's body and mind, according to
one's own interests. The purpose of law in the broadest
sense of the constitution or fundamental law is to con-
struct an institutional context in which the subject can
be secure. But Montesquieu's view here is not one of
absolute freedom, for any institutional context itself
requires constraints on the citizen's action. By defin-
ing freedom in terms of security, as freedom from fear,
Montesquieu has reconciled liberty with political con-
straints, so long as those constraints are clearly pub-
licized as laws. Liberty, then, is not absolute, but
only the freedom to do what the law permit s.^^ This
still leaves Montesquieu with the need to describe how
citizens can legitimately act in public, for they are
not merely private people.
Indeed, the pure privatization of life is another
characteristic of despotism which Montesquieu estab-
lishes in contrast to free moderate governments. Mon-
tesquieu must develop a notion of political action which
describes how citizens can act in the public space es-
tablished by the system of interlocking institutions and
laws. He must answer his own criticism of the concept
of interests; the theorist must somehow explain how
self-interest does not represent the private, selfish
concerns of an individual, but can be compatible with
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and reinforce the public interest.
Montesquieu's answer rests upon the crucial assump-
tion that politics is only a part of 1' esprit general.
That spirit describes the whole of a particular social
life in terms of an interrelationship of parts, not as
an aggregate of them. It does not merely describe a
functional interrelationship, as some critics who want
to assimilate Montesquieu into the modern sociological
tradition assume. There is a fundamental moral pur-
pose to 1' esprit, the protection of the free subject,
that goes beyond the mere stability of a stratified
society. It strives to establish the context in which
citizens can pursue their own interests while not con-
tradicting the public good. L' Esprit general does this
by describing a public sphere in which the citizen acts
which is not political: the world of moeurs and man-
ieres. This social world must develop independently of
politics. Moeurs and manieres cannot be changed by the
laws but through moeurs and manieres themselves. The
use of law would 'seem too tyrannical.''*'^
The self develops in society not in politics. The
free autonomous subject that Montesquieu's moral theory
describes is more comfortable in society wherein he can
express himself, pursue his own interests and impress
himself on others. Action in society derives from in-
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dividual amour-propre. This is why Montesquieu feels
that in general monarchy is more appropriate to contem-
porary life than republics. Modern republicans fail to
realize that political action which supports the public
good becomes a burden as individuals pursue their own
character and interests, as Montesquieu illustrated in
the development of Troglodyte society. Given the com-
plexity and extent of the modern state, there is no way
to convert private interests directly into the public
interest—this must be done indirectly.
For Montesquieu two solutions are adequate: the
commercial republic based upon the work ethic in a cap-
italist economy, and a monarchy based upon the principle
of honor. In both cases private interests are trans-
formed into the public interest through society. In
capitalist society individuals are driven by work. Work
life channels energy into production and acccumulat ion
which leads to the circulation of money and production
of a surplus for the operations of the state. As we
have seen in Chapter Two above developments in modern
technology allow for increased production and commerce
as well as more rapid and secure circulation of money
through credit and currency stabilization. These cre-
ate greater wealth for the state while giving all the
citizens a stake in pursuing the public interest. So
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long as the state acts only to reinforce the spirit of
moderation, which serves to ward off excess wealth,
which cuts into the work ethic, individuals can pursue
their self-interest while producing the public good."^"^
It is illustrative to see how women play an impor-
tant role in Montesquieu's political economy. They are
the guardians and primary determinants of the contours
of society (in the sense of public but non-political
action). The difference between moeurs and manieres is
that the former 'concerns more interior conduct, ' while
the latter concerns 'exterior' conduct.'*^ Because
they do not respect moderation women tend to deprave
moeurs, but they also determine manieres, in the pro-
cess increasing the demand so necessary to commerce:
The company of women depraves moeurs, and
forms taste: the desire to please more than
others establishes elegance of dress; and the
desire to please more than onself establishes
fashions. These fashions are important: by
the force of giving oneself over to this
frivolous spirit, one augments without ceas-
ing all the branches of its commerce.
Montesquieu most often seems to speak as if this were
the nature of women regardless of their particular gov-
ernment. In pure republics women are dangerous because
their nature inclines them to freedom and in their free-
dom they are governed by their passions. The luxury
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which develops must be banned because it undermines the
political virtue necessary to the stability and justice
of the state. It is important for my argument to note
that in a pure republic there is no intermediary between
private interest and public interest, the former must
directly be sacrificed to the latter. ^"^ Hence, in
Montesquieu's view, the action that comes naturally to
women is more appropriate to monarchies where society
48can more successfully absorb luxury. Free women are
not rational enough to partake in the direct public con-
sciousness necessary to republics (how different this is
from the model Roxane depicts in the Lett res Persanes )
:
Women exercise little restraint in monarchies,
because, the distinction of ranks calling them
to the court, they go there in order to par-
take of the spirit of liberty which is almost
the only one that is tolerated there. Each
is served there by their charms and by their
passions in order to advance her fortune; and
as their weakness does not allow them dignity,
but the vanity, luxury always rules them
there. 49
It seems clear, then, that through this non-political
public society, individuals, men and women in their own
ways, act on their own interests and characters to pro-
duce the public good.
In pure monarchies based upon the principle of
honor the relationship is as clear as it is in comraer-
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cial republics based upon the work ethic. Individuals
act according to their own ambitions; they are purely
concerned with impressing others, all of the action is
refracted through themselves, through their amour-
50propre. Montesquieu clearly recognizes that this
results in a society based upon deception: ". . . it
is a false honor which leads all the parties of the
state; but this false honor is as useful to the public,
as the truth would be to the individuals capable of at-
51taining it." It is in this context that Montesquieu
uses his famous description that amounts to an 'invisi-
ble hand' as operative in monarchical society:
Honor motivates all the parties of the body
politic; it ties them by its own action: and
it is found that each furthers the common
good, believing that he is furthering his own
individual interests. ^2
Montesquieu has gone to great lengths to distinguish
this public society from politics, and he insists on
the distinction in clear language:
Moeurs and manieres are usages that the laws
have not established, were not able to estab-
lish and did not want to establish.
There is this difference between laws
and moeurs, that the laws rule more the action
of the citizen and the moeurs rule more the
actions of men.^-^
Montesquieu's political economy of luxury demon-
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strates most clearly the importance of this non-poli-
tical public sphere. Luxury represents the excess
riches above what is necessary for physical subsistence,
and it is developed out of the surplus generated by
54labor. The primary social function of luxury is to
divide citizens into classes based upon wealth. In
states where there is complete equality in the 'for-
tunes' of citizens (it is important that Montesquieu
has come to use fortune here primarily in an economic
55
sense) the calculus of luxury is equal to zero.
The political function of luxury, related to the social
function, consists in increasing the wealth of the
state. These two functions come together in the growth
of modern cities. VJith Paris clearly in mind, Montes-
quieu writes:
Luxury is still in proportion with the gran-
deur of cities, and above all of the capital;
in such a way that it is by reason composed
of the riches of the state, of the inequality
of fortunes of individuals and of the number
of men that are assembled in a certain
place
.
Indeed, the city represents a new type of market, one
based upon unlimited accumulation and the continual need
for growth. The more people there are together in one
place the greater the possibility for self-aggrandize-
ment, the greater the chance that individuals can re-
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fleet their amour-propre in such a way as to distinguish
themselves from others. Luxury provides the outward
means of expression of this social distinction.^^
Luxury inclines people to act according to self-
interest, not the public interest. Because of this re-
publics must ban luxury in order to preserve the equal-
ity of fortunes necessary to reinforce virtue. But
in a nation wherein the society, not politics, predomi-
nates, luxury can have its full effects; the most impor-
tant of which is to create a new type of market based
upon the distinction between 'needs' and 'means.' This
distinction will become crucial to the nineteenth cen-
tury political economy of the market, especially Marxist
theory, in the form of a distinction between use-value
and exchange value. This distinction creates a new type
of market which nineteenth century political economy
will call a capitalist market:
There results from all that a general incon-
venience. Those who excel in a profession
charge for their art the price that they want
;
even the smallest talents follow this example;
there is no longer a harmony between needs and
means. When I am forced to plead my case in
court, it is necessary that I can pay a law-
yer; when I am ill, it is necessary that I can
pay a doctor.
Rather than diminishing commerce, Montesquieu continues,
this new type of market greatly augments it: "...
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people have more desires, more needs and more fantasies
when they are together." Luxury, and the market it pro-
duces, requires an economy based upon continual growth,
and the distinction between a productive and an unpro-
ductive class. Furthermore, it does this independently
from politics, and the actors who participate in this
market are not political.
The discussion of women, honor in monarchies and
the political economy of luxury together represent
Montesquieu's argument that citizens act primarily in a
public sphere which is non-political. In it they can
act according to their own self-interest and still pro-
duce the public interest. It remains for me to show
that not only do citizens not act directly to produce
the public good, but that they are essentially frozen
out of it. The political action appropriate to the
citizen does not take place within political space.
The action and knowledge required by a political space
defined in terms of institutions interacting according
to their own rationality is an objective knowledge of
that system and of the tools necessary to ensure its
proper operation. That tool which embodies the abstract
rationality of the institutional system of 1' esprit gen-
eral is law.
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III. Law; The Unity of Political Action
and Political Space
I. The universality of law and 1
' esprit general .
Montesquieu, following Gravina, distinguishes between
civil laws which govern the relations of individuals to
one another and political laws which govern the relation
of the citizens to the state. Together they comprise
the two elements of positive law. That law is meant as
a unity is clear from the description of both as a
'union' (reunion) of particulars. The political state
is "the union of all particular forces" and the civil
state is "the union of wills. We have just seen
the important consequences which Montesquieu draws from
the distinction between civil and political spheres of
action; but the principle of their unity is just as
important—both are fundamentally systems of law, and
law is always an expression of reason. Law as abstract
reason retains a static quality in Montesquieu's notion
of politics. In Book I, Chapter Three, where he draws
the distinction between the civil and the political, he
declares the universality of law as human reason:
Law, in general, is human reason, in such that
it governs all peoples of the earth; and the
political and civil laws of each nation ought
to be only individual cases where human reason
is applied.
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This universality of law in human reason is like-
wise united to the universality of 1
' esprit general,
for 1' esprit is the system of relations which estab-
lishes the parameters of law. Indeed, the object of De
L' Esprit des Lois is to describe the spirit of the laws,
not the laws themselves. And to comprehend that spirit,
in otder to make laws correctly, one must understand the
spirit which gorws out of all relations, physical and
moral, which impinge on the life of the state. Positive
laws must follow 1' esprit general:
They (the laws) ought to be relative to the
physical character of the country; to the
cold, hot or temperate climate, to the qual-
ity of the earth, to its location, to its
extent; to the genius of the life of its peo-
ple: farmers, hunters, or shepherds; they
should be relative to the degree of liberty
that the constitution is able to admit; to
the religion of the inhabitants, to their in-
clinations, riches, number, commerce, moeurs,
and manieres. Finally, they have relations
among themselves; with their origin, the ob-
ject of the legislator, and the order of
things on which they are established. It is
necessary to consider them from all these
perspectives.^^
This universality of the spirit of the laws parallels
the definition of 1 ' esprit general in Book XIX, Chapter
Four (p. 558):
Several things govern men: climate, religion,
the laws, the maxims of the government, the
examples of passed events, moeurs, manieres;
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the general spirit results from all of these.
Thus linked to 1' esprit general the web of relations
which constitutes law has a rationality of its own, in-
dependent of the subjects who obey them. That rational-
ity is one of balance and equilibrium; political insti-
tutions are related to one another as a physical system
of interlocking parts:
This relation of the laws with the principle,
stretches all the relations of the government;
and this principle receives from it in its
turn, a new force. It is thus that as within
physical movements, action is always followed
by a reaction. 63
Laws, we must remember, are 'necessary relations deriv-
ing from the nature of things' and if they are truly to
be laws they must be invariable. The forms of govern-
ment work best when subjects do not interfere, when the
laws remain unchanged. From the point of view of the
government, 1' esprit general provides an objective guide
to lawmaking. The imperatives of the system must be
followed if stability is to be guaranteed. For example,
this notion of an objective rationality embodied in the
general spirit leads Montesquieu to describe the best
monarchy as a machine wherein all of the parts interact
according to plan and in which the future is predict-
able :
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Withm monarchies, politics produces greatthings with the least virtue possible; as
within the most beautiful machines, the art
of rule employs as little movement, as fewforces and wheels as is possible. ^4
The ideal of monarchy requires little input from
ordinary citizens. Political knowledge and action must
be restricted to those with a rational knowledge of
1' esprit general. Since modern monarchies are more
complex than the simple model would imply, the actual
system of laws would likewise be complex and even in
c^ses contradictory. But the general model of the ob-
jectively rational system must still hold in the eyes
of the monarch and his advisors. Montesquieu's ration-
alism here leads him to a conservative philosophy of
law and social change as the one which can guarantee
the smooth, largely uninterrupted movement of the body
polit ic
.
The goal of legislation in a monarchy is the secur-
ity and the 'propriete' of the life of a citizen.
This requires many tribunals to make laws on all of the
various aspects of the society. These tribunals must
be guided by a conservative spirit, their decisions
"ought to be appraised in order that one judges there
today as one did yesterday ..." Since it must pre-
serve "not only the life and property of the citizens,"
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but also honor, laws must be made according to "des re-
cherches scrupuleuses .
" The complexity of the interac-
tion of all relevant factors requires a particularly
intense sort of reason:
It is not necessary to be astonished to find
within the laws of these states so many rules,
restrictions, and extensions which multiply
the particular cases, and seem to make an art
of reason itself.
Reason here requires as strict an application of a fixed
body of laws as is possible, and the goal of legal judg-
ment is to leave the spirit and tradition intact. This
strict application of law is reflected in even more me-
chanical terms in republics and governments that resem-
ble republics, where judgments must be made only accord-
ing to the letter of the laws.
Laws, then, must carefully follow 1' esprit general.
They must only reinforce those relations which people
have come to accept as natural parts of their social
routines, just as they must follow the principle of the
government. The legislator must "follow the spirit of
the nation whenever it is not contrary to the principles
of the government," because "we do nothing better than
that which we do freely, and while following our natural
6 7
genius (genie)." By following the principle of gov-
ernment, the legislator secures the state and by follow-
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ing 'I'esprit de la nation' he ensures that particul
interests will mesh with the public interest. But thi
ar
s
is often difficult. Indeed, political life often seems
to require two contradictory courses of action, both of
which are nevertheless necessary. The paragraph which
immediately precedes the above quote demonstrates this
dilemma with reference to women:
One may be able to contain women, to make laws
in order to correct their moeurs, and to limit
their luxury; but who knows if by doing this
one would not lose a certain taste which would
be the source of the riches of the nation, and
a politeness of manners which attracts for-
eigners to it.
It is crucial that the legislator, not the participants
themselves, must reconcile these contradictory courses
of action. Since direct order would be too destabiliz-
ing, too tyrannical, the legislator must address the
contradictions indirectly. By manipulating moeurs and
manners he must subtly, and as far as citizens are con-
cerned almost subconsciously, coerce the citizens to
act in ways which foster the public interest. In other
words he must create an ideology, a belief system
through which the individual will recognize his own
interest in such a way that it fosters the public good.
Montesquieu compliments this notion of the orien-
tation necessary to the legislator with a utilitarian
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notion of lawmaking. The most appropriate laws are
those which are necessary. Montesquieu means this in a
deterministic sense. The legislator must make laws
based upon a calculation of their effects. Laws are
viewed here as causes of behavior and their influence
should remain as pure as possible:
Just as useless laws weaken the necessary
laws, those that can be eluded weaken legis-
lation. A law ought to have its effect, and
it cannot be allowed to depart from it because
of a particular convent ion. ^8
Laws are means which have natural effects intrinsic to
them which induce certain types of behavior. The knowl-
edge necessary to the legislator is that knowledge of
the effects laws have on citizens. Citizens here are
objects, the laws, tools with which to manipulate their
behavior: "It is necessary to be on guard that the laws
be conceived in a manner that they do not choke the na-
69ture of things." And the paragraph which this sen-
tence introduces makes clear that by 'the nature of
things' Montesquieu means the principle and spirit of
70the government. The principle and spirit here are
independent of the laws; the laws are the means to make
sure that citizens conform to them. In republics,
"nothing gives more force to the laws, than the extreme
1 71
subordination of the citizens to the magistrates."
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Montesquieu follows this by claiming that, "paternal
authority is still very useful in order to maintain
moeurs." Laws must be capable of manipulating men,
turning the evil of man's nature into good:
A certain candor is necessary in the laws.
Made in order to punish the evil of men, they
ought themselves to have the greatest inno-
cence . ^ 2
This rationalist theory of law seems to contradict
Montesquieu's appreciation of the more subjective dimen-
sion of 1' esprit general which he embodied in the notion
of the principle of a form of government. His argument,
then, would seem incomplete without some attempt to
unify these. His engagement with the debate about the
ancient constitution of the French Monarchy and the un-
derlying theory of history together with a conservative
ideology seem to accomplish this unity.
2. The conjunction of politics and history . Montes-
quieu's conservative and object ivist theory of law and
human reason has prepared the way for his adoption of a
particular ideology based upon the historical tradition
of the fundamental laws. Within this ideology citizens
will recognize legitimate social change as that based
on the conservative principle of redressing the imbal-
ances in the fundamental laws produced by the changes
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in circumstance. Furthermore, the abstract rationality
of law, linked as it is to 1
' esprit general, allows
Montesquieu to give credibility to a particular inter-
pretation of a particular nation's history. m other
words, the historical method based upon the development
of 1' esprit as a general system of causes provides a
method for substantiating a particular ideology so long
as it is based upon a correct understanding of a na-
tion's traditions. When discussing monarchy as a form
of government he must claim that the ancient French laws
embody most clearly the principle of monarchy. "^^
Hence, it is important not only for Montesquieu to en-
join the debate with du Bos' these royale over the his-
torical development of the French monarchy, but also to
demonstrate that du Bos' view is based upon prejudice
rather than true historical principles. The spirit of
French law must be vindicated as based upon an under-
standing of French history.
Montesquieu realizes that he has based political
theory on different grounds than previous theory. Meth-
odological and epi stemological problems have been pro-
pelled into the forefront rather than remaining in the
background of theory. In the Lett res Persanes
,
partic-
ularly in the myth of the Troglodytes, Montesquieu has
75exposed contract theory as based upon a myth. Its
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View of the past reflected a projection of values and
perceptions of the present, it remained a creation of
the prejudices of its creator. Yet, Montesquieu be-
lieved that his scientific understanding of history was
different. In the "Preface" to De L'Esprit des Lois he
writes
:
I would believe myself the most happy of mor-
tals, if I were able to make men free them-
selves from their prejudices. By prejudices
here I mean, not what causes men to ignore
certain things, but that which causes them to
ignore themselves.
The ideology embodied in the these nobiliare was 'true'
in that it could be shown to have a firm basis in his-
torical fact.
This shifts the major focus of debate in political
theory away from abstract formulations of political
right and obligations to debate about the historical
accuracy and theoretical coherence of particular ideol-
ogies. To Montesquieu, rival accounts of actual his-
tory, such as du Bos', were more formidable and more
important rivals than either contract theory or ration-
alist natural law theory. He did not hesitate to use
the latter, as I have shown; they were in fact impor-
tant to his theoretical formulation. However, the most
important opponents were those who held a different
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interpretation of history. For Montesquieu, as for
other conservative theorists such as Burke and nine-
teenth century political theory in general, politics
had to be "historicized." Historical method became a
central point in political debate, just as political
thought (and philosophy itself) had to focus more
sharply on history.
Yet Montesquieu was not unaware of the epistemolog-
ical pandora's box he had opened. Just before launching
into the discussion of the French feudal laws, he ends
Book XXIX with a chapter, "Of Legislators," which raises
the crucial epistemological question of his new formu-
lation, along with the ambiguity implied in basing a
particular political position on historical 'fact:'
Aristotle wanted sometimes to satisfy his
jealousy against Plato, sometimes his passion
for Alexander. Plato was indignant with the
tyranny of the people of Athens. Machiavelli
was completely absorbed with his idol, the
Duke of Valentine. Thomas More, who spoke
rather from what he had read than from what
he had thought, wanted to govern all states
with the simplicity of a Greek city. Harring-
ton saw only the republic of England, while a
throng of writers discovered disorder wherever
they did not see a crown. The laws always
encounter the passions and the prejudices of
the legislator. Sometimes they pass through,
and are untainted by them, sometimes they re-
main there, incorporating them.^^
De L ' Esprit des Lois is a self-conscious attempt to
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raise historical interpretation to the level of reason.
The universal rationality described by the total de-
scription of the philosophical and historical principles
of I'esprit can provide a solid, unprejudiced account
of the modern state. Montesquieu was correct to claim
that his enterprise was novel. No one before had cor-
rectly perceived that the construction of the state re-
quired a universal account of both political and his-
torical principles, except perhaps Vico—that they were
indeed unified by a single overarching principle of
rationality, I'esprit general. Without his philosophy
of history, Montesquieu's political theory could claim
no more relation to truth than those theories he sought
to expose as myth; but equally important, without his
political theory, Montesquieu's philosophy of history
would have no point.
3. Law, tradition and ideology
. Montesquieu's conser-
vatism is cemented by the rule of law. Despite the
'sociological' orientation of method, it is to politics
in a more traditional sense that Montesquieu returns in
order to unite law in the sense of rationalist deductive
principles with law as representing the shared life of
individual subjects. These can only be reconciled
through politics—through the constitution of publically
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available meaning existing in everyday life. Law in
the sense of rational principles which guide the states-
man's action must be legitimized by an interpretation
of tradition. The power of Montesquieu's conservatism
is his ability to utilize tradition to legitimize and
bolster Reason. His dual conception of law as histori-
cal principles governed by causation, and hence determ-
inant of principles of action, and as an organic growth
of political norms out of everyday life, allows him to '
fuse together in a traditional ideology what later the-
ory would say were irreconcilable.
In this sense we can see how crucial it is to
Montesquieu's argument that historical facts fit his
methodological principles. The legitimacy of political
norms rests upon a proper understanding of tradition.
If tradition is to bolster a politics based upon reason,
then it too must be subjected to reason. History must
be the medium in which reason and tradition meet in the
proper principles of historical insight. In the con-
crete history of a particular nation the two notions of
law meet and form a unity. The 'esprit general' is com-
prised of both the laws of history and the laws as norms
of behavior. The best laws of the future grow out of
those of the past which we can recognize as successful
in history because of identifiable causes. If 1' esprit
274
general can become relatively fixed (Montesquieu's ideal
of law as unchanging) then the ideal accomodation has
been reached between the past and the future, between
man and his world. In order for this to happen 1 ' esprit
general must be knowable, but that knowledge must not
be a prelude to political creativity. Political crea-
tivity is in the past and the point of the knowledge of
tradition and history is not to change it, but to rein-
force it and make it work properly; to forestall its
demise as a society as its spirit confronts changing
circumstances
.
The desire to reconcile these two sorts of laws re-
quires two sorts of political obligation. Consent must
be historically conditioned. One demonstrates consent
not by participation in rights, especially property
rights as for Locke, but by living within a culture, as
Usbek remains within a despotic way of life although he
has physically left it. A citizen owes obedience so
long as the tradition is upheld. But since change must
be evolutionary, not revolutionary, and must result from
a rational understanding of 1' esprit general if it is
to have any hope of success, there is no real right of
resistance. Political action directed at social change
can only take on a posture of moderate reform directed
at reestablishing the traditional 'esprit.' This
change
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requires the same sort of knowledge as does proper rule.
Indeed, if the ruler acts upon proper principles no po-
litical action is necessary (or legitimate) on the part
of citizens. Montesquieu is clearly more concerned with
political obedience than with citizens' participation.
Citizens, then, obey; when things go right, they
do not act politically at all. And when they do they
must do so on the basis of a highly rational political
knowledge. The knowledge of rule is rational knowledge
of the historian-philosopher, making sure that the
pieces (systems of relations) of an elaborate jigsaw
puzzle continue to fit in their proper places. Condi-
tions change, but the task of the ruler is to ensure
that the overall scene that the puzzle constructs re-
mains as clear to external view as possible. In a dif-
ferent way, Montesquieu accepts the fundamental assump-
tions of the dualistic theory of political knowledge of
Bacon and Hobbes which I discussed in Chapter Three.
The internal cohesion of the polity has a single proper
form for any particular polity at any particular histor-
ical moment. History is a fluid set of laws and causes,
yet political knowledge requires that it must be frozen
at a particular point.
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IV. Conclus ion; The Modern Ideal of the Citizen
The citizen realizes himself in his social life not
in politics. He creates his social identity out of eco-
nomic and social interaction rather than in political
action. Montesquieu's ideal of politics as a rational
science of history leaves little room for the confronta-
tion of the competing interests and self
-interpretations
of citizens. Individual self
-interpretations vary as
the systems of relations they confront vary. Merchants
must act according to the spirit of commerce, soldiers
according to the spirit of war, women according to the
spirit of luxury. Likewise, individual action varies
as does the form of government : republican merchants
act according to different principles than monarchical
merchants. Likewise, the various forms of government
set the particular requirements for state control: for
example, women must be more controlled in republics for
monarchies can more successfully absorb luxury, the
spirit of women.
Individual self -interpretation, then, derives from
one's activity in society. The goals and purposes one
sets for life and how one relates to fellow human beings
is determined by the particular context of an individu-
al's position in civil society. What is peculiarly im-
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portant for Montesquieu's conservative political theory
is that although the citizen's self
-interpretat ion re-
sults from his recognition of his own particular condi-
tion he has little if any control over it. Capitalist
merchants recognize that their interests are best served
by the economic rationality of moderate accumulation and
act accordingly, just as noblemen in a monarchic court
recognize the need to define themselves in terms of
their distinguishability from others. However, they are
powerless to change the political relationships inherent
in their condition. Self-conscious reflection on their
condition can tell them nothing that mere recognition
of their objective circumstances does not already tell
them. Court life is false, the moeurs and manieres it
produces deceive and manipulate—but they are necessary
if a monarchy is to survive. More subtly perhaps,
Montesquieu's theory of political action in De L' Esprit
des Lois extends the more pessimistic implications of
Roxane's suicide. Injustice, illegitimate power rela-
tions, and unnaturalness abound in everyday politics.
The citizen may recognize them, but he must accept them,
he is powerless to change them. His attempts can only
end in the equivalent of suicide—which in political
terms is the fall from moderate government to despotism.
As did earlier thinkers like Montaigne, Montesquieu had
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little faith that attempts to change an unjust polity
by citizens would result in anything other than a fall
into tyranny.
What Montesquieu feared, and what all liberal the-
orists feared, was that a citizen's private interest
unleashed and made legitimate by the structure of life
in the early modern state would penetrate and command
the public good. In general, their solution, one vari-
ation of which Montesquieu's theory represents, was to
locate the primary sphere of action for the citizen
outside of politics, in a 'civil society.' This is
reflected in a dual notion of political knowledge.
Political knowledge from the point of view of the ruler
is the application of reason in order to obtain the ob-
jective goods of the state—liberty and security. From
the point of view of the citizen, everyday life was
guided by passion and the knowledge of self-interest.
In Montesquieu's constitutionalism formal guarantees of
citizenship take precedence over the requirements of
self-conscious everyday political activity.
But by doing this politics loses its 'life.' It
becomes more dull and technical, less concerned with
determining the public good according to collective pur-
poses and needs, than with procedures for 'distributing'
goods. For Montesquieu the best positive laws require
little interpretation. Even justice becomes a 'good.'
In republics justice represents the formal ethic of con-
tracts, of self-interest versus self-interest; in monar-
chies it represents the proper assignment of honors
according to 'just deserts.' Yet the signs no longer
merely represent justice, they are justice. The moral
goodness that once permeated political relationships has
somehow leaked out. The signs and symbols remain, the
substance has been transferred to other parts of the
social body. The contrast with Plato is illustrative.
Justice for the latter was defined in terms of action.
Even the third class of citizens who had nothing to do
with rule were governed by a justice which determined
that they do what best suited them, that they perform
the occupations most appropriate to their nature. The
content of justice, the fact that they could perform
actions they themselves regarded as just, was most im-
portant, not the fact of distribution. For Montesquieu
and modern liberal theory, distribution becomes the main
determinant of justice. Justice is fairness: it is
moderation in punishments, the equal enforcement of laws
and contracts and most important, the impartial applica-
tion of rules. Citizens must recognize rules of justice
in their everyday private action but they can take no
part in determining it. The role of politics under this
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notion of justice is formal and minimal. Its role is
to ensure that the conflicts of competing claims do not
erupt into major social conflicts. Political justice
mediates claims—it is a form of conflict resolution,
not a collective determinant of the public good.
Political virtue is the only principle of action
in Montesquieu's scheme which allows citizens to par-
ticipate in politics. But the idea of civic virtue,
drawn from the model of classical republics is too
extreme to be applicable in the modern world. The
self-sacrifice of it has a hollow ring in a society
which assumes that individuals act according to their
self-interest. Political virtue in modern republics
must be arrived at indirectly, through a commercial
capitalist ethic wherein private interest is kept
within certain limits and thereby fosters the public
interest.
Yet Montesquieu's theory retains, as does much
liberal theory, a longing for the ideal of civic virtue
drawn from classical philosophy. Something about the
idea of citizenship still implies that individuals as
citizens have a right and obligation to determine and
direct the public good in collective participation with
others. This last ideal haunts liberal theory as some-
thing it knows it must aspire to, but which it knows it
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has lost. We can recognize Roxane's rebellion as noble,
as embodying higher ideals of freedom than the merely
formal procedural freedom implied by the modern ideal
of citizenship than we think is possible for modern
citizens to realize.
Clearly, the originality of Montesquieu's theory
of citizenship is his identification of the public but
non-political realm of moeurs and manieres as the pri-
mary sphere of action for the citizen. Completing a
trend in early modern theory, which I discussed in Chap-
ter Three, Montesquieu constructs an ideal of citizen-
ship whereby all who contribute to the maintenance of
the society through producing wealth or safeguarding
private virtues which minimize conflict are as good
citizens (often better citizens) than those who act in
the political realm. His argument is a more general
form of a widely accepted view of women and the family
in the eighteenth century that has its greatest exponent
in Rousseau. Women are the guardians of virtue in the
family, which is important as the sphere in which social
norms are communicated to children. The continuity of
a way of life is located not in the public forum of
classical Greek society but in the private intimacy of
personal family relations. Montesquieu's conservatism
seems to extend this model of the virtues of women and
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the family to the life of citizens more generally. The
primary function of individuals in their capacities as
citizens is not to rationally determine the collective
good, but rather to transmit a particular tradition, to
follow and safeguard raoeurs and manieres while providing
for their own happiness and through 'society' the hap-
piness of others. The politics which compliments this
in the best of times is the passive ajudication of pri-
vate conflicts, and at worst of times a redirection of
the social order, forcibly if necessary, to put the na-
tion back on the track established by the ancient con-
stitution. This ideal of the citizen has a long history
in liberal theory in the modern state; in the conclusion
to the dissertation I want to trace its implications for
a modern theory of citizenship.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION: MONTESQUIEU AND THELIBERAL THEORY OF CITIZENSHIP
^ Montesqui eu and Liberal Theory
We can describe the dualism of Montesquieu's the-
ory of citizenship as actually embodying two different
senses of the citizen, both of which inform the self-
interpretations of citizens in liberal polities. I
have tried to show that he recognized both senses and
attempted to unify them in a universal theory of poli-
^^""^ De L' Esprit des Lois which relied on a constitu-
tionalism rooted in the fundamental laws of the kingdom
linked to the possibility of a scientific understanding
of the history of a political/legal tradition. Within
this theory of citizenship Montesquieu sought to incor-
porate a notion of political virtue on the part of indi-
vidual citizens into the structure of modern social life
and the state.
Montesquieu accepted the legitimacy of individual
self-interest, which was characteristic of both seven-
teenth century French moral theory and English political
theory. He likewise concluded, as most of his predeces-
sors did, that individual actors who would act to further
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their own interests implied the need for a 'society' to
absorb them in such a way as to mitigate conflict. He
was unhappy with the solution posed by contract theory
which in his eyes misunderstood the dynamic relation of
citizens and state power-political action could not be
reduced to consent without jeopardizing the political
identity of individual citizens. The particulars of the
interrelation of citizens and the state were different
for different forms of government: monarchy required a
society based upon rank and privilege to absorb the pri-
vate ambitions of the nobility and republics required
the market and a capitalistic ethic of apporpriat ion and
profit in order to absorb the individual self-interests
of merchants. The structure of Montesquieu's argument
for the stability of both monarchies and republics is,
in general outline, the same. Individuals ought to
balance their particular ambitions and the objects of
their world in order to produce harmony in individual
and social life. By drawing attention towards the per-
son of the king and providing a sphere of action for the
nobility in the parliaments, monarchies create a harmony
among classes. In Montesquieu's view, if monarchy is to
survive,"'" it must retain privilege on the part of a
noble class. This privilege, along with the principle
of honor, will channel their ambitions toward achieving
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social recognition. The king ought to be the arbiti
of rewards and privileges. In republics, the market
takes the place of the society of social recognition.
So long as private individual action is channeled into
commerce the private ambition of merchants, the dominant
class in republics, can be transformed into public bene-
fits. Chapter Two above has demonstrated how, according
to Montesquieu, modern republics require the dominance
of a commercial class acting upon capitalistic motiva-
tions. Hence, I have tried to argue that for Montesquieu
both monarchies and republics require a primarily non-
political but public social sphere to absorb the self-
interests of the nobility and the merchant class respec-
tively in order to produce a stable and just polity.
Counterposed to the moderate form of government, despo-
tism as a form of government fails precisely because it
cannot successfully insulate the state from private
self-interest.
In the introduction I explained the sense in which
I assert that Montesquieu's theory of citizenship is
'liberal.' This requires a bit further discussion here.
Montesquieu is a liberal theorist in that he accepts
certain philosophical assumptions which underlie the
liberal theory of state and society. He accepts that
the authority of the state must be rooted in the auton-
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omous individual who acts primarily on the basis of pas-
sion rather than reason and whose action is necessarily
based upon the pursuit of self-interest. m the Lett res
Persanes he presents individuals whose personal identi-
ties are- bound up with their political identities.
Politics must somehow provide a space in which individ-
uals can give form to their natural drive for self-ex-
pression and freedom. The despotic way of life in which
the characters find themselves does not allow a positive
expression of this sort and hence the only solution is
tragic self-destruction for the. main antagonists, Roxane
and Usbek. In De L'Esprit des Lois Montesquieu attempts
to establish a constitutional framework and a theory of
social and political life which can accomodate both the
demands of the state (security) and the need of individ-
ual citizens for political self-expression. I argue
that his universal notion of 1' esprit general, by unify-
ing the institutionalization of political practices
within particular governments and the spirit with which
citizens act, attempts, unsuccessfully, to provide a
conservative theory of the modern state which merges the
dual senses of the citizen as a subject of authority and
as a politically creative actor.
Although he accepts the two senses of citizenship
which liberal theory embodies, it is misleading to view
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Montesquieu as a liberal in the Lockean sense. it is
deceptive to characterize Montesquieu's theory of the
state as akin to a Lockean 'minimal' state as Thomas
2Pangle does. The state for Montesquieu does not
merely secure liberty in the sense of protecting proper-
ty (although this is one of its functions) but it also
provides a forum in which individuals identify them-
selves as men and women. L' Esprit unifies public life,
political and social, with private life into a whole in
ways in which the theory of the minimal state could
never accept.
The central point of Montesquieu's theory of the
modern state is that the state is an institutionaliza-
tion of laws. In the conclusion to Chapter Five I ex-
plain the complex notion of law which Montesquieu's
state embodies. The 'spirit of the laws' describes
above all the common meanings which citizens share which
make the system of laws more than a mere set of func-
3tional rules and which provides simultaneously for a
stable and just political order. People follow the laws
because they love the laws. In other words even the
action in civil society which cannot be overtly politi-
cal is impregnated with political virtue. The public
norms of civil society are constituted by the political'
needs of the state and vice-versa. According to Montes-
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quieu, men must act in certain ways if the state is to
survive and be just at the same time that they are free
to act according to their will and passions. His notion
of political virtue which he distinguishes from virtue
in general at the beginning of De L' Esprit des Lois de-
scribes the mediation of the political and the social,
of public and private.
The major mistake of those who wish to assimilate
Montesquieu's theory to the Lockean theory of the state
or to a more modern functionalist model of the state is
to misunderstand the importance of tradition in Montes-
quieu's thought. He draws on liberal assumptions about
the subject and tends to accept the dualism in political
knowledge between citizen and ruler which is at the root
of the early liberal theory of political knowledge (see
Chapter Three), yet he presents a deeply conservative
political theory, adhering to a stronger notion of cus-
tom and tradition than Lockean liberal theory could sus-
tain. He believes, as both liberal psyhologists follow-
ing Locke and post-Kantian liberals could not, that tra-
dition and custom would encourage citizens to act vir-
tuously. His rejection of the abstract assoc iat ionism
of Locke's Essay on Human Understanding paved the way
for a theory in which tradition cemented the social and
political bonds of citizenship. The Lockean idea of the
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individual as well as the later Kantian notion of the
self-reflexive individual subject jeopardizes the cen-
tral position which Montesquieu assigns to tradition.
There is for Montesquieu a certain level at which au-
thority cannot be questioned without jeopardizing the
possibility that self-interested action can at the same
time be politically virtuous. Only tradition, according
to Montesquieu, can provide the social space in which
this reconciliation is possible. Hegel's response to
Kantian radicalism is in some ways similar to Montes-
quieu's response to the abstractness of Hobbesian and
Lockean contract theory. Although we must be careful
not to overstate the similarities, the comparison is
useful because they both attempted similar things in
their theories and their solutions meet in interesting
4
ways. They both sought to instill in social and
political life a sense of virtue which was (and still
is) fundamentally challenged by the theorists, absolu-
tist or liberal, who defined the intellectual milieu
and practice of the modern state.
Locke's theory of the social contract and the
natural justification of private property legitimated
the pursuit of private interest. Man's natural entitle-
ment to the fruits of his labor gave his private inter-
ests a moral priority over virtuous action in the state;
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the state had its justification not in the laws of na-
ture, but in the limits of the laws of nature. The
state arises for Locke in order to adjudicate and en-
force competing claims and to secure property in ways
which the state of nature could not. Political obliga-
tion rests on consent, tacit and explicit, which in turn
rests on a narrow conception of rationality as a "facul-
ty of means. This implies a meager role for tradi-
tion in the legitimation of social and political prac-
tices .
But for Montesquieu the relation between the citi-
zen and the state is fundamentally different. For
Montesquieu, unlike Locke, political life is essential
to an individual's personal identity. He cannot be the
person he is outside of a particular political frame-
work. (Witness how Usbek struggles to leave despotism
behind but is caught in ways he does not realize until
it is too late—see Chapter Four.) His personality and
character involve him in the stability and moral fabric
of the state, both through the capacity of the state to
protect liberty and property and in the fact that the
private personality must be one with the moral necessi-
ties of the state. Montesquieu couples a modern version
of the classical argument that the state is only as good
as its citizens with the modern demands of private prop-
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erty to create a public sphere freed from collective
control. It is crucial that for Montesquieu neither of
these is a claim against the state, the individual does
not make claims as if a contract has been violated.
Injustice must be redressed by action, political when
possible, personal when no political recourse can be
effective. (Roxane demonstrates the predicament of the
individual when politics allows no recourse.) The best
polity, and the only really stable one, is the one in
which injustice is redressed by the recapturing of the
lost tradition. Hence, Montesquieu fills out the con-
tent of citizenship with tradition, not with formal
relationships. The citizen for Montesquieu relates to
the state in a far more intimate and immediate way than
for Locke. Both political life and private life have
their legitimate needs and requirements and national
1' esprit and tradition must unify these. In essence,
Montesquieu's theory of citizenship is an attempt to
institutionalize the tensions between an individual's
private life and its public expression.
Tradition in Montesquieu's view bears considerable
philosophical and political weight. To carry its load,
tradition is linked to a scientific understanding of
laws and causes (see Chapter One) which attempts to en-
sure that a particular interpretation of the tradition
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and the esprit general of a particular nation will have
objective merit. Helvetius' criticism of the very te
of the debate between the these royale and the these
nobiliare is devastating to Montesquieu's scheme.^
Helvetius wonders what relevance the fundamental laws
have to the contemporary moral dilemmas of political
creativity; he poses a question Montesquieu could never
answer: why can we not crate a stable polity on a new
basis, just as ancient lawgivers did? Changes in tech-
nology and social relations demand deeper changes in
politics than Montesquieu's conservative theory was
willing to accept. The central question for late eigh-
teenth and nineteenth century France was whether it was
morally and politically possible to transform France
into a republic. Montesquieu clearly did not think so.
His notion of tradition was not altogether wrong (it
supplies a dimension missing in much early liberal the-
ory) but it was too strictly conceived. While recogniz-
ing a self-reflective capability on the part of citizens
Montesquieu refuses to allow its consequences for social
change. His strict notion of tradition as a body of
fundamental laws moving almost unchanged through history
contradicts the developmental history which he argues
states undergo (see Chapter One). On another level
Montesquieu proclaims and then retreats from the crea-
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tive possibilities o the liberal political subject.
The citizen must be :ee to create his own life and
Montesquieu more tha other early liberal theorists
recognizes that this .ust involve a strong political
dimension, but his t .ory of political space as the
institutionalization
.f formal causal relations does
not provide sufficie
: space for the political action
he claims is necessa r to citizens.
The relevance o Montesquieu's theory is that it
highlights the funda mtal structure of the liberal
theory of the citize
. That theory contains two dif-
ferent senses of cit :enship; the relation between them
is problematic, cont lually producing tensions within
the polity. On the le hand the citizen is an active
self-creating being lo can be fulfilled only through
meaningful political action. He strives somehow to
participate in estab ishing the meaning and value of
collective life. On :he other hand the citizen is a
passive recipient of .Protection, related to the state
only through the for al logic of contractual obligation.
The modern dilemma o the citizen, to which we now turn,
is rooted in the coe istence of these two notions of
citizenship.
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11. Toward a Critical Theory of citizen.hnp
Any attemnpt to draw conclusions about the contem-
porary dilemma of citizenship from a study of the early
modern state must proceed with caution. Certainly some
contemporary theorists still accept the notion of the
non-political citizen. They accept the central argument
of early liberal theory that capitalist civil society
can successfully absorb men's passions (they are, as the
eighteenth century theorists were, less certain about
women) so as to render everyday political action on the
part of individuals unnecessary and to some degree dan-
7gerous. The primary political activity, periodic
voting, becomes less and less a creative activity and
is reduced to ensuring, however imperfectly, the 'ac-
countability' of decision-makers. According to this
view, in the context of modern corporate capitalism in
an age of high technology, even this already minimal
activity must be minimized further if modern democracies
under complex advanced capitalist economies are to suc-
cessfully manage social and economic life.® This view
shares certain assumptions with the eighteenth century
argument in its conclusions and general orientation.
Advocates of it accept the individualist theory of man
and the primacy of economic action and economic ration-
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ality.9 Likewise, they share the faith of the Lockean
tradition and of classical political economists that the
formal notion of citizenship, necessary to free individ-
uals to pursue their self-interest in the market, can
adequately ensure the compatibility of capitalism and
democracy. Yet we must be careful to recognize the
altered context
-the modern corporate capitalism guided
by the managerial state is vastly different from the
vision of entrepreneurial commercial capitalism linked
to a constitutional state which guided most early lib-
eral theorists. There are points of contact and the
modern theory has roots in the early theories, but they
are not the same theory.
The importance of the separation of the ruler and
ruled by a non-political public civil society which is
at the heart of early liberal theory of citizenship is
that it initiates a change in the contours of the con-
cept of citizenship. We now use the word citizenship
in two senses without investigating the connection be-
tween them. In the first sense citizenship refers to a
formal set of criteria for participation in the polity
and the nation. It delineates essential criteria of
nationality (native born or nationalized) which distin-
guishes a citizen of one state from that of another.
It also initiates individuals into certain procedural
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protections and rights guaranteed by the courts and the
institution of voting. The formal notion of citizenship
purges the life of the individual of any authentic poli-
tical action. Politics tends to become a rational field
of policy-making, the province of technical decision-
making which relies on an abstract characterization of
ends— "happiness of the greatest number," "the public
interest, "-which legitimizes the isolation of means as
a separate study, thereby vitiating the possibilities
for rational participation in decisions by citizens.
According to this formal notion, the primary action
of citizens is obedience to authority, unrestrained pur-
suit of private interests in the economy, and complacent
participation in the moral norms and customs of culture
and society. Political creativity is not a legitimate
category of action. VJith reference to politics, this
is reflected clearly in the attitude toward public of-
ficials as experts who merely process the 'inputs' pre-
sented to them. Politics tends to become the realm of
'public policy' which processes given 'objective' social
facts defined within a political language drawn from
social science; it is not the realm in which collective
decisions about the direction and worth of public life
are made. What are to count as relevant social facts
are presented to the public by the private, politics,
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then, only processes them.
An active notion of citizenship would seem to have
no place in the rigid objective notion of the political
wherein public decisions consist in the most efficient
means to affect privately determined ends. The spontan-
eous action and rational reflexivity of civic virtue can
never be objectified in such a way that public policy
decisions can be purely scientific matters. Yet it is
unfair and distorting to characterize our modern notion
of politics and citizenship as purely a formal affair.
While we hold to a paradigm of politics as formal deci-
sion-making based upon a knowledge which the majority
of the population is never privy to, our political prac-
tice does embody a certain more active citizenship, -""^
both within the formal structure and outside of it. Our
practice of voting does embody a legitimate sphere of
creativity for ordinary citizens, especially on the lo-
cal level, although the increasing manipulative uses of
the media by candidates jeopardizes this, especially at
the national level. We tend to reject or at least hold
at a certain moral distance those political machines
that deny any input to ordinary citizens. In addition
to staging theatrical events, a relatively new phenome-
non, political parties do allow for certain active par-
ticipation in real decisions for individual citizens.
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Politics as the adjudication and struggle between
competing visions of the public good does not taKe placem the formal governmental structure but does, at least
to some degree, in political parties at the local level
and occasionally at the national level. Outside the
formal system, the embodiment of an active conception
of Citizenship is the legitimacy of civil disobedience,
indeed, we often accord a certain nobility to those whom
we recognize as jeopardizing their private safety and
interest in order to force into political discourse a
sincerely felt vision of the public good. Our most
revered political heroes are those who took an initia-
tive in projecting a public spirit into a public dis-
course that had atrophied in its purely formal charac-
ter. We revere public spirit and political creativity
when it appears as genuine and sincere, but we are leary
of embodying this in everyday politics. To the extent
that we legitimize active citizenship it is extraordi-
nary. Participation in political campaigns is voluntary
and occurs at widely spaced intervals. For most parti-
cipants and for other 'party regulars' it is a way of
spending leisure time, a pursuit separated from the
private world of labor. The extra-ordinary character
of civil disobedience is even more clear. Our prevail-
ing conceptions of citizenship embody these two notions
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Of active and formal citizenship but they remain separ-
ate. Government remains a formal realm which eschews
any notion of political creativity and the realm of
legitimate political creativity is carefully circum-
scribed so as to insulate everyday politics from it.
In contemporary theories of the citizen the two
senses of citizenship are often recognized. Robert
Pranger distinguishes a political culture of power
wherein citizens are generally passive from a political
culture of participation in which citizenship is more
active. A similar distinction is developed by
Joseph Tussman's Obligation and the Body Politic where
he distinguishes between 'members' who are citizens with
obligations and duties and 'agents' who are leaders and
concerned with the responsibilities of power. More re-
cently, George Armstrong Kelly^^ has distinguished
between 'civic' and 'civil' notions of citizenship, the
former an active sphere of participation and the latter
a more passive sphere of rights and protections.
In both Pranger 's and Tussman's work the contradic-
tion between these two is laid bare. Pranger 's solution
is to eschew the world of power for the world of parti-
cipation. This solution is inadequate for it fails to
understand that the dichotomy as Pranger poses it is
false. Participation contains power and vice-versa.
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The crisis of the citizens is not that they are too much
involved in the culture of power or too little involved
in the culture of participation, but rather that they
are simultaneously pulled in both directions. They un-
derstand themselves both as creative actors in politics,
as well as passive partners in formal power relations
over which they have no control.
Likewise Tussman seeks a solution to the dilemma
of the modern citizen by replacing the stale privatized
politics of the market, the haven of the passive citi-
zen, with a political education towards public roles.
Tussman 's view is more compelling than Pranger's for it
is less abstract and more sensitive to the nuances of
civic virtue. Yet his solution remains too idealistic.
Recognizing the dual nature of the modern political sub-
ject, as creative member of the sovereignty and as the
subject of authority, Tussman exhorts us to eschew our
private interests for the public good, to place our pub-
lic self above our private self. We must, in his words,
"revitalize the public tribunal." In short, Tussman
asks for a return of republican virtue, of self-sacri-
fice for the public good. But like Pranger, Tussman
implies too great a dichotomy between the two senses of
the liberal citizen. He fails to realize that systems
of obligation and legitimation are rooted in systems of
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power, in structures of domination and subjection.
Tussman relies on an idealized notion of the forum in
Which political discourse takes place. The idealism of
Tussman-
s solution becomes clear as soon as we recognize
that political education in modern liberal democracies
is permeated by the power relations that sustain (and
are sustained by) the market. Tussman realizes this but
yet sees no way out but to pit the forum against the
market in hand to hand combat as if they were, at least
in principle, equal. Tussman is correct to lament the
fact that the market has already won.
Both Pranger and Tussman misconceive the nature of
the dilemma of the citizen. Both seem to see the con-
tradictory nature of the citizen as imposed upon him,
that his life presents him with a clear choice to be a
passive or active citizen. This misconceives the crisis
in democratic citizenship. It fails to realize that the
range of self-interpretations available to citizens is
more fluid. The practice of citizenship does not in-
volve exclusively passivity or creative action, but
rather making practical judgments in everyday life in a
complex and contradictory set of meanings.
Hence, a contemporary critical theory of citizen-
ship which seeks in some sense to 'solve' the crisis in
democratic citizenship must involve several dimensions
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Which are often either missing or undervalued in the
contemporary literature. It must first recognize that
the crisis of the modern democratic citizen requires a
fuller understanding of the dual nature of liberal cit-
izenship. The dichotomy between participation and pas-
sive/formal citizenship is inadequate as a description
of how citizens understand their public role. This
leads theorists to pose the dilemma in terms of a series
of other dichotomies which in actual social relations
are mixed: participation, power; the market, the forum;
private interest, public interest. The range of con-
cepts in which the debate has taken place is inadequate.
Citizens in modern democracies are not faced with the
types of choices this language implies. The liberal
citizen is involved in a cluster of possible self-inter-
pretations which are involved in institutions and prac-
tices which embody contradictory notions of the proper
role of the citizen.
My argument about the two senses of citizenship is
that they are both part of the language of the practice
of citizenship in liberal democracies and that they make
available to people a field of contradictory or at least
competing legitimations of citizenship. In an extreme
form our political language distinguishes two types of
self -interpretat ions regarding political action--that
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political action on the part of citizens is only legi-
timate periodically, and then only within prescribed
institutional practices (such as voting), a competing
interpretation however is also available in the belief
that citizenship requires a merging of individual and
social identity in everyday action. The former leads
to periodic participation according to strict institu-
tional norms and a corresponding patriotism which urges
that the citizen's primary self
-interpretation is as
follower; whereas the latter leads to more active forms
of participation either through established institution-
al practices—i.e., campaigning for office, lobbying,
etc.
. .
.—or in more 'grass roots' organizing in com-
munities and in the workplace. Citizens in modern lib-
eral democracies must be described as involved in a
cluster of meanings drawn from both of these. Given the
complex and open ended nature of possible points of con-
tact between these two senses an interpretive dimension
is necessary to any modern theory of citizenship in
order to give a coherent, even if not ' consi stent ' -"-^
account of the meaning of citizenship for the partici-
pant s
.
An adequate theory of citizenship must be embedded
in a theory of the state. The life of the citizen can
only be understood in the context of the relations of
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domination and subjection institutionalized in the state
and their forms of legitimation. Citizenship will take
on different meanings at different points in the life
of the state. At moments of crisis, the uncertainties
of public authority and the meanings associated with it
tend to lead the citizen in competing and contradictory
directions—toward a further dulling of the sense of
active participation (except in the blind sense of obe-
dience characteristic of modern patriotism) and hence
toward greater repression by the state, or to a height-
ened awareness of the participatory implications of ci-
tizenship and the rise of challenges to the state from
outside. In other words in periods of crisis the bal-
ance between the two senses of citizenship which accords
liberal political society with a certain degree of sta-
bility and cohesion breaks down and citizenship tends
to veer off towards either extreme. The actual particu-
lar movement can only be discussed with reference to
particular crises at particular moments. •''^
The main thrust of a critical theory of citizenship
must be to probe the emancipatory capability of the cur-
rent crisis of citizenship. As I have posed the contra-
dictory nature of the liberal theory of the citizen a
possibility emerges in the attempt to revive and rein-
terpret civic virtue as a crucial dimension of citizen-
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ship. What possibilities does the contemporary situa-
tion allow for not merely participation on the part of
citizens but for active involvement in the creation of
public norms and values as part of everyday life? This
is not a question of reviving older notions of partici-
pation (an anachronism and historical impossibility) or
of merely increases in participation for its own sake,
without questioning the structure and rules of that par-
ticipation. What is at stake is the possibility of mod-
ern citizens to recapture control over the directions of
their collective existence which the tendencies of ad-
vanced capitalism have vitiated and the liberal theory
of citizenship is powerless to affect. The purpose of
this dissertation has been to look into liberal theory
at its early stages in order to discover the roots of
the current crisis as well as the possibilities for the
future
.
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44 LXIV, 135.
45 IX, 55-6.
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XV, 67.
47 LXIV, 136.
48 XXI, 74-5.
49 IX, 55-6.
50 II, 47-8.
51 IX, 57.
52 VII, 52.
53 IX, 56.
54 XX, 73.
55 XXVI, 81; XLVIII; and LVI.
56 LXIII, 134.
57 XXXVIII.
CHAPTER V: Citizenship in Moderate Governments: The
Universal Politics of De L' Esprit des Lois
1 In a recent study, Montesquieu and Social
Theory (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), John Baum
claims that Montesquieu's view approaches Parsonian
functionalism. Later in the chapter I will argue that
this is an incorrect and ahistorical reading of
Mont esqui eu
.
2 For the term 'universal politics' I am indebt-
ed to a paper by Michael A. Mosher, "The Particulars of
a Universal Politics: The Case of Montesquieu and
Hegel, " presented at the 1980 Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association, Washington
D.C., August 28-31, 1980.
3 V, 9, p. 298, note (a). All references to De
L' Esprit des Lois are to the Pleiade edition unless
otherwise noted and are cited by book, chapter and page^
4 V, 9, 289.
5 V, 6, 280.
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6 Marx, for example, will argue that the die;-tinction between society and the sLte is rea!ly LreIdeology. Politics permeates civil society civil
?e?Ss'' If^M - - reflection orpowerrelations. i ontesquieu considered this possiblealternative formulation he did not incorporate it Lto
^ilf^irw''^t^Last ^--sanes, ^oe^f^r^ser^t
In fact til'oo • f
the case of despotic regimes,
o^i ^
conjunction of the social and the politi-
ootl<,^°!f J
with the public and private, defines des-p ism as a form of government.
7 IV, 1, 261.
8 IV, 2, 262.
9 IV, 2, 262-3.
10 IV, 3, 265.
11 IV, 6, 266-7.
12 See Lettres Persanes,
13 I am following Melvin
of this phrase.
14 XII, 11, 441.
15 XII, 4, 433.
16 XII, 1, 430.
Ibid.
XII, 2, 431.
XI, 4, 395.
17
18
19
20 Ibid.
21 Jean Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth
,
ed. M.J. Tooley (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, nd ) Book I,
Chapter 2, p. 8.
22 For a different view, see Thomas Pangle,
Montesquieu's Philosophy of Liberalism (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1973) . The arguments of
the founding fathers, especially Hamilton's, are much
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closer to Hobbes than to Montesquieu.
2 3 See my discussion of Montesquieu's moralpsychology in Chapter One above.
24 XIX, 4, 558.
25
26
Ibid
.
XI, 20, 430.
*
This interpretation of Montesquieu's conceptOf liberty distinguishes it from the more negative con-ception that Pangle (1973) attributes to him. It servesto argue, as other elements of my argument imply, thatlocating Montesquieu's version of liberalism in theLockean tradition is inadequate and distorting to
Montesquieu's thought.
28 See Roger Callois's note to Book II, Chapter
I in Pleiade II: 1498.
Lettres Persanes
, Letter Three.
30 Mark Hulliung is correct to argue that the
general orientation of Montesquieu's work from his
earliest essays to his final Defense de L'Esprit des
Lois is to criticize the absolutist monarchy of Louis
XIV by associating it with despotism rather than monar-
chy. This is clearly one ideological purpose of the
simplification of the forms of government. However,
Hulliung goes too far when he argues, as is the purpose
of his book, Montesquieu and the Old Regime (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1976), that Montesquieu
wants to replace the French monarchy with a republic.
31 XI, 5, 396.
32 V, 19, 304.
33 See the Republic
, trans. Francis M. Cornford
(London: Oxford University Press, 1941) sections
543A-576b, pp. 265-300.
34 In addition to the general end of government
as security each government has a purpose which is
unique to its own character and spirit. My argument is
that although Montesquieu does not explicitly state that
moderation and liberty are general ends of government.
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he treats them as if they are. A universal politics
results from the necessary interrelation of the generalends of security, liberty and moderation.
XI, 4, 395.
XI, 7, 408.
35
36
3 7 For a discussion of the problem of the order
and coherence of De L' Esprit des Lois as a text see
Neumann (1949). For a recent attempt to argue that the
entire book is coherent, I think an unsuccessful one,
see Pangle (1973) pp. 279ff.
38 XXIX, 1, 865.
39 XI, 6, 397.
40 XI, 3, 395.
^^ See Chapter Four above.
See note #1 above. Also see Raymond Aron,
Main Currents in Sociological Thought
, Volume 1
( Harmond sworth : Penguin Books , Ltd
. ,
1965).
43 XIX, 14, 564.
44 See above, p. 7.
45 XIX, 16, 566.
46 XIX, 8, 560.
4^ There is, as I have said, a hybrid form of
republic, the commercial republic, wherein virtue is
produced not by direct self-renunciation but through
the renunciation necessary to the work ethic, which
generates a replacement for political virtue out of
civil society.
48 VII, 4, 336.
49 VII, 9, 341.
50 See my discussion in Chapter One.
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52 Ibid.
5^ XIX, 17, 566.
5^ VII, 1, 332-3.
55 VII, 7, 333.
_
56 Montesquieu develops a principle of class di-
vision here which is 'Marxian- in its general character,The principle is that classes are differentiated bytheir place in the system of production. Hence, there
are workers who produce commodities through their ownlabor, and an unproductive class which lives off the
surplus of the workers.
57
58
VII, 1, 335.
Montesquieu cites Mandeville's Fable of the
B^Qs as a source of this argument. VII, 1, p. 333,
not e 6
.
59 VII, 2, 335.
60 VII, 1, 334.
61 I, 3, 237.
62 I, 3, 238.
63 V, 1, 273.
64 Ill, 5, 255.
65 VI, 1, 307.
66 VI, 3, 311.
67 XIX, 5, 559.
68 XXIX, 16, 880.
69 Ibid.
See the remainder of the paragraph (XXIX, 17,
880) .
"71 V, 7, 283.
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"72 XXIX, 16, 881.
73
74
VI, 10, 319.
^ ir. .
"^^^^ "^^^^ adequate descriptions of thisdebate. See Elie Carcassonne's classic account inMontesquieu et le Probleme de la Constitutinn v.^:!....^
i ^P^^"^' -^^27) and Franz Neumann's bril -liant summary m his introduction to the Hafner edition
?^q2qV^^''^^
translation of The Spirit of th. t..w.
rtl ll: t ?r recent work ot J.Q.C. Mackrell,
!^
,
^^^^^^^^^^ Feudalism' in Eighteenth-Century Fran^.(London: Koutiedge & Kegan Paul, lyyj) tor the context
^^.'^o^?^^ ^""^ ^^""^ Hulliung's fresh and novel ac-count ( 1 976 )
.
See Chapter Four, above.
"76 XXIX, 19, 882-3.
CHAPTER VI: Montesquieu and the Liberal Theory ofCitizenship
It is misleading to call Montesquieu's use of
the forms of government 'descriptive' as opposed to
'normative' as some recent commentators do, such as
Richter (1979), Baum (1979), and Werner Stark, Montes -
quieu, Pioneer of the Sociology of Knowledge (London:
Routledge and Paul, 1960). The argument is too often
couched in terms of whether Montesquieu preferred a
monarchy or a republic. (See Hulliung (1976) for an
attempt to argue that Montesquieu is really a republi-
can. Also see Chapters 4 and 5 of Pangle (1973).) This
is really a non-issue, for under different conditions
Montesquieu would support either a monarchy or a repub-
lic .
2 See Chapter Three of Pangle (1973).
For this interpretation see especially Baum
(1979)
.
^ I am indebted here to Michael Mosher's essay,
"The Particulars of a Universal Politics" (1980).
^ John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Under -
standing , 2 vols. (New York: Dover Publications, 1959)
2: 385ff.
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6 See Helvetius' two letters, one to Montesauieuand one to A.M Saurin, reprinted in Destutt de ??acy-sA Commentary and Review of Montesgui^n . of the
^i^ew York: Burt Franklin, 1^69, original, ?81l) :
teris^Jo^^J ^^"""^
classical liberal approach charac-tic of modern conservatives see George Stiqler
^ess!'l9yg)!"^ (Chicago: Chicago Univ:r;ity
8 See especially the Tri-lateral Commission
report. The Crisis of Democracy (New York: New YorkUniversity Press, 1975).
^ See the "Introduction" to Stigler (1975).For a brilliant critique of these individualist theor-ists see the series of essays in Part II of C.B.
Macpherson's Democratic Theory.: Essays in Retrieval(London: Oxford University Press, 1973).
10 The best recent argument for the coexistence
of two competing senses of citizenship is George Arm-
strong Kelly, "Who Needs a Theory of Citizenship,"
Daedelus 108: 4 (1979) 21-36. Also see the several
essays on citizenship in Michael Walzer, Obligations
:
Essays on Disobedience, War and Citizenship (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1970)
.
11 Robert Pranger, The Eclipse of Citizenship
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968).
12 Kelly (1979)
.
13 The distinction is from Charles Taylor,
"Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," Review of
Metaphysics XXV: 1 (1971) pp. 3-51.
I'* See Part III, "On the Logic of Legitimation
Problems," Jurgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Boston
Beacon Press, 1973).
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